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PREFACE
(An Introduction to Neutrosophy, Neutrosophic Logic, Neutrosophic
Set, and Neutrosophic Probability and Statistics)
Florentin Smarandache
Department of Mathematics
University of New Mexico
Gallup, NM 87301, USA

0.1 Introduction to Non-Standard Analysis.
In 1960s Abraham Robinson has developed the non-standard analysis, a formalization of
analysis and a branch of mathematical logic, that rigorously defines the infinitesimals.
Informally, an infinitesimal is an infinitely small number. Formally, x is said to be
infinitesimal if and only if for all positive integers n one has xxx < 1/n. Let &>0 be a such
infinitesimal number. The hyper-real number set is an extension of the real number set, which
includes classes of infinite numbers and classes of infinitesimal numbers. Let’s consider the
non-standard finite numbers 1+ = 1+&, where “1” is its standard part and “&” its non-standard
part, and –0 = 0-&, where “0” is its standard part and “&” its non-standard part.
Then, we call ]-0, 1+[ a non-standard unit interval. Obviously, 0 and 1, and analogously nonstandard numbers infinitely small but less than 0 or infinitely small but greater than 1, belong to
the non-standard unit interval. Actually, by “-a” one signifies a monad, i.e. a set of hyper-real
numbers in non-standard analysis:
.(-a)= {a-x: x%‘*, x is infinitesimal},
and similarly “b+” is a monad:
.(b+)= {b+x: x%‘*, x is infinitesimal}.
Generally, the left and right borders of a non-standard interval ]-0, 1+[ are vague, imprecise,
themselves being non-standard (sub)sets .(-a) and .(b+) as defined above.
Combining the two before mentioned definitions one gets, what we would call,
a binad of “-c+”:
.(-c+)= {c-x: x%‘*, x is infinitesimal} 4 {c+x: x%‘*, x is infinitesimal}, which is a collection of
open punctured neighborhoods (balls) of c.
Of course, –a < a and b+ > b. No order between –c+ and c.
-

Addition of non-standard finite numbers with themselves or with real numbers:

a + b = -(a + b)
a + b+ = (a + b)+
a + b+ = -(a + b)+
a + -b = -(a + b) (the left monads absorb themselves)
a+ + b+ = (a + b)+ (analogously, the right monads absorb themselves)
Similarly for subtraction, multiplication, division, roots, and powers of non-standard finite
numbers with themselves or with real numbers.
By extension let inf ]-0, 1+[ = -a and sup ]-0, 1+[ = b+.
0.2 Definition of Neutrosophic Components.
Let T, I, F be standard or non-standard real subsets of ]-0, 1+[,
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with
and

sup T = t_sup, inf T = t_inf,
sup I = i_sup, inf I = i_inf,
sup F = f_sup, inf F = f_inf,
n_sup = t_sup+i_sup+f_sup,
n_inf = t_inf+i_inf+f_inf.

The sets T, I, F are not necessarily intervals, but may be any real sub-unitary subsets:
discrete or continuous; single-element, finite, or (countably or uncountably) infinite; union
or intersection of various subsets; etc.
They may also overlap. The real subsets could represent the relative errors in determining t,
i, f (in the case when the subsets T, I, F are reduced to points).
Statically T, I, F are subsets.
But dynamically, looking therefore from another perspective, the components T, I, F are
at each instance dependant on many parameters, and therefore they can be considered
set-valued vector functions or even operators. The parameters can be: time, space, etc.
(some of them are hidden/unknown parameters): T(t, s, …), I(t, s, …), F(t, s, …), where
t=time, s=space, etc., that's why the neutrosophic logic can be used in quantum physics.
The Dynamic Neutrosophic Calculus can be used in psychology.
Neutrosophics try to reflect the dynamics of things and ideas.
See an example:
The proposition "Tomorrow it will be raining" does not mean a fixed-valued components
structure; this proposition may be say 40% true, 50% indeterminate, and 45% false at
time t1; but at time t2 may change at 50% true, 49% indeterminate, and 30% false
(according with new evidences, sources, etc.); and tomorrow at say time t145 the same
proposition may be 100%, 0% indeterminate, and 0% false (if tomorrow it will indeed
rain). This is the dynamics: the truth value changes from a time to another time.
In other examples:
In other examples: the truth value of a proposition may change from a place to another
place, for example: the proposition “It is raining” is 0% true, 0% indeterminate, and
100% false in Albuquerque (New Mexico), but moving to Las Cruces (New Mexico) the
truth value changes and it may be (1, 0, 0).
Also, the truth value depends/changes with respect to the observer (subjectivity is another
parameter of the functions/operators T, I, F). For example: “John is smart” can be (.35,
.67, .60) according to his boss, but (.80, .25, .10) according to himself, or (.50, .20, .30)
according to his secretary, etc.
In the this book T, I, F, called neutrosophic components, will represent the truth value,
indeterminacy value, and falsehood value respectively referring to neutrosophy,
neutrosophic logic, neutrosophic set, neutrosophic probability, neutrosophic statistics.
This representation is closer to the human mind reasoning. It characterizes/catches the
imprecision of knowledge or linguistic inexactitude received by various observers (that’s
why T, I, F are subsets - not necessarily single-elements), uncertainty due to incomplete
knowledge or acquisition errors or stochasticity (that’s why the subset I exists), and
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vagueness due to lack of clear contours or limits (that’s why T, I, F are subsets and I exists;
in particular for the appurtenance to the neutrosophic sets).
One has to specify the superior (x_sup) and inferior (x_inf) limits of the subsets because
in many problems arises the necessity to compute them.
0.3. Operations with Sets.
Let S1 and S2 be two (unidimensional) real standard or non-standard subsets, then one
defines:
Addition of Sets:
S1/S2 = {xxx=s1+s2, where s1cS1 and s2cS2},
with inf S1/S2 = inf S1 + inf S2, sup S1/S2 = sup S1 + sup S2;
and, as some particular cases, we have
{a}/S2 = {xxx=a+s2, where s2cS2}
with inf {a}/S2 = a + inf S2, sup {a}/S2 = a + sup S2.
Subtraction of Sets:
S10S2 = {xxx=s1-s2, where s1cS1 and s2cS2}.
For real positive subsets (most of the cases will fall in this range) one gets
inf S10S2 = inf S1 - sup S2, sup S10S2 = sup S1 - inf S2;
and, as some particular cases, we have
{a}0S2 = {xxx=a-s2, where s2cS2},
with inf {a}0S2 = a - sup S2, sup {a}0S2 = a - inf S2;
also {1+}0S2 = {xxx=1+-s2, where s2cS2},
with inf {1+}0S2 = 1+ - sup S2, sup {1+}0S2 = 100 - inf S2.
Multiplication of Sets:
S1?S2 = {xxx=s1$s2, where s1cS1 and s2cS2}.
For real positive subsets (most of the cases will fall in this range) one gets
inf S1?S2 = inf S1 $ inf S2, sup S1?S2 = sup S1 $ sup S2;
and, as some particular cases, we have
{a}?S2 = {xxx=a$s2, where s2cS2},
with inf {a}?S2 = a * inf S2, sup {a}?S2 = a $ sup S2;
also {1+}?S2 = {xxx=1$s2, where s2cS2},
with inf {1+}?S2 = 1+ $ inf S2, sup {1+}?S2 = 1+ $ sup S2.
Division of a Set by a Number:
Let k c‘*, then S12k = {xxx=s1/k, where s1cS1}.
1. NEUTROSOPHY:
1.1 Definition:
Neutrosophy is a new branch of philosophy that studies the origin, nature, and scope
of neutralities, as well as their interactions with different ideational spectra.
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It is the base of neutrosophic logic, a multiple value logic that generalizes the fuzzy logic
and deals with paradoxes, contradictions, antitheses, antinomies.
1.2 Characteristics of this mode of thinking:
- proposes new philosophical theses, principles, laws, methods, formulas, movements;
- reveals that world is full of indeterminacy;
- interprets the uninterpretable;
- regards, from many different angles, old concepts, systems:
showing that an idea, which is true in a given referential system, may be false in another
one, and vice versa;
- attempts to make peace in the war of ideas,
and to make war in the peaceful ideas;
- measures the stability of unstable systems,
and instability of stable systems.
Let's note by <A> an idea, or proposition, theory, event, concept, entity, by <Non-A>
what is not <A>, and by <Anti-A> the opposite of <A>. Also, <Neut-A> means what is
neither <A> nor <Anti-A>, i.e. neutrality in between the two extremes. And <A'> a
version of <A>.
<Non-A> is different from <Anti-A>.
1.3 Main Principle:
Between an idea <A> and its opposite <Anti-A>, there is a continuum-power spectrum of
neutralities <Neut-A>.
1.4 Fundamental Thesis of Neutrosophy:
Any idea <A> is T% true, I% indeterminate, and F% false, where T, I, F _ ] -0, 1+ [.
1.5 Main Laws of Neutrosophy:
Let <α> be an attribute, and (T, I, F) _ ] -0, 1+ [3. Then:
- There is a proposition <P> and a referential system {R}, such that <P> is T% <α>, I%
indeterminate or <Neut-α>, and F% <Anti-α>.
- For any proposition <P>, there is a referential system {R}, such that <P> is T% <α>, I%
indeterminate or <Neut-α>, and F% <Anti-α>.
- <α> is at some degree <Anti-α>, while <Anti-α> is at some degree <α>.
2. NEUTROSOPHIC LOGIC:
2.1 Introduction.
As an alternative to the existing logics we propose the Neutrosophic Logic to represent a
mathematical model of uncertainty, vagueness, ambiguity, imprecision, undefined, unknown,
incompleteness, inconsistency, redundancy, contradiction. It is a non-classical logic.
Eksioglu (1999) explains some of them:
“Imprecision of the human systems is due to the imperfection of knowledge that humain
receives (observation) from the external world. Imperfection leads to a doubt about the
value of a variable, a decision to be taken or a conclusion to be drawn for the actual
system. The sources of uncertainty can be stochasticity (the case of intrinsic imperfection
where a typical and single value does not exist), incomplete knowledge (ignorance of the
totality, limited view on a system because of its complexity) or the acquisition errors
(intrinsically imperfect observations, the quantitative errors in measures).”
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“Probability (called sometimes the objective probability) process uncertainty of random
type (stochastic) introduced by the chance. Uncertainty of the chance is clarified by the
time or by events' occurrence. The probability is thus connected to the frequency of the
events' occurrence.”
“The vagueness which constitutes another form of uncertainty is the character of those
which contours or limits lacking precision, clearness. […]
For certain objects, the fact to be in or out of a category is difficult to mention. Rather, it
is possible to express a partial or gradual membership.”
Indeterminacy means degrees of uncertainty, vagueness, imprecision, undefined, unknown,
inconsistency, redundancy.
A question would be to try, if possible, to get an axiomatic system for the neutrosophic logic.
Intuition is the base for any formalization, because the postulates and axioms derive from
intuition.
2.2 Definition:
A logic in which each proposition is estimated to have the percentage of truth in a subset T,
the percentage of indeterminacy in a subset I, and the percentage of falsity in a subset F, where
T, I, F are defined above, is called Neutrosophic Logic.
We use a subset of truth (or indeterminacy, or falsity), instead of a number only, because in
many cases we are not able to exactly determine the percentages of truth and of falsity but to
approximate them: for example a proposition is between 30-40% true and between 60-70%
false, even worst: between 30-40% or 45-50% true (according to various analyzers), and 60%
or between 66-70% false.
The subsets are not necessary intervals, but any sets (discrete, continuous, open or closed or
half-open/half-closed interval, intersections or unions of the previous sets, etc.) in accordance
with the given proposition.
A subset may have one element only in special cases of this logic.
Constants: (T, I, F) truth-values, where T, I, F are standard or non-standard subsets of the nonstandard interval ]-0, 1+[ , where ninf = inf T + inf I + inf F m -0, and nsup = sup T + sup I + sup F
[ 3+.
Atomic formulas: a, b, c, … .
Arbitrary formulas: A, B, C, … .
The neutrosophic logic is a formal frame trying to measure the truth, indeterminacy, and
falsehood.
My hypothesis is that no theory is exempted from paradoxes, because of the language
imprecision,
metaphoric
expression,
various
levels
or
meta-levels
of
understanding/interpretation which might overlap.
2.3 Definition of Neutrosophic Logical Connectives:
The connectives (rules of inference, or operators), in any non-bivalent logic, can be defined in
various ways, giving rise to lots of distinct logics. For example, in three-valued logic, where
three possible values are possible: true, false, or undecided, there are 3072 such logics!

9

(Weisstein, 1998) A single change in one of any connective’s truth table is enough to form a
(completely) different logic.
The rules are hypothetical or factual. How to choose them? The philosopher Van
Fraassen (1980) [see Shafer, 1986] commented that such rules may always be
controvertible “for it always involves the choice of one out of many possible but
nonactual worlds”. There are general rules of combination, and ad hoc rules.
For an applied logic to artificial intelligence, a better approach, the best way would be to define
the connectives recursively (Dubois, Prade), changing/adjusting the definitions after each step
in order to improve the next result. This might be comparable to approximating the limit of a
convergent sequence, calculating more and more terms, or by calculating the limit of a function
successively substituting the argument with values closer and closer to the critical point. The
recurrence allows evolution and self-improvement.
Or to use greedy algorithms, which are combinatorial algorithms that attempt at each iteration
as much improvement as possible unlike myopic algorithms that look at each iteration only at
very local information as with steepest descent method.
As in non-monotonic logic, we make assumptions, but we often err and must jump back, revise
our assumptions, and start again. We may add rules that don’t preserve monotonicity.
In bio-mathematics Heitkoetter and Beasley (1993-1999) present the evolutionary algorithms
which are used “to describe computer-based problem solving systems which employ
computational models of some of the known mechanisms of evolution as key elements in their
design and implementation”. They simulate, via processes of selection, mutation, and
reproduction, the evolution of individual structures. The major evolutionary algorithms studied
are: genetic algorithm (a model of machine learning based on genetic operators), evolutionary
programming (a stochastic optimization strategy based on linkage between parents and their
offspring; conceived by L. J. Fogel in 1960s), evolution strategy, classifier system, genetic
programming.
Pei Wang devised a Non-Axiomatic Reasoning System as an intelligent reasoning system,
where intelligence means working and adopting with insufficient knowledge and resources.
The inference mechanism (endowed with rules of transformation or rules of production) in
neutrosophy should be non-monotonic and should comprise ensembles of recursive rules, with
preferential rules and secondary ones (priority order), in order to design a good expert system.
One may add new rules and eliminate old ones proved unsatisfactory. There should be strict
rules, and rules with exceptions. Recursivity is seen as a computer program that learns from
itself. The statistical regression method may be employed as well to determine a best algorithm
of inference.
Non-monotonic reasoning means to make assumptions about things we don’t know. Heuristic
methods may be involved in order to find successive approximations.
In terms of the previous results, a default neutrosophic logic may be used instead of the normal
inference rules. The distribution of possible neutrosophic results serves as an orientating frame
for the new results. The flexible, continuously refined, rules obtain iterative and gradual
approaches of the result.
A comparison approach is employed to check the result (conclusion) p by studying the opposite
of this: what would happen if a non-p conclusion occurred? The inconsistence of information
shows up in the result, if not eliminated from the beginning. The data bases should be
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stratified. There exist methods to construct preferable coherent sub-bases within incoherent
bases. In Multi-Criteria Decision one exploits the complementarity of different criteria and the
complementarity of various sources.
For example, the Possibility Theory (Zadeh 1978, Dubois, Prade) gives a better approach than
the Fuzzy Set Theory (Yager) due to self-improving connectives. The Possibility Theory is
proximal to the Fuzzy Set Theory, the difference between these two theories is the way the
fusion operators are defined.
One uses the definitions of neutrosophic probability and neutrosophic set operations.
Similarly, there are many ways to construct such connectives according to each particular
problem to solve; here we present the easiest ones:
One notes the neutrosophic logical values of the propositions A1 and A2 by
NL(A1) = ( T1, I1, F1 ) and NL(A2) = ( T2, I2, F2 ).
For all neutrosophic logical values below: if, after calculations, one obtains numbers < 0 or > 1,
one replaces them by –0 or 1+ respectively.
2.3.1 Negation:
NL(ÕA1) = ( {1+}0T1, {1+}0I1, {1+}0F1 ).
2.3.2 Conjunction:
NL(A1 . A2) = ( T1?T2, I1?I2, F1?F2 ).
(And, in a similar way, generalized for n propositions.)
2.3.3 Weak or inclusive disjunction:
NL(A1 - A2) = ( T1/T20T1?T2, I1/I20I1?I2, F1/F20F1?F2 ).
(And, in a similar way, generalized for n propositions.)
2.3.4 Strong or exclusive disjunction:
NL(A1 I A2) =
( T1? ({1}0T2) /T2? ({1}0T1) 0T1?T2? ({1}0T1) ? ({1}0T2),
I1 ? ({1}0I2) /I2 ? ({1}0I1) 0I1 ? I2 ? ({1}0I1) ? ({1}0 I2),
F1? ({1}0F2) /F2? ({1}0 F1) 0F1? F2 ? ({1}0F1) ? ({1}0F2) ).
(And, in a similar way, generalized for n propositions.)
2.3.5 Material conditional (implication):
NL(A1 h A2) = ( {1+}0T1/T1?T2, {1+}0I1/I1?I2, {1+}0F1/F1?F2 ).
2.3.6 Material biconditional (equivalence):
NL(A1 f A2) = ( ({1+}0T1/T1?T2) ? ({1+}0T2/T1?T2),
({1+}0 I1/ I1? I2) ? ({1+}0I2/ I1 ? I2),
({1+}0F1/F1? F2) ? ({1+}0F2/F1? F2) ).
2.3.7 Sheffer's connector:
NL(A1 | A2) = NL(ÕA1 - ÕA2) = ( {1+}0T1?T2, {1+}0I1?I2, {1+}0F1?F2 ).
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2.3.8 Peirce's connector:
NL(A1oA2) = NL(ÕA1 . ÕA2) =
= ( ({1+}0T1) ? ({1+}0T2), ({1+}0I1) ? ({1+}0I2), ({1+}0F1) ? ({1+}0F2) ).
2.4 Generalizations:
When the sets are reduced to an element only respectively, then
t_sup = t_inf = t, i_sup = i_inf = i, f_sup = f_inf = f,
and n_sup = n_inf = n = t+i+f)
Hence, the neutrosophic logic generalizes:
- the intuitionistic logic, which supports incomplete theories (for 0 < n < 1 and i=0, 0 [ t, i, f
[ 1);
- the fuzzy logic (for n = 1 and i = 0, and 0 [ t, i, f [ 1);
from "CRC Concise Concise Encyclopedia of Mathematics", by Eric W. Weisstein, 1998, the
fuzzy logic is "an extension of two-valued logic such that statements need not to be True
or False, but may have a degree of truth between 0 and 1";
- the Boolean logic (for n = 1 and i = 0, with t, f either 0 or 1);
- the multi-valued logic (for 0 [ t, i, f [ 1);
definition of <many-valued logic> from "The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy", general
editor Robert Audi, 1995, p. 461: "propositions may take many values beyond simple truth
and falsity, values functionally determined by the values of their components";
Lukasiewicz considered three values (1, 1/2, 0). Post considered m values, etc. But they
varied in between 0 and 1 only. In the neutrosophic logic a proposition may take values
even greater than 1 (in percentage greater than 100%) or less than 0.
- the paraconsistent logic (for n > 1 and i = 0, with both t, f < 1);
- the dialetheism, which says that some contradictions are true (for t = f = 1 and i = 0; some
paradoxes can be denoted this way too);
- the faillibilism, which says that uncertainty belongs to every proposition (for i > 0);
- the paradoxist logic, based on paradoxes (i > 1);
- the pseudoparadoxist logic, based on pseudoparadoxes (0 < i < 1, t + f > 1);
- the tautologic logic, based on tautologies (i < 0, t > 1).
Compared with all other logics, the neutrosophic logic and intuitionistic fuzzy logic introduce
a percentage of "indeterminacy" - due to unexpected parameters hidden in some
propositions, or unknowness, or God’s will, but only neutrosophic logic let each
component t, i, f be even boiling over 1 (overflooded) or freezing under 0 (underdried): to
be able to make distinction between relative truth and absolute truth, and between relative
falsity and absolute falsity.
For example: in some tautologies t > 1, called "overtrue". Similarly, a proposition may be
"overindeterminate" (for i > 1, in some paradoxes), "overfalse" (for f > 1, in some
unconditionally false propositions); or "undertrue" (for t < 0, in some unconditionally
false propositions), "underindeterminate" (for i < 0, in some unconditionally true or false
propositions), "underfalse" (for f < 0, in some unconditionally true propositions).
This is because we should make a distinction between unconditionally true (t > 1, and f < 0 or
i < 0) and conditionally true propositions (t [ 1, and f [ 1 or i [ 1).
3 NEUTROSOPHIC SET:
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3.1 Definition:
Let T, I, F be real standard or non-standard subsets of ]-0, 1+[,
with
sup T = t_sup, inf T = t_inf,
sup I = i_sup, inf I = i_inf,
sup F = f_sup, inf F = f_inf,
and
n_sup = t_sup+i_sup+f_sup,
n_inf = t_inf+i_inf+f_inf.
Let U be a universe of discourse, and M a set included in U. An element x from U is noted
with respect to the set M as x(T, I, F) and belongs to M in the following way:
it is t% true in the set, i% indeterminate (unknown if it is) in the set, and f% false, where t
varies in T, i varies in I, f varies in F.
Statically T, I, F are subsets, but dynamically the components T, I, F are set-valued vector
functions/operators depending on many parameters, such as: time, space, etc. (some of them
are hidden parameters, i.e. unknown parameters).
3.2 General Examples:
Let A and B be two neutrosophic sets.
One can say, by language abuse, that any element neutrosophically belongs to any set, due to
the percentages of truth/indeterminacy/falsity involved, which varies between 0 and 1 or even
less than 0 or greater than 1.
Thus: x(50,20,30) belongs to A (which means, with a probability of 50% x is in A, with a
probability of 30% x is not in A, and the rest is undecidable); or y(0,0,100) belongs to A
(which normally means y is not for sure in A); or z(0,100,0) belongs to A (which means one
does know absolutely nothing about z's affiliation with A).
More general, x( (20-30), (40-45)4[50-51], {20,24,28} ) belongs to the set A, which means:
- with a probability in between 20-30% x is in A (one cannot find an exact approximate
because of various sources used);
- with a probability of 20% or 24% or 28% x is not in A;
- the indeterminacy related to the appurtenance of x to A is in between 40-45% or between 5051% (limits included);
The subsets representing the appurtenance, indeterminacy, and falsity may overlap, and n_sup
= 30+51+28 > 100 in this case.
3.3 Physics Examples:
a) For example the Schrodinger’s Cat Theory says that the quantum state of a photon can
basically be in more than one place in the same time, which translated to the neutrosophic set
means that an element (quantum state) belongs and does not belong to a set (one place) in the
same time; or an element (quantum state) belongs to two different sets (two different places) in
the same time. It is a question of “alternative worlds” theory very well represented by the
neutrosophic set theory.
In Schroedinger’s Equation on the behavior of electromagnetic waves and “matter waves” in
quantum theory, the wave function Psi that describes the superposition of possible states may
be simulated by a neutrosophic function, i.e. a function whose values are not unique for each
argument from the domain of definition (the vertical line test fails, intersecting the graph in
more points).
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Don’t we better describe, using the attribute “neutrosophic” than “fuzzy” or any others, a
quantum particle that neither exists nor non-exists?
b) How to describe a particle  in the infinite micro-universe that belongs to two distinct
places P1 and P2 in the same time?  c P1 and  v P1 as a true contradiction, or  c P1 and 
c ÕP1.
3.4 Philosophical Examples:
Or, how to calculate the truth-value of Zen (in Japanese) / Chan (in Chinese) doctrine
philosophical proposition: the present is eternal and comprises in itself the past and the future?
In Eastern Philosophy the contradictory utterances form the core of the Taoism and Zen/Chan
(which emerged from Buddhism and Taoism) doctrines.
How to judge the truth-value of a metaphor, or of an ambiguous statement, or of a social
phenomenon which is positive from a standpoint and negative from another standpoint?
There are many ways to construct them, in terms of the practical problem we need to simulate
or approach. Below there are mentioned the easiest ones:
3.5 Application:

A cloud is a neutrosophic set, because its borders are ambiguous, and each element (water
drop) belongs with a neutrosophic probability to the set (e.g. there are a kind of separated water
drops, around a compact mass of water drops, that we don't know how to consider them: in or
out of the cloud).
Also, we are not sure where the cloud ends nor where it begins, neither if some elements are or
are not in the set. That's why the percent of indeterminacy is required and the neutrosophic
probability (using subsets - not numbers - as components) should be used for better modeling:
it is a more organic, smooth, and especially accurate estimation. Indeterminacy is the zone of
ignorance of a proposition’s value, between truth and falsehood.
3.6 Neutrosophic Set Operations:
One notes, with respect to the sets A and B over the universe U,
x = x(T1, I1, F1) c A and x = x(T2, I2, F2) c B, by mentioning x’s neutrosophic membership
appurtenance.
And, similarly, y = y(T', I', F') c B.
For all neutrosophic set operations: if, after calculations, one obtains numbers < 0 or > 1, one
replaces them by –0 or 1+ respectively.
3.6.1 Complement of A:
If x( T1, I1, F1 ) c A,
then x( {1+}0T1, {1+}0I1, {1+}0F1 ) c C(A).
3.6.2 Intersection:
If x( T1, I1, F1 ) c A, x( T2, I2, F2 ) c B,
then x( T1?T2, I1?I2, F1?F2 ) c A 3 B.
3.6.3 Union:
If x( T1, I1, F1 ) c A, x( T2, I2, F2 ) c B,
then x( T1/T20T1?T2, I1/I20I1?I2, F1/F20F1?F2 ) c A 4 B.
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3.6.4 Difference:
If x( T1, I1, F1 ) c A, x( T2, I2, F2 ) c B,
then x( T10T1?T2, I10I1?I2, F10F1?F2 ) c A \ B,
because A \ B = A 3 C(B).
3.6.5 Cartesian Product:
If x( T1, I1, F1 ) c A, y( T', I', F' ) c B,
then ( x( T1, I1, F1 ), y( T', I', F' ) ) c A % B.
3.6.6 M is a subset of N:
If x( T1, I1, F1 ) c M u x( T2, I2, F2 ) c N,
where inf T1 [ inf T2, sup T1 [ sup T2, and inf F1 m inf F2, sup F1 m sup F2.
3.7 Generalizations and Comments:
From the intuitionistic logic, paraconsistent logic, dialetheism, faillibilism, paradoxes,
pseudoparadoxes, and tautologies we transfer the "adjectives" to the sets, i.e. to
intuitionistic set (set incompletely known), paraconsistent set, dialetheist set, faillibilist set
(each element has a percenatge of indeterminacy), paradoxist set (an element may belong
and may not belong in the same time to the set), pseudoparadoxist set, and tautologic set
respectively.
Hence, the neutrosophic set generalizes:
- the intuitionistic set, which supports incomplete set theories (for 0 < n < 1 and i = 0, 0 [ t, i,
f [ 1) and incomplete known elements belonging to a set;
- the fuzzy set (for n = 1 and i = 0, and 0 [ t, i, f [ 1);
- the classical set (for n = 1 and i = 0, with t, f either 0 or 1);
- the paraconsistent set (for n > 1 and i = 0, with both t, f < 1);
- the faillibilist set (i > 0);
- the dialetheist set, which says that the intersection of some disjoint sets is not empty (for t =
f = 1 and i = 0; some paradoxist sets can be denoted this way too);
- the paradoxist set (i > 1);
- the pseudoparadoxist set (0 < i < 1, t + f > 1);
- the tautological set (i < 0).
Compared with all other types of sets, in the neutrosophic set each element has three
components which are subsets (not numbers as in fuzzy set) and considers a subset,
similarly to intuitionistic fuzzy set, of "indeterminacy" - due to unexpected parameters
hidden in some sets, and let the superior limits of the components to even boil over 1
(overflooded) and the inferior limits of the components to even freeze under 0
(underdried).
For example: an element in some tautological sets may have t > 1, called "overincluded".
Similarly, an element in a set may be "overindeterminate" (for i > 1, in some paradoxist
sets), "overexcluded" (for f > 1, in some unconditionally false appurtenances); or
"undertrue" (for t < 0, in some unconditionally false appurtenances), "underindeterminate"
(for i < 0, in some unconditionally true or false appurtenances), "underfalse" (for f < 0, in
some unconditionally true appurtenances).
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This is because we should make a distinction between unconditionally true (t > 1, and f < 0 or
i < 0) and conditionally true appurtenances (t [ 1, and f [ 1 or i [ 1).
In a rough set RS, an element on its boundary-line cannot be classified neither as a member of
RS nor of its complement with certainty. In the neutrosophic set a such element may be
characterized by x(T, I, F), with corresponding set-values for T, I, F ` ]-0, 1+[.
4. NEUTROSOPHIC PROBABILITY:
4.1 Definition:
Let T, I, F be real standard or non-standard subsets included in ]-0, 1+[,
with sup T = t_sup, inf T = t_inf,
sup I = i_sup, inf I = i_inf,
sup F = f_sup, inf F = f_inf,
and n_sup = t_sup+i_sup+f_sup,
n_inf = t_inf+i_inf+f_inf.
The neutrosophic probability is a generalization of the classical probability and imprecise
probability in which the chance that an event A occurs is t% true - where t varies in the
subset T, i% indeterminate - where i varies in the subset I, and f% false - where f varies in
the subset F. Statically T, I, F are subsets, but dynamically the components T, I, F are setvalued vector functions/operators depending on many parameters, such as: time, space,
etc. (some of them are hidden parameters, i.e. unknown parameters).
In classical probability n_sup [ 1, while in neutrosophic probability n_sup [ 3+.
In imprecise probability: the probability of an event is a subset T _ [0, 1], not a number p c
[0, 1], what’s left is supposed to be the opposite, subset F (also from the unit interval [0, 1]);
there is no indeterminate subset I in imprecise probability.
One notes NP(A) = (T, I, F), a triple of sets.
4.2 Neutrosophic Probability Space:
The universal set, endowed with a neutrosophic probability defined for each of its subset,
forms a neutrosophic probability space.
Let A and B be two neutrosophic events, and NP(A) = (T1, I1, F1), NP(B) = (T2, I2, F2) their
neutrosophic probabilities. Then we define:
(T1, I1, F1) F (T2, I2, F2) = (T1/T2, I1/I2, F1/F2),
(T1, I1, F1) H (T2, I2, F2) = (T10T2, I10I2, F10F2),
(T1, I1, F1) E (T2, I2, F2) = (T1?T2, I1?I2, F1?F2).
NP(A3B) = NP(A) E NP(B);
NP(ÕA) = {1+} H NP(A), [this second axiom may be replaced, in specific applications,
with NP(ÕA) = (F1, I1,T1)];
NP(A4B) = NP(A) F NP(B) H NP(A) E NP(B).
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Neutrosophic probability is also a non-additive probability, like the classical probability, but
even for independent events, i.e. P(A4B) ! P(A)+P(B). We have equality only when A or B
are impossible events.
A probability-function P is called additive if P(A4B) = P(A)+P(B), sub-additive if P(A4B)
[ P(A)+P(B), and super-additive if P(A4B) m P(A)+P(B).
In the Dempster-Shafer Theory P(A) + P(ÕA) may be g 1, in neutrosophic probability almost
all the time P(A) + P(ÕA) g 1.
1. NP(impossible event) = (Timp, Iimp, Fimp),
where sup Timp [ 0, inf Fimp m 1; no restriction on Iimp.
NP(sure event) = (Tsur, Isur, Fsur),
where inf Tsur m 1, sup Fsur [ 0.
NP(totally indeterminate event) = (Tind, Iind, Find);
where inf Iind m 1; no restrictions on Tind or Find.
2. NP(A) c {(T, I, F), where T, I, F are real standard or non-standard subsets included in
]-0, 1+[ that may overlap}.
3. NP(A4B) = NP(A) F NP(B) H NP(A3B).
4. NP(A) = {1} H NP(ÕA).
4.3 Applications:
#1. From a pool of refugees, waiting in a political refugee camp in Turkey to get the American
visa, a% have the chance to be accepted - where a varies in the set A, r% to be rejected - where
r varies in the set R, and p% to be in pending (not yet decided) - where p varies in P.
Say, for example, that the chance of someone Popescu in the pool to emigrate to USA is
(between) 40-60% (considering different criteria of emigration one gets different percentages,
we have to take care of all of them), the chance of being rejected is 20-25% or 30-35%, and the
chance of being in pending is 10% or 20% or 30%. Then the neutrosophic probability that
Popescu emigrates to the Unites States is
NP(Popescu) = ( (40-60), (20-25)U(30-35), {10,20,30} ), closer to the life.
This is a better approach than the classical probability, where 40 [ P(Popescu) [ 60, because
from the pending chance - which will be converted to acceptance or rejection - Popescu might
get extra percentage in his will to emigration,
and also the superior limit of the subsets sum
60+35+30 > 100
and in other cases one may have the inferior sum < 0,
while in the classical fuzzy set theory the superior sum should be 100 and the inferior sum m 0.
In a similar way, we could say about the element Popescu that
Popescu( (40-60), (20-25)U(30-35), {10,20,30} ) belongs to the set of accepted refugees.
#2. The probability that candidate C will win an election is say 25-30% true (percent of people
voting for him), 35% false (percent of people voting against him), and 40% or 41%
indeterminate (percent of people not coming to the ballot box, or giving a blank vote - not
selecting anyone, or giving a negative vote - cutting all candidates on the list).
Dialectic and dualism don't work in this case anymore.
#3. Another example, the probability that tomorrow it will rain is say 50-54% true according to
meteorologists who have investigated the past years' weather, 30 or 34-35% false according to
today's very sunny and droughty summer, and 10 or 20% undecided (indeterminate).
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#4. The probability that Yankees will win tomorrow versus Cowboys is 60% true (according to
their confrontation's history giving Yankees' satisfaction), 30-32% false (supposing Cowboys
are actually up to the mark, while Yankees are declining), and 10 or 11 or 12% indeterminate
(left to the hazard: sickness of players, referee's mistakes, atmospheric conditions during the
game). These parameters act on players' psychology.
4.4 Remarks:
Neutrosophic probability are useful to those events which involve some degree of
indeterminacy (unknown) and more criteria of evaluation - as above. This kind of probability
is necessary because it provides a better approach than classical probability to uncertain events.
This probability uses a subset-approximation for the truth-value (like imprecise probability),
but also subset-approximations for indeterminacy- and falsity-values.
Also, it makes a distinction between “relative sure event”, event which is sure only in some
particular world(s): NP(rse) = 1, and “absolute sure event”, event which is sure in all possible
worlds: NP(ase) = 1+; similarly for “relative impossible event” / “absolute impossible event”,
and for “relative indeterminate event” / “absolute indeterminate event”.
In the case when the truth- and falsity-components are complementary, i.e. no
indeterminacy and their sum is 100, one falls to the classical probability. As, for example,
tossing dice or coins, or drawing cards from a well-shuffled deck, or drawing balls from an urn.
4.5 Generalizations:
An interesting particular case is for n = 1, with 0 [ t, i, f [ 1, which is closer to the classical
probability.
For n = 1 and i = 0, with 0 [ t, f [ 1, one obtains the classical probability.
If I disappear and F is ignored, while the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[ is transformed
into the classical unit interval [0, 1], one gets the imprecise probability.
From the intuitionistic logic, paraconsistent logic, dialetheism, faillibilism, paradoxism,
pseudoparadoxism, and tautologism we transfer the "adjectives" to probabilities, i.e. we
define the intuitionistic probability (when the probability space is incomplete),
paraconsistent probability, faillibilist probability, dialetheist probability, paradoxist
probability, pseudoparadoxist probability, and tautologic probability respectively.
Hence, the neutrosophic probability generalizes:
- the intuitionistic probability, which supports incomplete (not completely
known/determined) probability spaces (for 0 < n < 1 and i = 0, 0 [ t, f [ 1) or incomplete
events whose probability we need to calculate;
- the classical probability (for n = 1 and i = 0, and 0 [ t, f [ 1);
- the paraconsistent probability (for n > 1 and i = 0, with both t, f < 1);
- the dialetheist probability, which says that intersection of some disjoint probability spaces
is not empty (for t = f = 1 and i = 0; some paradoxist probabilities can be denoted this
way);
- the faillibilist probability (for i > 0);
- the pseudoparadoxism (for n_sup > 1 or n_inf < 0);
- the tautologism (for t_sup > 1).
Compared with all other types of classical probabilities, the neutrosophic probability
introduces a percentage of "indeterminacy" - due to unexpected parameters hidden in
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some probability spaces, and let each component t, i, f be even boiling over 1
(overflooded) or freezing under 0 (underdried).
For example: an element in some tautological probability space may have t > 1, called
"overprobable". Similarly, an element in some paradoxist probability space may be
"overindeterminate" (for i > 1), or "overunprobable" (for f > 1, in some unconditionally
false appurtenances); or "underprobable" (for t < 0, in some unconditionally false
appurtenances), "underindeterminate" (for i < 0, in some unconditionally true or false
appurtenances), "underunprobable" (for f < 0, in some unconditionally true
appurtenances).
This is because we should make a distinction between unconditionally true (t > 1, and f < 0 or
I < 0) and conditionally true appurtenances (t [ 1, and f [ 1 or I [ 1).
5 NEUTROSOPHIC STATISTICS:
Analysis of events, described by the neutrosophic probability, means neutrosophic statistics.
This is also a generalization of classical statistics.
In accordance with the development of neutrosophic probability the neutrosophic statistics
could be better studied. Here, above, it is only a definition in order to give scientists an
impulse for research.
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Combination of paradoxical sources of information
within the neutrosophic framework
Dr. Jean Dezert
Abstract - The recent emergence of Smarandache’s logic as foundations for a new general unifying theory for uncertain reasoning

is becoming both a new philosophical and mathematical research fie d and could modify deeply our perception and understanding
of our outer and inner worlds in coming years. The ability for neutrosophy to include all existing logics as special cases is undoubtedly appealing. Beside of all potential advantages of neutrosophy to handle antinomies and uncertainties, the current mathematical
neutrosophic logic, does not deal directly with the important problem of combination of evidences provided by different bodies of
evidence. This paper is the firs attempt to develop new foundations for the combination of sources of information in a very general
framework where information can be both uncertain and paradoxical. We develop a new rule of combination close to the ad-hoc
Dempster-Shafer rule of combination where both conjunctions and disjunctions of assertions are explicitly taking into account
in the fusion process. Through several simple examples, we show the effic ency of this new theory of plausible and paradoxical
reasoning to solve problems where the Dempster-Shafer theory usually fails. Finally a theoretical bridge between the neutrosophic
logic and our new theory is presented, in order to solve the delicate problem of the combination of neutrosophic evidences. The
neutrosophic logic seems to be an appealing general framework (prerequesite) for dealing with uncertain and paradoxical sources
of information through this new theory.
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1991 MSC: 03B99, 03E99, 60A99

1

Introduction

The processing of uncertain information has always been a hot topic of research since mainly the 18th century. Up
to middle of the 20th century, most theoretical advances have been devoted to the theory of probabilities through the
works of eminent mathematicians like J. Bernoulli (1713), A. De Moivre (1718), T. Bayes (1763), P. Laplace (1774), K.
Gauss (1823), S. Poisson (1837), I. Todhunter (1873), J. Bertrand (1889), E. Borel (1909), R. Fisher (1930), F. Ramsey
(1931), A. Kolmogorov (1933), H. Jeffreys (1939), R. Cox (1946), I. Good (1950), R. Carnap (1950), G. Polya (1954),
R. Jeffrey (1957), B. De Finetti (1958), M. Kendall (1963), L. Savage (1967),T. Fine (1973), E. Jaynes (1995) to name
just few of them. With the development of the computers, the last half of the 20th century has became very prolif c for
the development new original theories dealing with uncertainty and imprecise information. Mainly three major theories
are available now as alternative of the theory of probabilities for the automatic plausible reasoning in expert systems:
the fuzzy set theory developed by L. Zadeh in sixties (1965), the Shafer’s theory of evidence in seventies (1976) and
the theory of possibilities by D. Dubois and H. Prade in eighties (1985). Only recently a new general and original
theory, called neutrosophy, has been developed by F. Smarandache to unify all these existing theories in a common global
framework. This paper is focused on the development of a new theory of plausible and paradoxical reasoning within the
neutrosophical framework. After a brief presentation of probability and Dempster-Shafer theories in sections 2 and 3, we
propose the foundations for a new theory in section 4 and discuss about the justif cation of our new rule of combination of
uncertain and paradoxical sources of evidences. Several examples of our new inference will also been presented. In the
last section of this paper, we will show how our theory can serve as theoretical tool for the problem of the combination of
neutrosophical evidences.

2

The probability theory

Let  = fi ; i = 1; : : : ; ng be a f nite discrete set of exhaustive and exclusive hypotheses or outcomes of a random
experiment. The probability P (A) of A   has been def ned and interpreted differently (mainly through the geometrical
approach, the subjective approach and the frequency approach [35]) since the seventieth century. The frequency approach
P fAg is def ned as the ratio of the number of possible outcomes for event A to the total number of possible outcomes for
space . This is still now the easiest approach to introduce the notion of probability (chance) at a low mathematical level.
The foundations of the probability theory with a new interpretation as the logic of science can be found through the works
of E.T. Jaynes in [27, 25, 26].
 Dr. Jean Dezert is partially with Onera, 29 Av. Division Leclerc,92320 Châtillon, France. This personal research work is not supported by Onera
and does not ref ect the position or policy of Onera. Email: Jean.Dezert@onera.fr
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2.1

Axiomatic approach of the theory of probabilities

Within the frequency approach of probability, one implicitly assumes that each elementary element of  is equally probable. Hence the def nition of probabibility itself turns to fall actually in a vicious circle def nition. Moreover the principle
of suff cient reason (the hypothesis of equiprobable repartition for elementary components of  in case of no prior information), called also the principle of indifference, has been strongly critized especially for cases involving inf nitely many
possible outcomes because this can lead to confusing paradoxes. That is why, since the work of A. Kolmogorov in 1933,
the axiomatic of the probability theory based on -algebras and measure theory has been def nitely adopted. We remind
now the four axioms of modern theory of probability:
A1: (Nonnegativity)

0  P fAg  1

(1)

A2: (Unity) Any sure event (the sample space) has probability one

P fg = 1

(2)

A3: (Finite additivity) If A1; : : : ; An are disjoint events, then

P fA1 [ : : : [ An g = P fA1g + : : : + P fAng

(3)

A4: (countable additivity) If A1 ; A2; : : : are disjoint events

Pf

1
[

i=1

2.2

Ai g =

1
X
i=1

P fAig

(4)

Consequences of axioms and bayesian inference

From these axioms, all other probability laws (especially total probability theorem and Bayes’s rule) can be derived. In
particular,

P f;g = 0

and

P fAcg = 1 P fAg

(5)

A  B ) P fAg  P fB g

(6)

8A; B  ; P fA [ B g = P fAg + P fB g P fA \ B g

(7)

8A1 ; : : : ; An  ; P fA1 [ : : : [ Ang 

n
X
i=1

P fAig

(Boole’s inequality)

(8)

More precisely, in the general case, one has the Poincaré’s equality

P fA1 [ : : : [ An g =

+( 1)k

n
X
i=1

P fAig

X
i<j

P fAi \ Aj g + : : :

1 X P fAi \ : : : \ Ai g + : : : + (
1
k
i1 <:::<ik

\

1)n P f

i=1;n

Ai g

(9)

which can be also written under a more compact form as

P fA1 [ : : : [ An g =

X

\

( 1)jI j+1 P f Ai g

I f1;::: ;ng
I 6=;

i2I

(10)

6 0) is called the
The probability of an event A under the condition that event B has occured (with probability P fB g =
conditional (or a posteriori) probability of A given B and is def ned as
P fA j B g =
23

P fA \ B g
P fB g

(11)

A and B are said to be independent if P fA \ B g = P fAgP fB g or equivalently P fA j B g = P fAg and
P fB j Ag = P fB g.
Events

The probability of any event B can be recovered from any partition
A1 ; : : : ; An of sample space  by the total probability theorem

P fB g =
Since P fA j B gP fB g =
inference [4]

n
X
i=1

P fB j Ai gP fAig

(12)

P fA \ B g = P fB j AgP fAg, one gets the famous Baye’s formula, also called the Bayesian
P fA j B g =

2.3

(i.e. a set of exhaustive and disjoint events)

P fB j AgP fAg
P fB g

(13)

Bayesian rule of combination

Suppose now that M independent sources of information (bodies of evidence) B1 ; : : : ; BM provide M subjective probability functions P1f:g; : : : ; PM f:g over the same space , then the optimal bayesian fusion rule is obtained as follows
(see [13] for a more general and theoretical justif cation).

p1i

Q

m=1;M Pm
MQ
i=1;n i
m=1;M

P1;::: ;M fi g , [P1  : : :  PM ]fi g = P

M

p1

fi g
Pm fi g

(14)

where pi is the prior probability of i . This bayesian fusion rule of combination
is however
P
Q not def ned when the sources
are in full contradiction because in such case the normalization constant i=1;n p1i M m=1;M Pm fi g is zero. A source
Bj is said to be in full conf ict with a source Bk if, for all i , Pj fi gPk fi g = 0. When the fusion is possible and when
all the prior probabilities pi are unknown, one has then to use the principle of indifference by setting all pi = 1=n and the
bayesian rule of combination reduces to

P1;::: ;M fi g = [P1  : : :  PM ]fig = P

Q

Pm fi g
m=1;M Pm fi g

m=1;M

i=1;n

Q

(15)

The Bayesian inference (13) can be interpreted as a special case of bayesian rule of combination (15) between two sources
of information (prior and posterior information).

3

The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence

We present now the basis of the Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) or the Mathematical Theory of Evidence (MTE) [48, 11]
called also sometimes the theory of probable or evidential reasoning. The DST is usually considered as a generalization
of the bayesian theory of subjective probability [52] and offers a simple and direct representation of ignorance. The DST
has shown its compatibility with the classical probability theory, with boolean logic and has a feasible computational
complexity [46] for problems of small dimension. The DST is a powerful theoretical tool which can be applied for the
representation of incomplete knowledge, belief updating, and for combination of evidence [42, 17] through the DemspterShafer’s rule of combination presented in the following. The Dempster-Shafer model of representation and processing of
uncertainty has led to a huge number of practical applications in a wide range of domains (technical and medical diagnosis
under unreliable measuring devices, information retrieval, integration of knowledge from heterogeneous sources for object
identif cation and tracking, network reliability computation, multisensor image segmentation, autonomous navigation,
safety control in large plants, map construction and maintenance, just to mention a few).

3.1

Basic probability masses

Defin tion
Let  = fi ; i = 1; : : : ; ng be a f nite discrete set of exhaustive and exclusive elements (hypotheses) called elementary
elements.  has been called the frame of discernment of hypotheses or universe of discourse by G. Shafer. The cardinality
(number of elementary elements) of  is denoted jj. The power set P() of  which is the set of all subsets of  is
usually noted P() = 2 because its cardinality is exactly 2jj . Any element of 2 is then a composite event (disjunction)
of the frame of discernment. The DST starts by def ning a map associated to a body of evidence B (source of information),
called basic assignment probability (bpa) or information granule m(:) : 2 ! [0; 1] such that

m(;) = 0
24

(16)

X
A22

m(A) 

X

m(A) = 1

A

(17)

m(:) represents the strength of some evidence provided by the source of information under consideration. Condition (16)

ref ects the fact that no belief ought to be committed to ; and condition (17) ref ects the convention that one’s total belief
has measure one [48]. The quantity m(A) is called A’s basic probability number or sometimes A’s basic mass. m(A)
corresponds to the measure of the partial belief that is committed exactly to A (degree of truth supported exactly by A)
by the body of evidence B but not the total belief committed to A. All subsets A for which m(A) > 0 are called focal
elements of m. The set of all focal elements of m(:) is called the core K(m) of m. Note that m(A1 ) and m(A2 ) can both
be 0 even if m(A1 [ A2 ) 6= 0. Even more peculiar, note that A  B
m(A) < m(B ). Hence, the bpa m(:) is in general
different from a probability distribution p(:).

;

Example
Consider  = f1; 2 ; 3 g, then 2 = f;; 1; 2; 3 ; 1 [ 2 ; 1 [ 3 ; 2 [ 3 ; 1 [ 2 [ 3 g. An information granule m(:)
on this frame of discernment  could be def ned as

m(;) , 0
m(1 ) = 0:40
m(2 ) = 0:20
m(3 ) = 0:05

m(1 [ 2 [ 3 ) = 0:05
m(1 [ 2 ) = 0:10
m(2 [ 3 ) = 0:10
m(1 [ 3 ) = 0:10

In this particular example K(m) = f1 ; 2; 3 ; 1 [ 2 ; 1 [ 3 ; 2 [ 3 ; 1 [ 2 [ 3 g and note that 1
m(1 ) > m(1 [ 2 ).

3.2

 f1 [ 2 g with

Belief functions

To obtain the measure of the total belief committed to A 2 2 , one must add to m(A) the masses m(B ) for all proper
subsets B  A. G. Shafer has def ned the belief (credibility) function Bel(:) : 2 ! [0; 1] associated with bpa m(:) as
Bel(A) =

X

m(B )

BA

(18)

Bel(A) summarizes all our reasons to believe in A (i.e. the lower probability to believe in A). More generally, a belief
function Bel(:) can be characterized without reference to the information granule m(:) if Bel(:) satisf es the following
three conditions

8n > 0; 8A1; : : : ; An  ;

Bel() = 1

(19)

Bel(;) = 0

(20)

Bel(A1 [ : : : [ An ) 

X
I f1;::: ;ng
I 6=;

For any given belief function Bel(:), one can always associate an unique information granule
inverse of belief function [44], and def ned by [48]

8A  ;

m(A) =

X

\

( 1)jI j+1 Bel( Ai )
i2I

(21)

m(:), called the Möbius

( 1)jA Bj Bel(B )

BA

(22)

The vacuous belief function having Bel() = 1 but Bel(A) = 0 for all A 6=  describes the full ignorance on the frame
of discernment . The corresponding bpa mv (:) is such that mv () = 1 and mv (A) = 0 for all A 6= .
For any given belief function Bel(:) def ned on frame , the following inequality holds

8A; B  ;

max (0; Bel(A) + Bel(B )

1)  Bel(A \ B )  min(Bel(A); Bel(B ))

25

(23)

Bayesian belief functions
Any belief function satisfying Bel(;) = 0, Bel() = 1 and Bel(A [ B ) = Bel(A) + Bel(B ) whenever A; B   and
A \ B = ; is called a Bayesian belief function. In such case, relation (21) coincides exactly with (10) and a probability
function P (:) is only a particular Dempster-Shafer’s belief function. In this sense, the Dempster-Shafer theory can be
considered as a generalization of the probability theory.
If Bel(:) is a bayesian belief function, then all focal elements are only single points of P(). The basic probability
mass assignement m(:) commits a positive number m(i ) only to some elementary i 2  (possibly all i ) and zero to
all possible disjunctions of 1 ; : : : ; n . In other words there exists a bayesian bpa m(:) :  ! [0; 1] such that

X
i 2

3.3

m(i ) = 1

8A  ;

and

Bel(A) =

X
i 2A

m(i )

(24)

Plausibility functions

Since the degree of belief Bel(A) does not reveal to what extent one believes its negation Ac , Shafer has introduced the
degree of doubt of A as the total belief of Ac . The degree of doubt is less useful than the plausibility (credibility) Pl(A)
of A which measures the total probability mass that can move into A. Pl(A) can be interpreted as the upper probability of
A. More precisely Pl(A) is def ned by
Pl(A) , 1

Dou(A) = 1

Bel(Ac ) =

X

B

X

m(B )

BAc

m(B ) =

X

B\A6=;

m(B )

(25)

More generally, the dual of (21) implies

8n > 0; 8A1; : : : ; An  ;

Pl(A1 \ : : : \ An ) 

X

[

I f1;::: ;ng
I 6=;

( 1)jI j+1 Pl( Ai )
i2I

(26)

The direct comparison of (18) with (25) indicates that

8A  ;

Bel(A)  Pl(A)

(27)

For any given plausibility function Pl(:) def ned on frame , the following inequality holds

8A; B  ;

max(Pl(A); Pl(B ))

 Pl(A [ B )  min(1; Pl(A) + Pl(B ))

(28)

Let  be a given frame of discernment and m(:) a general bpa (neither a vacuous bpa, nor a bayesian bpa) provided by a
body of evidence, then it is always
P possible to build the following pignistic probability [63] (bayesian belief function) by
choosing 8i 2 ; P fig = Bji 2B jB1 j m(B ). In such case, one always has

8A  ;

Bel(A)

 [P (A) =

X

i 2A

P fi g] 

Pl(A)

(29)

Since Bel(A) summarizes all our reasons to believe in A and Pl(A) expresses how much we should believe in A if all
currently unknown were to support A, the true belief in A is somewhere in the interval [Bel(A); Pl(A)]. Now suppose
that the true value of a parameter under consideration is known with some uncertainty [Bel(A); Pl(A)]  [0; 1], then its
corresponding bpa m(A) can always be constructed by choosing

m(A) = Bel(A)
3.4

m(A [ Ac ) = Pl(A)

Bel(A)

m(Ac ) = 1

Pl(A)

(30)

The Dempster’s rule of combination

Glenn Shafer has proposed the ad-hoc Dempster’s rule of combination (orthogonal summation), symbolized by the operator , to combine two so-called distinct bodies of evidences B1 and B2 over the same frame of discernment . Let
Bel1 (:) and Bel2 (:) be two belief functions over the same frame of discernment  and m1 (:) and m2 (:) their corresponding bpa masses. The combined global belief function Bel(:) = Bel1(:)  Bel2(:) is obtained from the combination of the
information granules m1 (:) and m2 (:) as follows: m(;) = 0 and for any C 6= ; and C  ,

m(C ) , [m1  m2 ](C ) =

P
m (A)m2 (B )
PA\B=C 1
A\B6=;

m1 (A)m2 (B )
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=1

P
A\B=C m1 (A)m2 (B )
P
A\B=;

m1 (A)m2 (B )

(31)

P

The summation notation A\B=C must be interpreted as the sum over all A; B   such that A \ B = C (interpretation for other summation
P notations follows directly by analogy). The orthogonal
P sum m(:) is a proper basic probability
assignment if K , 1
m
(
A
)
m
(
B
)
=
6
0
.
If
K
=
0
,which
means
2
A\B=; 1
A\B=; m1 (A)m2 (B ) = 1 then orthogonal sum m(:) does not exist and the bodies of evidences B1 and B2 are said to be totally (f atly) contradictory or in full
contradiction. Such case arises whenever the cores of Bel1 (:) and Bel2 (:) are disjoint or equivalently when there exists
A   such that Bel1 (A) = 1 and Bel2(Ac ) = 1. The same problem of existence has already been pointed out previously
in the presentation of the optimal Bayesian fusion rule.
The quantity log1=K is called the weight of conf ict between the the bodies of evidences B1 and B2 . It is easy to show
that the Dempster’s rule of combination is commutative (m1  m2 = m2  m1 ) and associative ([m1  m2 ]  m3 =
m1  [m2  m3 ]). The vacuous belief function such that mv () = 1 and mv (A) = 0 for A 6=  is the identity element
for  binary operator, i.e. mv  m = m  mv  m. If Bel1 (:) and Bel2 (:) are two combinable belief functions and if
Bel1 (:) is Bayesian, then Bel1  Bel2 is a bayesian belief function.
This rule of combination, initially proposed by G. Shafer without a strong theoretical justif cation (it’s only an ‘’ad-hoc
justif cation”), has been criticized in the past decades by many disparagers of this theory. Nowadays, this rule of combination has however been fully justif ed by the axiomatic of the transferable belief model developed by Ph. Smets in
[59, 60, 61, 63]. We mention the fact that such theoretical justif cation had been already attempted by Cheng and Kashyap
in [7]. Discussions on justif cations and interpretations of the DST and the Dempster’s rule of combination can be found
in [16, 30, 31, 32, 42, 45, 68]. An interesting discussion on the justif cation of Dempster’s rule of combination from the
information entropy viewpoint based on the measurement projection and balance principles can be found in [66]. Connection of the DST with the Fuzzy Set Theory can be found in [5, 64]. The relationship between experimental observations
and the DST belief functions is currently a hot topic of research. Several models have been developed for f tting belief
functions with experimental data. A very recent detailed presentation and discussion on this problem can be found in [69].
We can see a very close similitude between the Dempster’s rule and the optimal bayesian fusion rule (15). Actually
these two rules coincides exactly when m1 (:) and m2 (:) become bayesian basic probability assignments and if we accept
the principle of indifference within the optimal Bayesian fusion rule.
The complexity of DS rule of combination is important in general with large frames of discernment since the computational burden of f nding all pairs A and B of subsets of  such that A \ B = C is o(2jj jC j  2jj jC j) which is a large
number. For example, if jj = 10 and jC j = 2, we will have o(216 ) = o(65536) tests to do to f nd fA \ B jA \ B = C g
A simple example of the Dempster’s rule of combination
Consider the simple frame of discernment  = fS (unny); R(ainy)g about the true nature of the weather at a given
location L for the next day and let consider two independent bodies of evidence B1 and B2 providing the following
weather forecasts at L

m1 (S ) = 0:80
m2 (S ) = 0:90

m1 (R) = 0:12
m2 (R) = 0:02

m1 (S [ R) = 0:08
m2 (S [ R) = 0:08

Applying Dempster’s rule of combination yields the following result

m(S ) = (m1  m2 )(S ) = (0:72 + 0:072 + 0:064)=(1 0:108 0:016)  0:9772
m(R) = (m1  m2 )(R) = (0:0024 + 0:0096 + 0:0016)=(1 0:108 0:016)  0:0155
m(S [ R) = (m1  m2 )(S [ R) = 0:0064=(1 0:108 0:016)  0:0073
Hence, in this example, the fusion of the two sources of evidence reinforces the belief that tomorrow will be a sunny day
at location L (assuming that both bodies of evidence are equally reliable).
Another simple but disturbing example
L. Zadeh has given the following example of a use of the Dempster’s rule which shows an unexpected result. Two
doctors examine a patient and agree that it suffers from either meningitis (M), concussion (C) or brain tumor (T). Thus
 = fM; C; T g. Assume that the doctors agree in their low expectation of a tumor, but disagree in likely cause and
provide the following diagnosis

m1 (M ) = 0:99
m2 (C ) = 0:99

m1 (T ) = 0:01
m2 (T ) = 0:01

If we now combine beliefs using Dempster’s rule of combination, one gets the unexpected f nal conclusion m(T ) =
0:0001
1 0:0099 0:0099 0:9801 = 1 which means that the patient suffers with certainty from brain tumor !!!.
This unexpected result arises from the fact that the two bodies of evidence (doctors) agree that patient does not suffer

[m1  m2 ](T ) =
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from tumor but are in almost full contradiction for the other causes of the disease. This very simple but practical example shows
the limitations of practical use of the DS theory for automated reasoning. Some care must always be taken about the degree of
conflict between sources before taking final decision from the result of the Dempster’s rule of combination. A justification of non
effectiveness of the Dempster’s rule in such kind of example based on an information entropy argument has already been
presented in [66].
Conditional Belief functions
Let mB(A) = 1 if B ⊆ A and mB(A) =0 for if B ⊄ A (the subset B is the only focal element of BelB and its basic probability number
is one). Then BelB is a belief function that focuses all of the belief on B (note that BelB is not in general a Bayesian belief
function unless B=1). If we now consider another belief function Bel over Θ combinable with BelB, then the orthogonal sum
of Bel with BelB denoted as Bel(.B) =Bel ⊕ BelB is defined for all A ⊂ Θ by [48]

Bel (A B ) =
and

(

Bel (A B ) =

(32)

Pl (A ∩ B )
Pl (B )

(33)

Bel (A ∩ B )
= Pl (A B )
Bel (B )

(34)

Pl (A B ) =
If Bel is a Bayesian belief function, then

) ( )
( )

Bel A ∪ B c − Bel B c
1 − Bel B c

which coincides exactly with the classical conditional probability P(AB) defined in (11).

4 A new theory for plausible and paradoxical reasoning [DSmT]*
4.1 Introduction
As seen in the previous Zadeh’s troubling example, the use of the DST must be done only with extreme caution if one has to take
a final and important decision with the result of the Dempter’s rule of combination. In most (if not all) of practical applications
based on the DST, some ad-hoc or heuristic recipes are added to the fusion process to correctly manage or reduce the possibility
of high degree of conflict between sources. Otherwise, the fusion results lead to unreliable/dangerous conclusion or cannot
provide a result at all when the degree of conflict becomes high. Even if the DST provides fruitful results in many applications
(mainly in artificial intelligence and systems expert areas) in past decades, we argue that this theory is still too limited because it
is based on the following very restrictive constraints :
C1- The DST considers a discrete and finite frame of discernment based on a set of exhaustive and exclusive elementary
elements.
C2- The bodies of evidence are assumed independent (each source of information does not take into account the knowledge of
other sources) and provide a belief function on the power set 2Θ.
These two constraints are very strong in many practical problems involving uncertain and probable reasoning and dealing with
fusion of uncertain and imprecise information. A discussion about this important remark had already been discussed earlier in
[33, 34, 47]. In [47], the author proposed a new partitioning management technique to overcome mainly the C2 constraint. The
first constraint is very severe actually since it does not allow paradoxes on elements of the frame of discernment Θ. The DST
accepts as foundation the commonly adopted principle of the third exclude. Even if at first glance, it makes sense in the
traditional classical thought, we can develop a new theory that does not accept the principle of the third exclude and accepts and
deals with paradoxes. This is the main purpose of this paper.
The constraint C1 assumes that each elementary hypothesis of the frame of discernment Θ is finely and precisely well defined
and we are able to discriminate between all elementary hypotheses without ambiguity and difficulty. We argue that this
constraint is too limited and that it is not always possible in practice to model a frame of discernment satisfying C1 even for some
very simple problems where each elementary hypothesis corresponds to a fuzzy concept or attribute. In such cases, the
elementary elements of the ”frame of discernment” cannot be precisely separated without ambiguity such that no refinement of
the frame of discernment satisfying the first constraint is possible. As a simple example, consider an armed robbery situation
having a witness and the frame of discernment (associated to the possible size of the thief) having only two elementary imprecise
classes Θ ={θ1= small, θ2 = tall}. An investigator asks the witness about the size of the thief and the witness declares that the
thief was tall with bpa number m(θ1) = 0.80, small with bpa number
* This has been called Dezert-Smarandache Theory for Plausible and Paradoxical Reasoning [ref.].
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m(2 ) = 0:15 and is uncertain (either tall or small) with m(1 [ 2 ) = 0:05. The investigator will have to deal only with
this information although the smallness and the tallness have not been precisely def ned. The use of this testimony by the
investigator (having in other side extra-information about the thief from other sources of information) to infer on the true
size of the thief is delicate especially with the important missing information about the size of the witness (who could be
either a basketball player, a dwarf or most probably has a size on the average as you and me - assuming you are neither a
dwarf or a basketball player. These both hypotheses are not incompatible actually since some dwarfs really enjoy to play
basketball).
In many situations, we argue that the frame of discernment  can only be described in terms of imprecise elements
which cannot be clearly separated and which cannot be considered as fully disjoint and that the ref nement of initial frame
into a new one satisfying C1 is like a graal quest and cannot be accomplished. Our last remark about C1 constraint
concerns the universal nature of the frame of discernment. As shown in our previous simple example, it is clear that, in
general, the ”same” frame of discernment is interpreted differently by the bodies of evidence. Some subjectivity, or at
least some fortuitious biases, on the information provided by a source of information is almost unavoidable, otherwise
this would assume (as foundation for the DST) that all bodies of evidence have an objective/universal (possibly uncertain)
interpretation or measure of the phenomena under consideration. This vision seems to be too excessive because usually
independent bodies of evidence provide their beliefs about some hypotheses only with respect to their own worlds of
knowledge and experience. We don’t go deeper here in the techniques of ref nements and coarsenings of compatible
frame of discernments which is a prerequesite to the Dempster’s rule of combination. This has already been presented in
details in chapter 6 of [48]. We just want to emphaze here that these nice appealing techniques cannot be used at all in all
cases where C1 cannot be satisf ed and we have more generally to accept the idea to deal with paradoxical information.
To convince the reader to accept our radical new way of thought, just think about the true nature of a photon? For experts
working in particle physics, photons look like particles, for physicists working in electromagnetic f eld theory, photons
are considered as electromagnetic waves. Both interpretations are true, there is no unicity on the true nature of the photon
and actually a photon holds both aspects which appears as a paradoxe for most of human minds. This notion has been
accepted in modern physics only with great diff culty and many vigourous discussions about this fondamental question
have held at the beginning of the 20th century between all eminent physicists at that time.
The constraint C2 hides a strong diff culty already discussed in the previous paragraph. In order to apply the Dempter’s
rule of combination of two independent bodies of evidence B1 and B2 ), it is necessary that both frames of discernment
1 and 2 (related to each source B1 and B2 ) have to be compatible and to correspond to the same ”universal vision” of
the possibilities of the answer of the question under consideration. This constraint is itself very diff cult to satisfy actually
since each source of information has usually only a personal (and maybe biaised) interpretation of elements of frame of
discernment. The belief provided by each local source of information mainly depends on the own knowledge frame of
the source without reference to the (inaccessible) absolute truth of the space of possibilities. Therefore, C2 is in many
cases also a too strong hypothesis to accept for foundations of a general theory of probable and paradoxical reasoning. A
general theory should include the possibility to deal with evidences arising from different sources of information which
have no access to absolute interpretation of the elements of the frame of discernment  under consideration. This yields to
accept paradoxical information as basis for a new general theory of probable reasoning. Actually we will show in the f rst
example on section 4.3 that paradoxical information resulting of fusion of several bodies of evidence is very informative
and can be used to help us to take legitimous f nal decision.
In other words, this new theory can be interpreted as a general and direct extension of probability theory and the
Dempster-Shafer theory in the following sense. Let  = f1 ; 2 g be the simpliest frame of discernment involving only
two elementary hypotheses (with no more additional assumptions on 1 and 2 ), then



the probability theory deals with basic assignment masses m(:) 2 [0; 1] such that



the Dempster-Shafer theory extends the probability theory by dealing with basic assignment masses
such that



m(1 ) + m(2 ) = 1

m(:) 2 [0; 1]

m(1 ) + m(2 ) + m(1 [ 2 ) = 1

our general theory extends the two previous theories by accepting the possibility of paradoxical information and
deals with new basic assignment masses m(:) 2 [0; 1] such that

m(1 ) + m(2 ) + m(1 [ 2 ) + m(1 \ 2 ) = 1

4.2
4.2.1

Hyper-power set and general basic probability assignment m(:)
Hyper-power set def nition

Let  = f1 ; : : : ; ng be a set of n elementary elements considered as exhaustive which cannot be precisely def ned
and separated so that no ref nement of  in a new larger set ref of disjoint elementary hypotheses is possible and let’s
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consider the classical set operators [ (disjunction) and \ (conjunction). The exhaustive hypothesis about  is not a strong
constraint since when i ; i = 1; n does not constitute an exhaustive set of elementary possibilities, we can always add an
extra element 0 such that i ; i = 0; n describes now an exhaustive set. We will assume therefore, from now on and in the
following, that  characterizes an exhaustive frame of discernment.  will be called a general frame of discernment in
the sequel to emphaze the fact that  does not satisfy the Dempster-Shafer C1 constraint.
The classical power set P() = 2 has been def ned as the set of all proper subsets of  when all elements i are disjoint.
We extend here this notion and def ne now the ”hyper-power” set D as the set of all composite possibilities build from 
with [ and \ operators such that 8A 2 D ; B 2 D ; (A [ B ) 2 D and (A \ B ) 2 D . Obviously, one would always
have D  2ref if the ref ned power set 2ref could be def ned and accessible which is unfortunately not possible in
n
general as already argued. The cardinality of hyper-power set D is majored by 22 when Card() =j  j= n. The
generation of hyper-power set D corresponds to the famous Dedekind’s problem on enumerating the set of monotone
Boolean functions (i.e., functions expressible using only AND and OR set operators) [10]. This problem is also related
with the Sperner systems [65, 37] based on f nite poset (called also as antichains in literature) [8]. The number of
antichains on the n-set  are equal to the number of monotonic increasing Boolean functions of n variables, and also the
number of free distributive lattices with n generators [18, 20, 28, 29, 38, 54]. Determining these numbers is exactly the
Dedekind’s problem. The choice of letter D in our notation D to represent the hyper-power set of  is in honour of
the great mathematician R. Dedekind. The general solution of the Dedekind’s problem (for n > 10) has not been found
yet. We just know that the cardinality numbers of D follow the integers of the Dedekind’s sequence minus one when
Card() = n increases.
Examples
1. If we consider  = fg (empty set) then D
2.
3.
4.

= f;g and j D j= 1
If we consider  = f1 g then D = f;; 1g and j D j= 2
If we consider  = f1 ; 2 g then D = f;; 1; 2 ; 1 [ 2 ; 1 \ 2 g and j D j= 5
If we consider  = f1 ; 2 ; 3g then
D = f;; 1; 2 ; 3; 1 [ 2 ; 1 [ 3 ; 2 [ 3 ; 1 \ 2 ; 1 \ 3 ; 2 \ 3 ; 1 [ 2 [ 3 ; 1 \ 2 \ 3 ;
(1 [ 2 ) \ 3 ; (1 [ 3 ) \ 2 ; (2 [ 3 ) \ 1 ; (1 \ 2 ) [ 3 ; (1 \ 3 ) [ 2 ; (2 \ 3 ) [ 1 ;
(1 [ 2 ) \ (1 [ 3 ) \ (2 [ 3 )g
and j D

j= 19

It is not diff cult, although tedious, to check that 8A 2 D ; B 2 D ; (A [ B ) 2 D and (A \ B ) 2 D . The
extension to larger frame of discernment is possible but requires a higher computational burden. The general and
direct analytic computation of j D j for a n-set  with n > 10 is not known and is still under investigations
in the mathematical community. Cardinality numbers j D j follow the Dedekind’s sequence (minus one), i.e.
1; 2; 5; 19; 167; 7580; 7828353; : : : when Card() = n = 0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; : : : .

4.3
4.3.1

General basic assignment numbers
Def nition

Let  be a general frame of discernment of the problem under consideration. We def ne a map
associated to a given body of evidence B which can support paradoxical information, as follows

m(;) = 0
X
A2D

m(:) : D ! [0; 1]
(35)

m(A) = 1

(36)

The quantity m(A) is called A’s general basic probability number. As in the DST, all subsets A 2 D for which
m(A) > 0 are called focal elements of m(:) and the set of all focal elements of m(:) is also called the core K(m) of m.
The belief and plausibility functions are def ned in the same way as in the DST, i.e.
Bel(A) =

X
B2D ;BA
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m(B )

(37)

Pl(A) =

X
B2D ;B\A6=;

m(B )

(38)

Note that, we don’t def ne here explicitly the complementary Ac of a proposition A since m(Ac ) cannot be precisely
evaluated from [ and \ operators on D since we include the possibility to deal with a complete paradoxical source of
information such that 8A 2 D ; 8B 2 D ; m(A \ B ) > 0. These def nitions are compatible with the DST def nitions
when the sources of information become uncertain but rational (they do not support paradoxical information). We still
have 8A 2 D ; Bel(A)  Pl(A).
4.3.2

Construction of pignistic probabilities from general basic assignment numbers

The construction of a pignistic probability measure from the general basic numbers m(:) over
possible and is given by the general expression of the form

8i = 1; : : : ; n

P fig =

X
A2D

i

(A)m(A)

D with jj = n is still
(39)

where i (A) 2 [0; 1] are weighting coeff cients which depend on the inclusion or non-inclusion of i with respect to
proposition A. No general analytic expression for i (A) has been derived yet even if i (A) can be obtained explicitely
for simple examples. When general bpa m(:) reduces to classical bpa (i.e. the DS bpa without paradoxe), then i (A) =
1
jAj if i  A and therefore one gets

8i = 1; : : : ; n

P fi g =

1 m(A)
j
A
j
Aji 2A
X

(40)

We present now two examples of pignistic probabilities reconstruction from a general and non degenerated bpa m(:) (i.e.
A 2 D with A 6= ; such that m(A) = 0) over D .

@



Example 1 : If  = f1 ; 2 g then

1
1
2
2
1
1
P f2 g = m(2 ) + m(1 [ 2 ) + m(1 \ 2 )
2
2
P f1 g = m(1 ) + m(1 [ 2 ) + m(1 \ 2 )



Example 2 : If  = f1 ; 2 ; 3g then

1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
+ 13 m(1 [ 2 [ 3 ) + 31 m(1 \ 2 \ 3 )
+ 1=2 +3 1=3 m((1 [ 2 ) \ 3 ) + 1=2 +3 1=3 m((1 [ 3 ) \ 2 ) + 1=2 + 1=32 + 1=3 m((2 [ 3 ) \ 1 )
+ 1=2 + 1=52 + 1=3 m((1 \ 2 ) [ 3 ) + 1=2 + 15=2 + 1=3 m((1 \ 3 ) [ 2 )
+ 1 + 1=2 +51=2 + 1=3 m((2 \ 3 ) [ 1 ) + 1=2 + 1=42 + 1=3 m((1 [ 2 ) \ (1 [ 2 ) \ (2 [ 3 ))

P f1 g =m(1 ) + m(1 [ 2 ) + m(1 [ 3 ) + m(1 \ 2 ) + m(1 \ 3 )

1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
+ 13 m(1 [ 2 [ 3 ) + 31 m(1 \ 2 \ 3 )
+ 1=2 +3 1=3 m((1 [ 2 ) \ 3 ) + 1=2 + 1=32 + 1=3 m((1 [ 3 ) \ 2 ) + 1=2 +3 1=3 m((2 [ 3 ) \ 1 )
+ 1=2 + 1=52 + 1=3 m((1 \ 2 ) [ 3 ) + 1 + 1=2 +51=2 + 1=3 m((1 \ 3 ) [ 2 )
+ 1=2 + 1=52 + 1=3 m((2 \ 3 ) [ 1 ) + 1=2 + 14=2 + 1=3 m((1 [ 2 ) \ (1 [ 2 ) \ (2 [ 3 ))

P f2 g =m(2 ) + m(1 [ 2 ) + m(2 [ 3 ) + m(1 \ 2 ) + m(2 \ 3 )
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1
1
1
1
m(θ 1 ∪ θ 3 ) + m(θ 2 ∪ θ 3 ) + m(θ 1 ∩ θ 3 ) + m(θ 2 ∩ θ 3 )
2
2
2
2
1
1
+ m(θ 1 ∪ θ 2 ∪ θ 3 ) + m(θ 1 ∪ θ 2 ∪ θ 3 )
3
3
1 2 +1 2 +1 3
1 2 +1 3
1 2 +1 3
+
m(θ 1 ∪ θ 2 ∪ θ 3 ) +
m(θ 1 ∪ θ 3 ∪ θ 2 ) +
m(θ 2 ∪ θ 3 ∪ θ 1 )
3
3
3
1+1 2 +1 2 +1 3
1 2 +1 2 +1 3
+
m((θ 1 ∩ θ 2 ) ∪ θ 3 ) +
m((θ 1 ∩ θ 3 ) ∪ θ 2 )
5
5
1 2 +1 2 +1 3
1 2 +1 2 +1 3
+
m(θ 2 ∪ θ 3 ) ∪ θ 1 +
m((θ 1 ∪ θ 2 ) ∩ (θ 1 ∪ θ 2 ) ∩ (θ 2 ∪ θ 3 ))
5
4

P{θ 3 } = m(θ 3 ) +

The evaluation of weighting coefficients αθi(A) has been obtained from the geometrical interpretation of the relative contribution
of the distinct parts of A with proposition θi under consideration. For example, consider A = (θ1∩θ2)∪θ3 which corresponds to
the area a1∪a2∪a3∪a4∪a5 on the following Venn diagram.

Figure 1: Representation of A = (θ1∩θ2)∪θ3 ≡ a1 ∪ a2 ∪ a3 ∪ a4 ∪ a5
a1 which is shared only by θ3 will contribute to θ3 with weight 1; a2 which is shared by θ1 and θ3 will contribute to θ3 with weight
1/2; a3 which is not shared by θ3 will contribute to θ3 with weight 0; a4 which is shared by θ2 and θ3 will contribute to θ3 with
weight 1/2; a5 which is shared by both θ1, θ2 and θ3 will contribute to θ3 with weight 1/3. Since moreover, one must have
∀A∈DΘ with m(A)≠0,
given by

αθ 3 (A) =

m(A) ≠ 0, ∑i =1αθ i (A)m(A) = m(A), it is necessary to normalize αθi(A).
n

Therefore αθi(A) is

1+1 2 +1 2 +1 3
1 2 +1 2 +1 3
1 2 +1 2 +1 3
and similarly αθ 2 (A) =
, αθ 1 (A) =
5
5
5

All αθi(A), ∀A∈DΘ entering in derivation of P{θi} can be obtained using similar process.

4.4 General rule of combination of paradoxical sources of evidence*
4.4.1 The rule of combination
Let’s consider now two distinct (but potentially paradoxical) bodies of evidences B1 and B2 over the same frame of discernment θ
with belief functions Bel1(.) and Bel2(.) associated with information granules m1(.) and m2(.). The combined global belief
function Bel(.) =Bel1(.) ⊕ Bel2(.) is obtained through the combination of the granules m1(.) and m2(.) by the simple rule

∀CεD θ , m(C )∆[m1 ⊕ m2 ](C ) =

∑ m (A)m (B )

1
A, BεDθ , A∩ B =C

2

(41)

Since DΘ is closed under ∪ and ∩ operators, this new rule of combination guarantees that m(.) : DΘ → [0, 1] is a proper general
information granule satisfying (35) and (36). The global belief function Bel(.) is then obtained from the granule m(.) through
(37). This rule of combination is commutative and associative and can always be used for fusion of paradoxical and/or rational
sources of information (bodies of evidence). Obviously, the decision process will have to be made with more caution to take
final decision based on the general granule m() when internal paradoxical conflicts arise.
It is important to note that any fusion of sources of information generates either uncertainties, paradoxes or in general both. This
is intrinsic to the general fusion process itself. For instance, let’s consider the frame of discernment Θ = {θ1, θ2}and the
following very simple examples:
*This has been called Dezert-Smarandache Rule of Combination of Paradoxical Sources of Evidence [ref.].
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If we consider the two rational information granules

then



m1 (1 [ 2 ) = 0

m1 (1 \ 2 ) = 0

m2 (1 ) = 0:90

m2 (2 ) = 0:10

m2 (1 [ 2 ) = 0

m2 (1 \ 2 ) = 0

m(1 ) = 0:72

m(2 ) = 0:02

m(1 [ 2 ) = 0

m(1 \ 2 ) = 0:26

m1 (1 ) = 0:80

m1 (2 ) = 0:15

m1 (1 [ 2 ) = 0:05

m1 (1 \ 2 ) = 0

m2 (1 ) = 0:90

m2 (2 ) = 0:05

m2 (1 [ 2 ) = 0:05

m2 (1 \ 2 ) = 0

m(1 ) = 0:805

m(2 ) = 0:0175

m(1 [ 2 ) = 0:0025

m(1 \ 2 ) = 0:175

If we consider the two paradoxical information granules

then



m1 (2 ) = 0:20

If we consider the two uncertain information granules

then



m1 (1 ) = 0:80

m1 (1 ) = 0:80

m1 (2 ) = 0:15

m1 (1 [ 2 ) = 0

m1 (1 \ 2 ) = 0:05

m2 (1 ) = 0:90

m2 (2 ) = 0:05

m2 (1 [ 2 ) = 0

m2 (1 \ 2 ) = 0:05

m(1 ) = 0:72

m(2 ) = 0:0075

m(1 [ 2 ) = 0

m(1 \ 2 ) = 0:2725

If we consider the two uncertain and paradoxical information granules

then

m1 (1 ) = 0:80

m1 (2 ) = 0:10

m1 (1 [ 2 ) = 0:05

m1 (1 \ 2 ) = 0:05

m2 (1 ) = 0:90

m2 (2 ) = 0:05

m2 (1 [ 2 ) = 0:03

m2 (1 \ 2 ) = 0:02

m(2 ) = 0:0105

m(1 [ 2 ) = 0:0015

m(1 ) = 0:789

m(1 \ 2 ) = 0:199

Note that this
Pgeneral fusion rule can also be used with intuitionist logic in which the sum of bpa is allowed to be
less than
one
(
m(A) < 1) and with the paraconsistent logic in which the sum of bpa is
P
Pallowed to be greater than
one ( m(A) > 1) as well. In such cases, the fusion result does not provide in general
m(A) = 1. By example,
let’s consider the fusion of the paraconsistent source B1 with m1 (1 ) = 0:60, m1 (2 ) = 0:30, m1 (1 [ 2 ) = 0:20,
m1 (1 \ 2 ) = 0:10 with the intuitionist source B2 with m2 (1 ) = 0:50, m2 (2 ) = 0:20, m2 (1 [ 2 ) = 0:10,
m2 (1 \ 2 ) = 0:10. In such case, the fusion result of these two sources of information yields the following global
paraconsistent bpa m(:)

m(1 ) = 0:46

m(2 ) = 0:13

m(1 [ 2 ) = 0:02

m(1 \ 2 ) = 0:47

)

X

m = 1:08 > 1

In practice, for the sake of fair comparison between several alternatives or choices, it is better and simplier to deal with
normalized bpa to take a f nal important decision for the problem under consideration. A nice property of the new rule of
combination of non-normalized bpa is its invariance to the pre- or post-normalization process as we will show right now.
In the previous example, the post-normalization of bpa m(:) will yield the new bpa m0 (:)

0:13  0:12 m0 ( [  ) = 0:02  0:019 m0 ( \  ) = 0:47  0:435
1 2
1 2
1:08
1:08
1:08
The fusion of pre-normalization of bpa m1 (:) and m2 (:) will yield the same normalized bpa m0 (:) since
0:6 = 0:50 m0 ( ) = 0:3 = 0:25 m0 ( [  ) = 0:2  0:17 m0 ( \  ) = 0:1  0:08
m01 (1 ) =
1 2
1 1 2
1 1 2
1:2
1:2
1:2
1:2
0:5  0:56 m0 ( ) = 0:2  0:22 m0 ( [  ) = 0:1  0:11 m0 ( \  ) = 0:1  0:11
m02 (1 ) =
2 2
2 1 2
2 1 2
0:9
0:9
0:9
0:9
m0 (1 )  0:426
m0 (2 )  0:12
m0 (1 [ 2 )  0:019
m0 (1 \ 2 )  0:435
m0 (1 ) =

0:46  0:426
1:08

m0 (2 ) =

It is easy to verify from the general fusion table that the pre or post normalization step yields always
P the same global
normalized bpa even for the general case (when jj = n) P
because the post-normalization
constant
m(A) is always
P
equal to the product of the two pre-normalization constants m1 (A) and m2 (A).
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4.4.2

Justifi ation of the new rule of combination from information entropy

Let’s consider two bodies of evidence B1 and B2 characterized respectively by their bpa m1 (:),m2 (:) and their cores
K1 = K(m1), K2 = K(m2). Following Sun’s notation [66], each source of information will be denoted





"





"

K1 =
B1 = m
1
K2 =
B2 = m
2

f1(1)
f2(1)
:::
fk(1)
(1)
(1)
m1 (f1 ) m1 (f2 ) : : : m1 (fk(1) )
f1(2)
f2(2)
:::
fl(2)
(2)
(2)
m2 (f1 ) m2 (f2 ) : : : m2 (fl(2) )

#

(42)

#
(43)

(1) ; i = 1; k are focal elements of B and f (2) ; j = 1; l are focal elements of B .
1
2
j

where fi

Let’s consider now the combined information associated with a new body of evidence

B1 and B2 having bpa m(:) with core K. We denote B as
 

K =
B , B1  B2 = m

B resulting from the fusion of

"

f1(1) \ f1(2)
f1(1) \ f2(2) : : : fk(1) \ fl(2)
m(f1(1) \ f1(2) ) m(f1(1) \ f2(2) ) : : : m(fk(1) \ fl(2) )

#
(44)

The fusion of 2 informations granules can be represented with the general table fusion as follows


m1 (f1(1) )
m1 (f2(1) )
:::
m1 (fi(1) )
:::
m1 (fk(1) )
m2 (f1(2) ) m(f1(1) \ f1(2) ) m(f2(1) \ f1(2) ) : : : m(fi(1) \ f1(2) ) : : : m(fk(1) \ f1(2) )
m2 (f2(2) ) m(f1(1) \ f2(2) ) m(f2(1) \ f2(2) ) : : : m(fi(1) \ f2(2) ) : : : m(fk(1) \ f2(2) )
:::
:::
:::
m2 (fj(2) ) m(f1(1) \ fj(2) ) m(f2(1) \ fj(2) )
:::
:::
:::
m2 (fl(2) ) m(f1(1) \ fl(2) ) m(f2(1) \ fl(2) )

:::
:::
: : : m(fi(1) \ fj(2) )
:::
:::
: : : m(fi(1) \ fl(2) )

:::
:::
: : : m(fk(1) \ fj(2) )
:::
:::
: : : m(fk(1) \ fl(2) )

We look for the optimal rule of combination, i.e. the bpa m(:) = m1 (:)  m2 (:) which maximizes the joint entropy of
the two information sources. The justif cation for the Maxent criteria is discussed in [24, 27]. Thus, one has to f nd m(:)
such that [66, 67].

2

4
max
[H (m)]  max
m
m

k X
l
X
i=1 j =1

3

m(fi(1) \ fj(2) ) log[m(fi(1) \ fj(2) )]5  min
[ H (m)]
m

(45)

satisfying both



the measurement projection principle (marginal bpa), i.e.

m1 (fi(1) ) =



l
X
j =1

m(fi(1) \ fj(2) )

8i = 1; : : : ; k and 8j = 1; : : : ; l

and

m2 (fj(2) ) =

k
X
i=1

m(fi(1) \ fj(2) )

(46)

These constraints state that the marginal bpa m1 (:) is obtained by the summation over each column of the fusion
table and the marginal bpa m2 (:) is obtained by the summation over each row of the fusion table.
the measurement balance principle (the sum of all cells of the fusion table must be unity)
k X
l
X
i=1 j =1

(1)

m(fi(1) \ fj(2) ) = 1

(47)

(2)

Using the concise notation mij , m(fi \fj ), the Lagrangian associated with this optimization problem under equality
constraints is given by (we consider here the minimization of J (m) appearing in r.h.s of (45))

L(m; ) =

k X
l
X
i=1 j =1
k
X

+

i=1

mij ln[mij ]

i [m1 (fi(1) )

l
X
j =1

mij ] +

l
X
j =1
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(2)
i [m2 (fj )

k
X
i=1

k X
l
X

mij ] + [

i=1 j =1

mij

1]

(48)

which can be written more concisely as

L(m; ) = H (m) + 0 g(m)
where m = [m11 m12 : : :

mkl ]0 and
2

1

(49)

2

Pl

m1 (f1(1) )

3

6 .. 7
6.7
6 7
6k 7
6 7
7
=6
6 17
6 .. 7
6.7
6 7
4 l5

j =1 m1j

3

6
7
..
6
7
.
6
7
P
6
7
l
6m1 (fk(1) )
7
m
kj
j =1
6
7
Pk
(2)
7
g(m) = 6
6 m2 (f1 )
i=1 mi1 7
6
7
.
6
7
..
6
7
P
6
7
k
4 m2 (fl(2) )
5
m
il
i=1
Pk Pl

and



1

j =1 mij

i=1

(50)

Following the classical method of Lagrange multipliers, one has to f nd optimal solution (m ;  ) such that

@L  
(m ;  ) = 0 and @@L (m ; ) = 0
(51)
@m
The f rst k  l equations express the general solution m[] and the k + l + 1 last equations determine  and therefore by
substitution into m[], the optimal solution m = m[ ]. One has to solve
2 @L 3 2
3 203
ln(m ) + 1 +  
@L
@m

11
@m
6 . 11 7 6
..
6 .. 7 6
.
7 6
6
= 666 @m@ Lij 777 = 66 ln(mij ) + 1 + 
..
6 .. 7 6
.
4 . 5 4

1

1

.. 7
7 6
.7
7 6
7
7 6
6
.. 7 = 0
7
j7
.
7=6
7
7 6
.. 7
5 6
4.5

i

ln(mkl ) + 1 +  k

@L
@mkl

(52)

0

l

which yields 8i; j ,

mij = e



1 ei e



1 Pl

and

@L
@

2 @L 3 2 3
2
0
@1
6 .. 7 6 . 7
6
6 . 7 6 .. 7
6
6
7
6
6
7
6 @L 7 6 7
6
6 @k 7 607
6
6 @L 7 6 7
= 66 @ 1 77 = 607 = 0 , 666
.. 7
6 .. 7 6
6
.7
6 . 7 6
6
6
6 @L 7 4 7
6
5
0
4@ l5
4

e
e

1
j =1 e e

3

j

..
.

1 Pl ek e j
j =1
1 Pk
1 i



i=1 e



e

..
.

P


e P1 kiP
=1le l e i
k

1
l i
e
i=1
j =1 e e

0

@L
@

e

(53)

j

2

m1 (f1(1) )

3

7 6
7
..
7 6
7
.
7 6
7
7 6
7
(1)
7 6m1 (fk )7
7 6
7
7 = 6m2 (f1(2) )7
7 6
7
7 6
..
7
7 6
7
.
7 6
7
5 4m2 (f (2) )5

1

(54)

l

The last constraint in (54) can also be written as

e



k

l

1 X X e l ei
i=1 j =1

=e

k

Now with basic algebraic manipulation, the optimal global bpa mij

mij = e



1 ei e

= (e
|





1 ei e

l

)=1

8i; j we are searching for, can be expressed as

j

1

z

=e

l

1 (X ei )(X e
i=1
j =1



j

e



l

1 ei X e
j =1

l

{z

m1 (fi(1) )
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1(

) (e
}|

k
X
i=1



}|

ei )(

1e

j

{z

l
X

{

e l)

j =1
k
X 
ei
i=1

m2 (fj(2) )

)
}

(55)

Thus, the solution of the maximisation of the joint entropy is obtained by choosing 8i; j

mij = m(fi(1) \ fj(2) ) = m1 (fi(1) )m2 (fj(2) )

(56)

(1) \f (2)

Since it may exist several combinations yielding to the same focal element, the bpa of all focal elements equal to fi
over the fusion space is

m(fi(1) \ fj(2) ) =

X
i;j

m1 (fi(1) )m2 (fj(2) )

j

(57)

which coincides exactly with the new rule of combination expressed previously.
4.4.3

Numerical example of entropy calculation

We present here a very simple numerical example of the derivation of entropies of individual sources of informations and
the combined (joint) entropy of combined sources. Let’s consider the simple frame of discernment  = f1 ; 2g and the
two following (uncertain and paradoxical) information granules

m1 (1 ) = 0:60

m1 (2 ) = 0:20

m1 (1 [ 2 ) = 0:10

m1 (1 \ 2 ) = 0:10

m2 (1 ) = 0:50

m2 (2 ) = 0:20

m2 (1 [ 2 ) = 0:10

m2 (1 \ 2 ) = 0:20

The fusion rule can be described through the following fusion table


m2 (1 ) = 0:50
m2 (2 ) = 0:20
m2 (1 [ 2 ) = 0:10
m2 (1 \ 2 ) = 0:20

m1 (1 ) = 0:60
0:30 (1 )
0:12 (1 \ 2 )
0:06 (1 )
0:12 (1 \ 2 )

m1 (2 ) = 0:20
0:10 (1 \ 2 )
0:04 (2 )
0:02 (2 )
0:04 (1 \ 2 )

m1 (1 [ 2 ) = 0:10
0:05 (1 )
0:02 (2 )
0:01 (1 [ 2 )
0:02 (1 \ 2 )

m1 (1 \ 2 ) = 0:10
0:05 (1 \ 2 )
0:02 (1 \ 2 )
0:01 (1 \ 2 )
0:02 (1 \ 2 )
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Each cell of the table provides a part of the global bpa m(:) contribution for the corresponding proposition M indicated
between parentheses. The entropies of individual sources are given by

H (M1 ) = 0:60 ln(0:60) 0:20 ln(0:20) 0:10 ln(0:10) 0:10 ln(0:10) = 1:0889 nats
H (M2 ) = 0:50 ln(0:50) 0:20 ln(0:20) 0:10 ln(0:10) 0:20 ln(0:20) = 1:2206 nats
The conditional entropies H (M1 jM2) and H (M2 jM1) are given by [9]

H (M1 jM2) =m2 (M2 = 1 )H (M1 jM2 = 1 ) + m2 (M2 = 2 )H (M1 jM2 = 2 )
+ m2 (M2 = 1 \ 2 )H (M1 jM2 = 1 \ 2 ) + m2 (M2 = 1 [ 2 )H (M1 jM2 = 1 [ 2 )

30 ; 0:10 ; 0:05 ; 0:05 ) + 0:2H ( 0:12 ; 0:04 ; 0:02 ; 0:02 )
=0:5H ( 00::50
0:50 0:50 0:50 
0:20 0:20 0:20 0:20 

0:02 0:01 0:01
0:12 0:04 0:02 0:02
+ 0:1H ( 00::06
10 ; 0:10 ; 0:10 ; 0:10 ) + 0:2H ( 0:20 ; 0:20 ; 0:20 ; 0:20 )
=(0:5  1:0889) + (0:2  1:0889) + (0:1  1:0889) + (0:2  1:0889)
=1:0889 nats
H (M2 jM1) =m1 (M1 = 1 )H (M2 jM1 = 1 ) + m1 (M1 = 2 )H (M2 jM1 = 2 )
+ m1 (M1 = 1 \ 2 )H (M2 jM1 = 1 \ 2 ) + m1 (M1 = 1 [ 2 )H (M2 jM1 = 1 [ 2 )




0
:10 0:04 0:02 0:04
0
:30 0:12 0:06 0:12
=0:6H ( 0:60 ; 0:60 ; 0:60 ; 0:60 ) + 0:2H ( 0:20 ; 0:20 ; 0:20 ; 0:20 )




0
:05 0:02 0:01 0:02
0
:05 0:02 0:01 0:02
+ 0:1H ( 0:10 ; 0:10 ; 0:10 ; 0:10 ) + 0:1H ( 0:10 ; 0:10 ; 0:10 ; 0:10 )
=(0:6  1:2206) + (0:2  1:2206) + (0:1  1:2206) + (0:1  1:2206)
=1:2206 nats
Therefore, one has

H (M1 ) = H (M1 jM2 ) = 1:0889 nats

and
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H (M2 ) = H (M2jM1 ) = 1:2206 nats

The joint entropy H (M ) = H (M1 ; M2) is directly obtained from the cells of the fusion table and one gets

H (M ) = H [(0:3; 0:1; 0:05; 0:05; 0:12; 0:04; 0:02; 0:02; 0:06; 0:02; 0:01; 0:01; 0:12; 0:04; 0:02; 0:02)] = 2:3095 nats
Hence, one has verif ed the classical result (chain rule) of the information theory, i.e.

H (M ) = H (M1 ) + H (M2 jM1) = H (M2 ) + H (M1 jM2)
or more specially because of the independence of the two sources of information

H (M ) = H (M1 ) + H (M2 )
Note that H (M ) must be evaluated using the full description of the fusion table (from all the cells of the table) and not
from the global bpa m(:). Otherwise a smaller value for H (M ) is deduced, as it can be easily shown. From the fusion
table, one gets the f nal bpa m(:) with

m(1 ) = 0:41

m(2 ) = 0:08

m(1 [ 2 ) = 0:01

m(1 \ 2 ) = 0:50

The evaluation of H (M ) from bpa m(:) yields the value

H~ (M ) = H [(0:41; 0:08; 0:01; 0:50)] = 0:96023 nats < H (M )

Remark
Note that in this example, the combination of the two sources reduces the uncertainty of judgment of each local infor~ (M ) < H (M1 ) and H~ (M ) < H (M2 ). This is unfortunalely not a valid conclusion in general as
mation sources since H
many people (wrongly) think. We argue that the fusion of independent sources of information does not necessarly reduces
the uncertainty of judgment. To convince the reader, just take the similar example with the following new information
granules

m1 (1 ) = 0:900
m2 (1 ) = 0:090

m1 (2 ) = 0:090
m2 (2 ) = 0:900
It is not too diff cult to check that global bpa m(:) is
m(1 ) = 0:08991

m1 (1 [ 2 ) = 0:009
m2 (1 [ 2 ) = 0:009

m(2 ) = 0:08991

m(1 [ 2 ) = 0:000081

m1 (1 \ 2 ) = 0:001
m2 (1 \ 2 ) = 0:001

m(1 \ 2 ) = 0:820099

with corresponding entropies

~ (M )
but H
judgment.
4.4.4

H (M1 ) = H (M2 ) = 0:36084 nats

(H~ (M ) = 0:59659) < (H (M ) = 0:72168)

and

> H (M1 ) and H~ (M ) > H (M2 ). Thus in this case, the fusion increases actually the uncertainty of the f nal

Def nition for the generalized entropy of a source

The evaluation of the entropy H (m) of a given source from the direct extension of its classical def nition, with convention
(see [9]) 0 ln(0) = 0 and with bpa m(:), i.e.

H (m) =

X

A2D

m(A) ln(m(A))

seems to not be the best measure for the self-information of a general (uncertain and paradoxical) source of information
because it does not catch the intrinsic informational strength (i.i.s. for short) s(A) of the propositions A. An extension
of the classical entropy in the DST framework had already been proposed in 1983 by R. Yager based on the weight of
conf ict between the belief function Bel and the certain support function BelA focused on each proposition A (see [70] for
details). In the classical def nition (based only on probability measure), one always has s(A)  jAj = 1. This does not
hold in our general theory of plausible and paradoxical reasoning and we propose to generalize the notion of entropy in
the following manner to measure correctly the self-information of a general source :

Hg (m) =

1 m(A) ln( 1 m(A))
s(A)
s(A)
A2D
X

(59)

Hg (m) will be called the generalized entropy of the source associated with bpa m(:). This general def nition introduces
the cardinality of a general (irreductible) proposition A which can be derived from the two following important rules
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0

s@

[
i=1;n

0

s@

1

Bi A = s (B1 [ : : : [ Bn ) =

\
i=1;n

P
1=s (Bi )
Q i=1;n

(60)

Q
s ( Bi )
Pi=1;n

(61)

1

Bi A = s (B1 \ : : : \ Bn ) =

i=1;n

1=s (Bi )

i=1;n s

( Bi )

It is very important to note that these rules apply only on irreductible propositions (logical atoms) A. A proposition A is
said to be irreductible (or equivalently has a compact form) if and only if it does not admit other equivalent form with a
smaller number of operands and operators. For example (1 [ 3 ) \ (2 [ 3 ) is not an irreductible proposition since it
can be reduced to its equivalent logical atom (1 \ 2 ) [ 3 . To compute the i.i.s. s(A) of any proposition A using the
rules (60) and (61), the proposition has f rst to be reduced to its minimal representation (irreductible form).

Examples
Here are few examples of the value of the cardinality for some elementary and composite irreductible propositions A. We
recall that i involved in A are singletons such that ji j = 1.

A = 1 [ 2 ) s(A) = 2
A = 1 \ 2 ) s(A) = 1=2
A = 1 [ 2 [ 3 = (1 [ 2 ) [ 3 = 1 [ (2 [ 3 ) = 2 [ (1 [ 3 ) ) s(A) = 3
A = 1 \ 2 \ 3 = (1 \ 2 ) \ 3 = 1 \ (2 \ 3 ) = 2 \ (1 \ 3 ) ) s(A) = 1=3
A = (1 \ 2 ) [ 3 ) s(A) = 3=2
A = (1 [ 2 ) \ 3 ) s(A) = 2=3
A = (1 \ 2 ) [ (3 \ 4 ) ) s(A) = 1
A = (1 [ 2 ) \ (3 [ 4 ) ) s(A) = 1
A = (1 \ 2 ) [ (3 \ 4 \ 5 ) ) s(A) = 5=6
A = (1 [ 2 ) \ (3 [ 4 [ 5 ) ) s(A) = 6=5
Thus the evaluation of s(A) for any general irreductible proposition A can always be obtained from the two basic rules
(60) and (61). This generalized def nition makes sense with the notion of entropy and is coherent with classical def nition
(i.e. Hg (m)  H (m) when m(:) becomes a bayesian bpa p(:)). Let  = f1 ; : : : ; n g be a general frame of discernment of the problem under consideration and a general body of evidence with information granule m(:) on D , then
the generalized entropy Hg (m) takes its minimal value n ln(n) when the source provides the maximum of paradoxe
which is obtained when m(1 \ : : : \ n ) = 1. It is important to note that the maximum of uncertainty is not obtained
when m(1 [ : : : [ n ) = 1 but rather for a specif c m() which distributes some weight of evidence assignment to each
proposition A 2 D because there is less information (from the information theory viewpoint) when there exists several
propositions with non nul bpa rather than one. One has also to take into account the intrinsic self-information of the
propositions to get a good measure of global information provided by a source. The generalized entropy includes both
aspects of the information (the intrinsic and the classical aspect). The uniform distribution for m(:) does not generate the
maximum generalized-entropy because of the different intrinsic self-information of each proposition (see next example).
We argue that the generalized entropy of any source def ned with respect to a frame  appears to be a very useful tool to
measure the degree of uncertainty and paradoxe of any given source of information.

Example
We give here some values of Hg (m) for different sources of information over the same frame  = f1 ; 2g. The
sources have been classif ed from the most informative one B1 up to the less informative one B16. B16 corresponds to the
source containing minimal information on the hyper-power set of the frame  (thus B16 has the minimal discrimination
power between all possible propositions). There does not exist a source Bk such that HgBk (m) > HgB16 (m) for this
simpliest example. Finding m (:) such that Hg (m ) takes its maximal value for a general frame  with jj = n is called
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the general whitening source problem. No solution for this problem has been obtained so far.

B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6
B7
B8
B9
B10
B11
B12
B13
B14
B15
B16

m(1 ) m(2 ) m(1 [ 2 ) m(1 \ 2 ) Hg (m)
0
0
0
1
1:386
0
0
0:3
0:7
0:186

1
0
0:1
0
0:8
0
0:5
0:7
0:7
0:1
0:1
0:1
0:25
0:25

0
1
0:2
0
0:2
0
0:5
0:2
0:2
0:2
0:2
0:2
0:25
0:25

0
0
0
1
0
0:7
0
0:1
0
0:7
0:3
0:4
0:25
0:35

0
0
0:7
0
0
0:3
0
0
0:1
1
0:4
0:3
0:25
0:15

0
0
0:081
0:346
0:500
0:673
0:693
0:721
0:893
0:919
1:015
1:180
1:299
1:359

B1 is the most informative source because all the weights of evidence about the truth are focused only on the smaller
element 1 \ 2 of hyper-powerset D . B2 is less informative than B1 because there exists an ambiguity between the
two propositions 1 [ 2 and 1 \ 2 . B3 and B4 are less informative than B1 because the weights of evidence about
the truth are focused on larger elements (1 or 2 respectively) of D . B6 is less informative than B3 or B4 because the
weight of evidence about the truth is focused on a bigger element 1 [ 2 of D . B7 is less informative than previous
sources since there exists an ambiguity between the two propositions 1 and 2 but it is more informative than B9 since
the discrimination power (our easiness to decide which proposition supports the truth) is higher with B7 than with B9 .
Note that even if in this very simple example, it is not obvious to see that B16 is the less informative (white) source of
information. Most of readers would have probably thought to choose either B6 or B15. This comes from the confusion
between the intrinsic information supported by the proposition itself and the information supported by the whole bpa
m(:).
4.4.5

Zadeh’s example

Let’s take back the disturbing Zadeh’s example given in section 3.4. Two doctors examine a patient and agree that it
suffers from either meningitis (M), concussion (C) or brain tumor (T). Thus  = fM; C; T g. Assume that the doctors
agree in their low expectation of a tumor, but disagree in likely cause and provide the following diagnosis

m1 (M ) = 0:99

m1 (T ) = 0:01

and

m2 (C ) = 0:99

m2 (T ) = 0:01

and

8A 2 D ; A 6= T; A 6= M; m1 (A) = 0
8A 2 D ; A 6= T; A 6= C; m2 (A) = 0

The new general rule of combination (41), yields the following combined information granule

m(M \ C ) = 0:9801

m(M \ T ) = 0:0099

m(C \ T ) = 0:0099

m(T ) = 0:0001

From this granule, one gets
Bel(M ) = m(M \ C ) + m(M \ T ) = 0:99
Bel(C ) = m(M \ C ) + m(T \ C ) = 0:99
Bel(T ) = m(T ) + m(M \ T ) + m(C \ T ) = 0:0199
If both doctors can be considered as equally reliable, the combined information granule m(:) mainly focuses weight of
evidence on the paradoxical proposition M \ C which means that patient suffers both meningitis and concussion but
almost surely not from brain tumor. This conclusion is coherent with the common sense actually. Then, no therapy for
brain tumor (like heavy and ever risky brain surgical intervention) will be chosen in such case. This really helps to take
important decision to save the life of the patient in this example. A deeper medical examination adapted to both meningitis
and concussion will almost surely be done before applying the best therapy for the patient. Just remember that in this
case, the DST had concluded that the patient had brain tumor with certainty : : : .
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4.4.6

Mahler’s example revisited

Let’s consider now the following example excerpt from the R. Mahler’s paper [36]. We consider that our classif cation
knowledge base consists of the three (imaginary) new and rare diseases corresponding to following frame of discernment

 = f1 = kotosis; 2 = phlegaria; 3 = pinpoxg
We assume that the three diseases are equally likely to occur in the patient population but there is some evidence that
phlegaria and pinpox are the same disease and there is also a small possibility that kotosis and phlegaria might be the
same disease. Finally, there is a small possibility that all three diseases are the same. This information can be expressed
by assigning a priori bpa as follows

m0 (1 ) = 0:2
m0 (2 ) = 0:2
m0 (3 ) = 0:2
m0 (2 \ 3 ) = 0:2 m0 (1 \ 2 ) = 0:1 m0 (1 \ 2 \ 3 ) = 0:1
Let Bel(:) the prior belief measure corresponding to this prior bpa m(:). Now assume that Doctor D1 and Doctor D2
examine a patient and deliver diagnoses with following reports:




Report for D1 :

m1 (1 [ 2 [ 3 ) = 0:05

m2 (2 ) = 0:80
The combination of the evidences provided by the two doctors m0 = m1  m2 obtained by the general rule of combination
(41) yields the following bpa m0 (:)
Report for D2 :

m2 (1 [ 2 [ 3 ) = 0:20

m1 (2 [ 3 ) = 0:95

m0 (2 ) = 0:8
m0 (2 [ 3 ) = 0:19
m0 (1 [ 2 [ 3 ) = 0:01
The combination of bpa m0 (:) with prior evidence m0 (:) yields the f nal bpa m = m0  m0 = m0  [m1  m2 ] with
m(1 ) = 0:002
m(2 ) = 0:200
m(3 ) = 0:040
m(1 \ 2 ) = 0:260
m(2 \ 3 ) = 0:360 m(1 \ 2 \ 3 ) = 0:100
m(1 \ (2 [ 3 )) = 0:038
Therefore the f nal belief function given by (37) is
Bel(1 ) = 0:002 + 0:260 + 0:100 + 0:038 = 0:400
Bel(2 ) = 0:200 + 0:260 + 0:360 + 0:100 = 0:920
Bel(3 ) = 0:040 + 0:360 + 0:100 = 0:500
Bel(1 \ 2 ) = 0:260 + 0:100 = 0:360
Bel(2 \ 3 ) = 0:360 + 0:100 = 0:460
Bel(1 \ (2 [ 3 )) = 0:038 + 0:100 = 0:138
Bel(1 \ 2 \ 3 ) = 0:100
Thus, on the basis of all the evidences one has, we are able to conclude with high a degree of belief that the patient has
phlegaria which is coherent with the Mahler’s conclusion based on his Conditioned Dempster-Shafer theory developed
from his conditional event algebra although a totally new and simpliest approach has been adopted here.
4.4.7

A thief identif cation example

Let’s revisit a very simple thief identif cation example. Assume that a 75 years old grandfather is taking a walk with his
9 years old grandson in a park. They saw at 50 meters away, a 45 years old pickpocket robbering the bag of an old lady.
A policeman looking for some witnesses of this event asks separately the grandfather and his grandchild if they have seen
the thief (they both answer yes) and how was the thief (a young or an old man). The grandfather (source of information
B1 reports that the thief was a young man with high conf dence 0.99 and with only a low uncertainty 0.01. His grandson
reports that the thief was a old man with high conf dence 0.99 and with only a low uncertainty 0.01. These two witnesses
provide fair reports (with respect to their own world of knowledge) even if apparently they appear as paradoxical. The
policeman then send the two reports with only minimal information about witnesses (saying only their names and that they
were a priori fully trustable) to an investigator. The investigator has no possibility to meet or to call back the witnesses in
order to get more details.
Under such condition, what would be the best decision to be taken by the investigator about the age of the thief to
eventually help to catch him? Such kind of simple examples occur quite frequently in witnesses problems actually. A
rational investigator will almost surely suspect a mistake or an error in one or both reports since they appear apparently
in full contradiction. The investigator will then try to take his f nal decision with some other better information (if any).
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If the investigator uses our new plausible and paradoxical reasoning, he will def ned the following bpa with respect to the
frame of discernment  = f1 = young; 2 = oldg and the available reports B1 and B2 with following bpa

m1 (1 ) = 0:99

m1 (1 [ 2 ) = 0:01

m1 (1 \ 2 ) = 0

m2 (1 [ 2 ) = 0:01
The fusion of these two sources of information yields the global bpa m(:) with

m2 (1 \ 2 ) = 0

m2 (1 ) = 0

m(1 ) = 0:0099

m1 (2 ) = 0
m2 (2 ) = 0:99

m(2 ) = 0:0099

m(1 [ 2 ) = 0:0001

m(1 \ 2 ) = 0:9801

Thus, from this global information, the investigator has no better choice but to consider with almost certainty that the thief
was both a young and old man. By assuming that the expected life duration is around 80 years, the inspector will deduce
that the true age of the thief is around 40 years old which is not too far from the truth. At least, this conclusion could be
helpful to interrogate some suspicious individuals.
4.4.8

A model to generate information granules m(:) from intervals

We present here a model to generate information granules m(:) from information represented by intervals. It is very common in practice that uncertain sources of information provide evidence on a given proposition in term of basic intervals
[ ; ]  [0; 1] rather than a direct bpa m(:). In such cases, some preprocessing must be done before applying the general
rule of combination between such sources to take the f nal decision.
In the DST framework, we recall that the simpliest and easiest transformation to convert [;  ] into bpa has already
been proposed by A. Appriou in [3]. The basic idea was to interpret  as the minimal credibility committed to A and 
as the plausibility committed to A. In other words, the Appriou’s transformation model within the DST is the following
one

 = m(A)
 = 1 m(Ac )
  = m(A [ Ac )
This model can be directly extended within our new theory of plausible and paradoxical reasoning by setting now.

1
2
1 m(A \ Ac )
 = 1 m(Ac )
2

c
  = m(A [ A )
 = m(A) + m(A \ Ac )

or equivalently

1
(62)
2
1
m(Ac ) + m(A \ Ac ) = 1 
(63)
2
c

m(A [ A ) =  
(64)
This appealing model presents nice properties specially when  =  = 0 or when  =  = 1. This model is moreover
coherent with the previous Appriou’s model whenever the source becomes rational (i.e m(A \ Ac ) = 0). This new model
presents however a degree of freedom since one has only two constraints (62) and (63) for three unknowns m(A), m(Ac )
and m(A \ Ac ). Thus in general, without an additional constraint, there exists many possible choices for m(A), m(Ac )
and m(A \ Ac ) and therefore there exists several bpa m(:) satisfying this transformation model. Without extra prior
information, it becomes diff cult to justify the choice of a specif c bpa versus all other admissible possibilities for m(:).
m(A) + m(A \ Ac ) = 

To solve this important drawback, we propose to add the constraint on the maximization of the generalized-entropy

Hg (m). This will allow us to obtain from [; ] the unique bpa m(:) having the minimum of specif city and admissible
with our transformation model. From def nition of Hg (m) and previous equations (62)-(64), one gets
Hg (m) = ( m(A \ Ac )=2) ln( m(A \ Ac )=2) (1  m(A \ Ac )=2) ln(1  m(A \ Ac )=2)

1 (  ) ln( 1 (  )) 2m(A \ Ac ) ln(2m(A \ Ac ))


2
2
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The maximization of Hg (m) is obtained for the optimal value m? (A \ Ac ) such that @m(A\gAc ) (m? (A \ Ac ))
@ 2Hg
?
c
@m(A\Ac )2 (m (A \ A )) < 0. The annulation of the f rst derivative is obtained by the solution of the equation
@H

= 0 and

1 ln( m? =2) + 1 ln(1  m? =2) 2m? ln(2m? ) 1 = 0
2 
2

or equivalently after basic algebraic manipulations

64e2 (m? )4 (m? )2 + 2(1  +  )m? 4(1  ) = 0

(65)

The solution of this equation does not admit a simple analytic expression but can be easily found using classical numerical
methods. It is also easy to check that the second derivative is always negative and therefore Hg (m) reaches its maximal
value when

1
(66)
2
1
m(Ac ) + m? (A \ Ac ) = 1 
(67)
2
c

m(A [ A ) =  
(68)
This completes the def nition of our new transformation model. Note that [ ; ] can also be generated from bpa m(:)
m(A) + m? (A \ Ac ) = 

through (62)-(64).

Numerical examples











5

[;  ] = [0:0; 0:0]
[;  ] = [0:2; 0:2]
[;  ] = [0:5; 0:5]
[;  ] = [0:8; 0:8]
[;  ] = [1:0; 1:0]
[;  ] = [0:2; 0:4]
[;  ] = [0:6; 0:8]
[;  ] = [0:4; 0:6]
[;  ] = [0:3; 0:9]
[;  ] = [0:0; 1:0]

m(A \ Ac ) = 0:000

m(A) = 0:000

m(Ac ) = 1:000

m(A [ Ac ) = 0:000

m(A \ Ac )  0:192

m(A)  0:404

m(Ac )  0:404

m(A [ Ac ) = 0:000

m(A \ Ac )  0:164
m(A \ Ac )  0:164

m(A \ Ac ) = 0:000
m(A \ Ac )  0:152
m(A \ Ac )  0:152
m(A \ Ac )  0:170
m(A \ Ac )  0:100

m(A \ Ac ) = 0:000

m(A)  0:118
m(A)  0:718
m(A) = 1:000

m(A)  0:124
m(A)  0:524
m(A)  0:315
m(A)  0:250
m(A) = 0:000

m(Ac )  0:718
m(Ac )  0:118
m(Ac ) = 0:000

m(Ac )  0:524
m(Ac )  0:124
m(Ac )  0:315
m(Ac )  0:050
m(Ac ) = 0:000

m(A [ Ac ) = 0:000
m(A [ Ac ) = 0:000
m(A [ Ac ) = 0:000
m(A [ Ac ) = 0:200
m(A [ Ac ) = 0:200
m(A [ Ac ) = 0:200
m(A [ Ac ) = 0:600
m(A [ Ac ) = 1:000

Plausible and paradoxical reasoning in the neutrosophy framework

5.1

Neutrosophy and the neutrosophic logic

The neutrosophy is a new branch of philosophy, introduced by Florentin Smarandache in 1980, which studies the origin,
nature and scope of neutralities, as well as their interactions with different ideational spectra. Neutrosophy considers a
proposition, theory, event, concept, or entitity, A in relation to its opposite, anti-A and that which is not A, non-A, and
that which is neither A nor anti-A, denoted by neut-A. Neutrosophy serves as the basis for the neutrosophic logic [22].
The Neutrosophic Logic (NL) or Smarandache’s logic is a general framework for the unif cation of all existing logics
[56, 57, 58]). The main idea of NL is to characterize each logical statement in a 3D neutrosophic space where each
dimension of the space represents respectively the truth (T), the falsehood (F) and the indeterminacy (I) of the statement
under consideration where T, I and F are standard or non-sandard real subsets of ] 0; 1+ [. Moreover in NL, each statement
is allowed to be over or under true, over or under false and over or under inderterminate by using hyper real numbers
developed in the non-standard analysis theory [43, 14]. The neutrosophical value (A) = (T (A); I (A); F (A)) in a frame
of discernment (world of discourse)  of a statement A is then def ned as a subset (a volume not necessary connexe;
i.e. a set of disjoint volumes) of the neutrosophic space. Any statement A represented by a triplet (A) is called a
neutrosophic event or
event. The subset t , T (A) characterizes the truth part of statement A.
i , (A)
and f , F (A) represent the inderterminacy and the falsehood of A. This Smarandache’s representation is close to
the human reasoning. It characterizes and catches the imprecision of knowledge or linguistic inexactitude received by
various observers, uncertainty due to incomplete knowledge of acquisition errors or stochasticity, and vagueness due to

N

N

N

N

N
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N

lack of clear contours or limits. This approach allows theoretically to consider any kinds of logical statements. For
example, the fuzzy set logic or the classical modal logic (which works with statements verifying T (A), I (A)  0,
F (A) = 1 T (A), where T is a real number belonging to [0; 1]) are included in NL. The neutrosophic logic can easily
handle also paradoxes. We emphaze the fact that in general the neutrosohic value (A) of a proposition A can also depend
on dynamical parameters which can evolve with time, space, etc. For seak of concise notation, we omit to introduce this
dependence in our notations in the sequel.

N

Basic operations on sets
Beside this modelling, F. Smarandache has introduced the following operations on sets. Consider S1 and S2 be two
(unidimensional) standard or non-standard real subsets. The addition, substraction, multiplication and division (by a non
null f nite number) of these sets are def ned as follows :



Addition

S1  S2 = S2  S1 , fx j x = s1 + s2 ; 8s1 2 S1 ; 8s2 2 S2 g



Substraction

S1 S2 = (S2

S1 ) , fx j x = s1 s2 ; 8s1 2 S1 ; 8s2 2 S2 g

For real positive subsets, the Inf and Sup values of S1
Inf[S1



(69)

S2 ] = Inf[S1 ]

(70)

S2 are given by

Sup[S2]

Sup[S1

and

S2 ] = Sup[S1 ]

Inf[S2]

Multiplication

S1 S2 = S2 S1 , fx j x = s1  s2 ; 8s1 2 S1 ; 8s2 2 S2 g

(71)

For real positive subsets, one gets
Inf[S1



S2 ] = Inf[S1 ]  Inf[S2]

and

Sup[S1

S2 ] = Sup[S1 ]  Sup[S2 ]

Division of a set by a non null standard number
Let k 2 , then

R

S1 k , fx j x = s1 =k; 8s1 2 S1 g

(72)

Neutrosophic topology
Let’s construct now a neutrosophic topology (NT) [56] on interval ] 0; 1+[, by considering the associated family of
standard or non-standard subsets included in ] 0; 1+ [ and the empty set ;, which is closed under set union and f nite
intersection. The union and intersection of two any propositions A and B (corresponding to either the part of truth,
indeterminacy or falsehood of a given assertion def ned on ] 0; 1+ [) are def ned as follows

A [ B = (A  B ) (A B )

The neutrosophic complement of A is def ned as A = f1+ g
a mapping function (:) such that

N

The interval ]

and

A\B = A B

A and the N

(73)

value of an assertion A is characterized by

N : A 7! N(A) = (T (A); I (A); F (A)) ] 0; 1+[3

(74)

0; 1+[, endowed with this topology, forms a neutrosophic topological space.

Consider now two statements A1 and A2, then one def nes the following basic neutrosophic operators:

N(A1)  N(A2) =(T1  T2; I1  I2; F1  F2)
N(A1) N(A2) =(T1 T2; I1 I2; F1 F2)
N(A1) N(A2) =(T1 T2; I1 I2; F1 F2)

where Ti

(75)
(76)
(77)

= T (Ai ), Ii = I (Ai ), Fi = F (Ai) for i = 1; 2.

Since the truth, falsehood and indeterminacy of any statement must belong to ] 0; 1+ [, the result of each previous operator
, and must be in ] 0; 1+[3. Therefore upper and lower bounds of T1  T2 must be set respectively to 0 and 1+
whenever inf (T1  T2 ) < 0 or sup(T1  T2 ) > 1. The same remark applies for and operators and for falsehood
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and inderterminacy part of compounded statement.

N

All classical logical operators and connectors can be extented in the { Logic. For notation convenience, we will
identify logical operators with their classical counterpart in set theory as pointed out in [35] (hence the following equiv , A1 ^ A2  A1 \ A2 and A1 _ A2  A1 [ A2 throughout this paper). We recall here
alences will be used :A  A
only important operators used in the sequel. Additional neutrosophic logical operators like (strong disjunction, implication, equivalence, Sheffer’s and Pierce’s connectors) and general, physics and philosophical examples of application of
neutrosophic operators can be found in [56, 58].





Negation

N(A ) = (f1g

T (A); f1g I (A); f1g F (A))

(78)

Conjunction

N(A1 \ A2) = N(A1) N(A2) = (T1

T2 ; I1 I2; F1 F2)

(79)

Disjunction

N(A1 [ A2) = (T1 [ T2; I1 [ I2; F1 [ F2)

= ((T1  T2 ) (T1 T2 ); (I1  I2 ) (I1 I2); (I1  I2 ) (I1 I2 ))
= [N(A1)  N(A2)] [N(A1) N(A2)]

N { Membership function over a neutrosophic set

(80)

N

element x of  is characterized by its
Let  be a world of discourse (called frame of discernment in the DST). Each
own neutrosophical basic assignment ( { value) (x) , (T (x); I (x); F (x)) with T (x),I (x) and F (x) ] 0; 1+[. The
{ membership function of any neutrosophical element x with any subset M   is def ned in similar way by

N

N

N

N(x j M ) , (TM (x); IM (x); FM (x))
(81)
with TM (x),IM (x) and FM (x) ] 0; 1+[. The N { value of x over M can be interpreted, by abuse of language, as
its membership function to M in the following sense: x is t% true in the set M , i% indeterminate (unknown if it is)
in M , and f % false in M , where t varies in T , i varies in I , f varies in F . The standard notation x 2 M will be
used in the sequel to denote the neutrosophical membership of x to M . One can say actually that any element x of a
given frame of discernment supported by a body of evidence neutrosophically belongs to any set, due to the percentages
of truth/indeterminacy/falsity involved, which varies between 0 and 1 or even less than 0 or greater than 1. From this
def nition and previous neutrosophic rules, one gets directly the following basic neutrosophical set operations :



Complement of M
If x 2 M with



N(x j M ) , (TM (x); IM (x); FM (x)), then x 2= M with
N(x j M ) = (f1g TM (x); f1g IM (x); f1g

Intersection M

N

, (TM (x); IM (x); FM (x)) and x 2 N with NjW (x j N ) , (TN (x); IN (x); FN (x)),

N(x j M \ N ) = (TM (x)

Union M

(82)

\N

If x 2 M with (x j M )
then x 2 M \ N with



FM (x))

TN (x); IM (x) IN (x); FM (x) FN (x))

(83)

[N

N

If x 2 M with (x j M ) , (TM (x); IM (x); FM (x)) and x 2 N with
x 2 M [ N with

N(x j N ) , (TN (x); IN (x); FN (x)), then

N(x j M [ N ) = (TM [N (x); IM [N (x); FM [N (x))

(84)

where

TM [N (x) , [TM (x)  TN (x)]
IM [N (x) , [IM (x)  IN (x)]
FM [N (x) , [FM (x)  FN (x)]
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[TM (x) TN (x)]
[IM (x) IN (x)]
[FM (x) FN (x)]

(85)
(86)
(87)



Difference M

N

 , if x 2 M with N(x j M ) , (TM (x); IM (x); FM (x)) and x 2 N with N(x j N ) ,
Since M N , M N
(TN (x); IN (x); FN (x)), then x 2 M N with
N(x j M N ) = (TM N (x); IM N (x); FM N (x))
(88)
where

TM
IM
FM



Inclusion M

(x) , TM (x)
N (x) , IM (x)
N (x) , FM (x)
N

[TM (x) TN (x)]
[IM (x) IN (x)]
[FM (x) FN (x)]

(89)
(90)
(91)

N

M  N if for all x 2 M with N(x j M ) , (TM (x); IM (x); FM (x)) and x 2 N with
N(x j N ) , (TN (x); IN (x); FN (x)), one has jointly TM (x)  TN (x), IM (x)  IN (x) and FM (x)  FN (x).
We will said that

5.2

Combination of neutrosophic evidences

Let’s consider a general f nite frame of discernment  = f1 ; : : : ; n g and two bodies of (neutrosophic) evidence B1
and B2 . In the neutrosophic framework, we assume that each body of evidence provides some report of evidence (i.e.
value) committed to some elements of the hyper-power set D . In other words, the information one has to deal with
is the reports:

N




Report for B1 :
Report for B2 :

R1 = fN1(A1 ); : : : ; N1(Am )g for A1 ; : : : ; Am 2 D
R2 = fN2(B1 ); : : : ; N2(Bn )g for B1 ; : : : ; Bn 2 D

where each neutrosophic value for a proposition corresponds actually to a given triplet (T (:); I (:); F (:))
Within the neutrosophic logic, one has the full degree of freedom between the
values for a report.

N

] 0; 1+ [3

Our major concern now is to solve the diff cult question on how to combine such kind of information to get the global
and most pertinent information about the problem under consideration. So, is it possible to construct a new global report
(and hopefully more informative) R from R1 and R2 ? Unfortunatly, the neutrosophic logic which is a new appealing and
modelling tool to deal with uncertainties on propositions of same universe of discourse does not provide a clear and direct
mathematical mechanism for dealing with combination of such kind of evidences. We propose in this section a possible
issue for this important question based on our new generalization of the DST.
The main idea for combining such kind of evidences is to convert the reports into two proper general bpa mR1 (:) and
The combination of neutrosophic evidences
is a two-level process.

mR2 (:) and then combine them using the general rule of combination (41).
Level 1 : the general bpa transformation

N(:)g into a set of corresponding elementary bpa

The major diff culty is the mapping of the set of neutrosophic values f

m(:). Several cases are now examined.



Case 1 (simpliest case) : We assume that each neutrosophic evidence corresponds only to a triplet of real positive
or null numbers belonging to [0; 1] (i.e. T (:), I (:) and F (:) are restricted to real numbers 2 [0; 1].
Since in the neutrosophic logic, T (:), I (:) and F (:) have no strong mathematical relationships, the easiest solution
within the classical DST would be to use the following transformation

m( A) = T (A)=c

m(Ac ) = F (A)=c

m(A [ Ac ) = I (A)=c

where c is a normalization constant such that m( A) + m(Ac ) + m(A \ Ac ) = 1.

In our general theory of plausible and paradoxical reasoning, it seems more judicious to use the following mapping
based on our general modelling of information granule described in section 4.4.8. Thus, we are now able to construct

45

from T (:), I (:) and F (:) the three corresponding elementary bpa as follows for any proposition C
in a given report :

2 D involved

m1 (A) = T (A) 21 m?1
m1 (Ac ) = 1 T (A) 12 m?1
m1 (A \ Ac ) = m?1
m1 (A [ Ac ) = 0



m2 (A) = 1 F (A) 12 m?2 m3 (A) = 0
m2 (Ac ) = F (A) 21 m?2
m3 (Ac ) = 0
c
?
m2 (A \ A ) = m2
m3 (A \ Ac ) = 1 I (A)
c
m2 (A [ A ) = 0
m3 (A [ Ac ) = I (A)
4 (m? )2 + 2m? 4(1 T (A))T (A) = 0 and m? by the
where m?1 is given by the solution of equation 64e2(m?1 )
1
1
2
4
2
2
?
?
?
(m2 ) + 2m2 4(1 F (A))F (A) = 0. The mapping m3 (:) comes from the
solution of equation 64e (m2 )
necessity to not assign a prior preference to A rather than to Ac when only indeterminacy is available.
Case 2 : We assume now that each neutrosophic evidence corresponds only to a triplet of real intervals belonging
to [0; 1]. In this case, the more general mapping is proposed.

m1 (A) = mT 21 m?1
m1 (Ac ) = 1 MT
m1 (A \ Ac ) = m?1
m1 (A [ Ac ) = MT

m2 (A) = 1 MF 1 m?
1 m? m2 (Ac ) = mF 1 m?2 2
2 1
2 2
m2 (A \ Ac ) = m?2
mT m2 (A [ Ac ) = MF mF

m3 (A) = (MI mI )=2
m3 (Ac ) = (MI mI )=2
m3 (A \ Ac ) = 1 MI
m3 (A [ Ac ) = mI

where mT , Inf(T (A)), MT , Sup(T (A)), mF , Inf(F (A)), MF , Sup(F (A)) and mI , Inf(I (A)), MI ,
4
2
Sup(I (A)). m?1 is given by the solution of equation 64e2 (m?1 ) (m?1 ) +2(1 MT + mT )m?1 4(1 MT )mT = 0
4
2
?
2
?
?
and m2 by the solution of equation 64e (m2 )
(m2 ) + 2(1 MF + mF )m?2 4(1 MI )mI = 0.



S

Case
S 3 (general case)S: We assume now that each component of neutrosophic value (T (A) = i Ti (A); I (A) =
j Ij (A); F (A) =
k Fk (A)) is actually the union of subintervals of [0; 1]. In such general case, we propose
to construct for each possible combinations of (Ti (A); Ij (A); Fk (A)) a corresponding general bpa as for case 2
then combine all bpa using the general rule of combination to get the global bpa relative to the proposition under
consideration.

Level 2 : the combination of evidences
We have just shown how general elementary bpa can be evaluated from each neutrosophic values of a report. For the
report R1, we have now in hands a set of bpa m1 (:); : : :mm (:) associated to every proposition in this report. Similarly,
we get also another set of bpa m01 (:); : : :m0n (:) for report R2. For each set of bpa, we are now able to compute the global
general bpa mR1 (:) and mR2 (:) from the general rule of combination (41) by

mR1 = m1  m2  : : :  mm
mR2 = m01  m02  : : :  m0n
The next step of the combination is then to combine the bpa mR1 with mR2 by applying for the last time the general

rule of combination (41) to f nally get the global result we are looking for; i.e.

m(:) = mR1  mR2
From the global bpa m(:) def ned on the hyper-power set D , we will then be able to evaluate the degree of belief of each
proposition of D which will help us to take the most pertinent decision for the problem under consideration.

6

Conclusion

In this paper, the foundations for a new theory of paradoxical and plausible reasoning has been developed which takes
into account in the combination process itself the possibility for uncertain and paradoxical information. The basis for the
development of this theory is to work with the hyper-power set of the frame of discernment relative to the problem under
consideration rather than its classical power set since, in general, the frame of discernment cannot be fully described in
terms of an exhaustive and exclusive list of disjoint elementary hypotheses. In such general case, no ref nement is possible
to apply directly the Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) of evidence. In our new theory, the rule of combination is justif ed
from the maximum entropy principle and there is no mathematical impossibility to combine sources of evidence even if
they appear at f rst glance in contradiction (in the Shafer’s sense) since the paradox between sources is fully taken into
account in our formalism. We have also shown that in general, the combination of evidence yields unavoidable paradoxes.
This theory has shown, through many illustrated examples, that conclusions drawn from it, provides results which agree
perfectly with the human reasoning and is useful to take a decision on complex problems where DST usually fails. The
last part of this work has been devoted to the development of a theoretical bridge between the neutrosophic logic and
this new theory, in order to solve the delicate problem of the combination of neutrosophic evidences. The neutrosophic
logic serves here as the most general framework (prerequesite) for dealing with uncertain and paradoxical sources of
information through this new theory.
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Abstract: This paper presents the concept of Dynamic Fuzzy Set (DFS) as an instance of
Neutrosophic Set (NS) useful in the modeling of dynamics of mental processes. For each
element of a NS there is a triple (T, F, I) understood as functions/operators dependent on
time, space, and other not necessarily known parameters. T determines a degree of truth
that a given element is in the set, while F and I are for a degree of false and
indeterminacy, respectively. DFS has been defined as such a set that for each of its
elements there is a function that for a given time returns a value of membership of a
given element to the set. Based on DFS one can perform an extraordinary fuzzy
inferencing as battle between populations of copies of contradictory statements. It has
been observed that resulting membership values may change in time even when the
processed data remain constant. Psychological justification of DFS came from
empirically confirmed fact that that subject’s feelings about a perceived person or social
situation can oscillate from a highly positive value to a highly negative value and back
even in absence of new data about related objects.
1 INTRODUCTION
The concept of the fuzzy set, invented in the 60’s [8] has proved to reflect the way
humans categorize [4]. However, while categorization is an important determinant of
human behavior, it is not the only determinant. In order to model mental mechanisms
underlying human interactions with surrounding reality a number of logics has been
invented, however each of them deals rather with a selected isolated facet of mental
activity. Neutrosophic approach proposed by Florentin Smarandache tries to bring all the
logics together towards a unitary, formally analyzable, general model of reality [5]. A
part of the neutrosophic model called Neutrosophic Set (NS) intended to generalize fuzzy
set. From another attempt to generalize the concept of fuzzy set the idea of Dynamic
Fuzzy Set (DFS) emerged. Let as, therefore, compare the two definitions:
Definition 1 (Smarandache [5: 77]):
Neutrosophic Set is a set such that an element belongs to the set with a
neutrosophic probability, i.e. t% is true that the element is in the set, f% false,
and i% indeterminate.
Definition 2 (based on Buller [1]):
Dynamic Fuzzy Set is a fuzzy set such that an element belongs to the set with a
membership value that changes in time.
In [5: 78] some examples of NS application suggesting that NS much better than classic
fuzzy set reflect complex truth about reality one can find can be found. Nevertheless, the
early definition of NS cited above says nothing about a space to which t%, f% and i%
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belong. If t%, f% and i% were interpreted as real numbers, DFS could be treated as a
different sort of generalization of fuzzy set, not included in the concept of NS. But the
concept of NS evolved. Let’s present another definition:
Definition 3 (based on Smarandache [8: 111] and Smarandache [9]):
Neutrosophic Set included in a universe of discourse is a set such that an
element from the universe belongs to the set in such a way that t% is true that
the element is in the set, f% false, and i% indeterminate, where t varies in T, f
varies in F, i varies in I, where T, I, F are functions/operators depending on
many known and unknown parameters; here T(…), I(…), F(…) are standard or
non-standard subsets included in the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[.
Compared to the Fuzzy Set, the Neutrosophic Set can distinguish between
‘absolute membership’ (appurtenance) of an element to a set (T= 1+), and
‘relative membership’ (T=1), whereas the ‘partial membership’ is represented by
0 < T < 1. Also, the sum of neutrosophic membership components (truth,
indeterminacy, falsehood) are not required to be 1 as in fuzzy membership
components, but may be any number between 0 and 3.
Since Definition 3 allows T, I and F to be dependent on time (as one of the known
parameters), DFS may be recognized as an instance of NS such that, for example, t% : T
→ [0, 1], i = 0 = const., f% : T → [0, 1], ∀t∈T f% = 1 – t%, where T is a space of integers
representing moments in time.
The importance of DFS comes from increasing interest in dynamic processes in
psychology. The development of social cognition caused in the 90’s an increasing
interest in intrinsic dynamics of human categorization. Experiments confirmed that when
judging a perceived person or social situation people sometimes oscillate from highly
positive feelings to highly negative feelings even in absence of new data [3]. Similar
oscillations were demonstrated by computational models of human working memory that
treated mental process as a “debate” in a “society of memes” in a cellular working
memory [2]. The idea of Dynamic Fuzzy Calculus (DFC) based on DFS emerged from
the research on the models.
2 Dynamic Fuzzy Calculus
Let E = {∅, e1, ¬e1, e2, ¬e2, …} be the space of particular notions, where ∅ denotes a
notion of reference while ¬ is the operator of negation. Let T be the space of integers
representing time, while A be a space of functions such that ∀µ∈A µ : E2 → [0, 1]K, where
K is a positive integer.
Let the entity of interest be a space B° such that
∀a∈B° a : T → A
Any element of B° may be considered as a system of relationships between notions. Each
of the relationships applies to a pair of notions and expresses itself as a K-element vector
of real numbers not lesser than 0 not greater than 1. Elements of the vector can be
interpreted as strengths of several sorts of memberships of the second notion in a pair to a
DFS represented by the first notion in the pair. Each of the strengths may, by definition,
change over time.
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When a system consists of a set of related notions and the relationships between the
notions change in time we say could say that in the system a kind of mental activity takes
palace. Buller [1] argues that thinking is nothing but changing relationships between
notions, and concludes that any element of the space B° could be considered to be a
model of a mind or even to be a mind itself. The thing that is the source of inconstancy of
the relationships within B° is a brain that can be understood as any machine dedicated to
a given a∈B° that processes every at onto at+1.
The space B′′ contains minds that use brains understood as external devices to
determine relationships between specific notions for consecutive moments of time.
Formally:
a∈B′′ ⇔ ( a∈B°°, ∃〈x, F〉 x = (x0, x1, x2, …, xN),
x : T → MN, F : A × MN → A × MN,
(at+1, xt+1) = F(at, xt) ),
where M = E2 is the space of memes, while N is a positive integer. The brain may be,
therefore, considered as the couple 〈x, F〉.
Appendix contains a description of an instance of a∈B′ reflecting an isolated process of
social judgment. Some simulation results appeared to fit the psychological evidence that
subjects may oscillate from highly positive feelings to highly negative feelings without
new data about objects of reference, i.e. based exclusively on intrinsic dynamics of
mental process. It has been suggested that the membership of reference tended to a 2state limit cycle attractor.
Neurotrophic dynamics
Let us consider a situation wherein somebody becomes a victim of a sexual assault.
Among a number of possible plots of the victim’s feelings towards the perpetrator let us
consider: (a) start from extreme hatred in t0 and then a linear decay of the hatred towards
indifference in tk, and (b) constant extreme hatred that in 0.75 tk turns suddenly into
perverse love. In terms of DFS we can describe each of the cases via providing of
appropriate formula for function µH,t, where µH,t= 1 means that the perpetrator in time t
fully belongs to the dynamic fuzzy set of people extremely hated by the victim, µH,t=0
may mean that the perpetrator in time t fully belongs to the dynamic fuzzy set of people
extremely loved by the victim, while µH,t=0.5 may mean that the perpetrator in time t is
perfectly indifferent to the victim. If one wanted to describe the victim’s feelings for t∈[
t0, tk] in terms of classic fuzzy sets, the simplest solution would be to provide µH as the
average value of µH,t in the period [ t0, tk]. The unavoidable price for this simplicity is loss
of the knowledge ablot the essence of the victim’s mental states. Indeed, in both
considered cases the µH would take the same value 0.75. As for full neutrosophic
generalization, much more knowledge about subjects’ mental states could be added to the
model if the neutrosophic component I were included and allowed to change in time.
However, the question how to measure subjects’ indeterminacy, especially in reference to
social judgment, remains open.
Conclusions
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Psychological evidence provides justification for cognitive models based on Dynamic
Fuzzy Sets (DFS) and Dynamic Fuzzy Calculus that deal with membership values
changing over time. Subjects’ oscillation from highly positive feelings to highly negative
ones and back when knowledge about an object of interest remains constant can be
interpreted in terms of membership to a dynamic fuzzy set tending to a 2-state limit cycle
attractor. DFS-based modeling also seems to lead to the philosophical thesis that mind is
nothing but relationships that occur between certain notions, and that change over time.
Neutrosophic approach intends to generalize existing logics to the most possible extent.
DFS can be assumed to be an instance of Neutrsophic Set. A possibility generalization of
DFS in the course of adding of more neutrosophic components, for example,
indeterminacy factor, encourages to search for new ways of experimental exploration of
dynamics of social judgment and for new ways of mathematical description of mental
processes.
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Appendix. Dynamic Fuzzy Calculus in a model of social judgment (based on [1])
Let us consider an instance of a∈B′ such that:
1. K=2;
2. E = {∅, N, n, R, r, A, a}, where n=¬N, r=¬R, a= ¬A;
3. ∀t∈T m∉{〈s|m〉∈E2 | m≠∅ ⇒ s∉{∅, m}} ⇒ µs,t(m) = 0;
4. ∀t∈T µs,t(¬m) = 1 - µs,t(m);
5. ∀t∈T x0,t = 〈∅|∅〉,
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6. if ui,t = 〈∅|∅〉 then xi,t = νt, while if ui,t ≠ 〈∅|∅〉 then xi,t = ui,t, where
7. ∀m′′∈M P(νt = m′ ) = µ1(m′, t)µ2(m′, t) / ∑m∈M µ1(m, t)µ2(m, t), where ∀Z P(Z) is
probability of Z;
8. ui,t : ZN × T → M, ∀ i,j,k∈ZN, ui,t = ψ(xj,t, xk,t), where j=Li(xt), k=Ri(xt), where ZN =
{ι∈I | 0≤ι≤N}, where Z is the space of integers, while
9. ψ : M2 → M, ∀m∈M ∀α,β∈E | α≠β, ¬α≠β
m ∈{ 〈β|α〉, 〈¬α|∅〉 } ⇒ ψ(〈α|∅〉, m) = 〈∅|∅〉;
m ∉{ 〈β|α〉, 〈¬α|∅〉 } ⇒ ψ(〈α|∅〉, m) = 〈α|∅〉;
m ∉{ 〈α|∅〉, 〈¬α|∅〉 } ⇒ ψ(〈β|α〉, m) = 〈β|α〉;
ψ(〈β|α〉, 〈α|∅〉) = 〈β|∅〉; ψ(〈β|α〉, 〈¬α|∅〉) = 〈¬β|∅〉;
10. L, R : ZN × MN → ZN,
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
xp, t ≠ 〈∅|∅〉
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
xq, t ≠ 〈∅|∅〉
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
xr, t ≠ 〈∅|∅〉
r p r p r p p p
Lw(ϕ,λ,0)(xt)
q q p q p q r r
Rw(ϕ,λ,0)(xt)
q q q q q q q q
Lw(ϕ,λ,1)(xt)
p p p p p p p 0
Rw(ϕ,λ,1)(xt)
r r r r p r r r
Lw(ϕ,λ,2)(xt)
p p q q q q p p
Rw(ϕ,λ,2)(xt)
where p = w(ϕp, λ p, 2), q = w(ϕq, λq, 1), r = w(ϕr, λr, 0), ϕp = (ϕ + ϕmax) mod ϕmax + 1, ϕq
= ϕ, ϕr = (ϕ + 1) mod ϕmax + 1, λq = (λ + λmax) mod λmax + 1, if ϕ mod 2 ≠ 0 then λp = λr
= λ, if ϕ mod 2 = 0 then λp = λr = (λ + λmax) mod λmax + 1, where
11. w is any one-by-one function such that w : G → ZN, where G = {(ϕ, λ, δ) ∈ Z | 0 ≤ ϕ
≤ ϕmax, 0 ≤ λ ≤ λmax, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 2} ∪ {e}, (ϕmax, + 1)(λmax + 1) = N, e is any element such
that e≠∅;
12. ∀m∉{〈A|∅〉, 〈a|∅〉} µ1(m, t) = const., while µ1(〈A|∅〉, t) = NA / (NA + Na), where for a
given notion e, Ne = Ce, N, Ce, 0 = 0, Ce, i+1 = Ce, i + j, j = 1 if xi, t = e, while j = 0 if xi, t ≠ e;
where CJ, i is an auxiliary counter.
13. ∀m∈M µ2(m, t) = const.
Assuming that N and R represent ‘nicety’ and ‘richness’ of a date proponent, respectively,
while A|∅ is a meme suggesting subject’s readiness to having the date, let us simulate the
plot of µ1(〈A|∅〉, t). For given constant values µ1(〈N|∅〉, t)=.6, µ1(〈R|∅〉, t)=.4,
µ1(〈A|N〉, t)=µ1(〈A|R〉, t)=1.0, µ2(〈N|∅〉, t) =µ2(〈R|∅〉, t)=.67, µ2(〈A|N〉, t)=µ2(〈A|R〉, t)=.2,
F produces a plot of µ1(〈A|∅〉, t) such as, for examle:
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ABSTRACT:
Probabilistic methods have been used to model uncertainty in many optimization
problems, an alternative is to use NeuroFuzzy and Neutrosophic control methods
to model uncertainties with new economies. New economies have a solid impact
on the growth of financial markets. In this day of age, one needs to be able to
monitor these rapid dynamical changes with as much precision as possible. The
NeuroFuzzy and Neutrosophic control based optimization minimizes the system
possibility of failure.
Therefore, we are able to formulate our optimal control model with significant
reliability. NeuroFuzzy systems combine the advantages of fuzzy systems - the
transparent representation of knowledge and the ability to cope with uncertainties
with the advantages of neural nets. In this paper, we have proposed and
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designed a NeuroFuzzy and Neutrosophic and control system for analysing the
impact of new economies growth and decline.

1. Introduction:
In recent years, substantial progress has been made in our ability to model and
deal with uncertainty through computationally - orientated techniques. In finance,
there is a long-standing tradition that probability theory is the only available tool
for dealing with a stochastic nature. Recently, however the validity has been
called into question by researchers, the development of other tools - centered on
possibility theory and neurofuzzy control for dealing with uncertainty. Sengupta
created a model of Shumpeterian Dynamics. In that model, two key variables
were introduced through a two staged formulation using Schumpeterian
dynamics. Sengupta formulated a model for innovation input in the form of
knowledge capitol, the stochastic process followed as a birth and death process
mechanism, where Bt represents new ideas and Dt represents the relative
obsolescence or destruction of the old. In this paper we will illustrate a
comparison of modeling using Schumpeterian dynamics versus Neurofuzzy and
Neutrosophic control modeling solely emphasizing this application to new
economies. As we all are aware of the hundreds of new companies entering the
market - Bt - birth at the same instance there are companies exiting the market Dt
- death. we will demonstrate the entrance and exiting phenomena using
Neurofuzzy control.
2. The stochas
stochastic
tic model proposed by Sengupta
Sengupta11,12 has given the mean the variance of the innovation input as follows:
E(xt+1)= xt e bt-dt= er1 xt , r1= bt-dt (2.1)
and Var ( xt+1) = bt+dt/bt-dt [ er1-1] er1xt if bt ≠ dt (2.2)
= 2btdt. One can observe that equation (2.2) does not hold when bt=dt. That is, if
bt=dt , the variance (xt+1) is not defined and is not equal to 2btdt. The elimination
of (2.2) will lead to some jump discontinuity of the growth model
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Given the stochastic innovation process E(xt+1)=xt+Bt-Dt and using the
assumption that the birth and death flows are endogenously determined. That is,
Bt=bo+b1xt+b2xt-1 (2.3)
Dt=d0+d1xt+d2xt-1 (2.4)
It is noted that xt= - β o +β 1xt+1 +β 2xt+1.
The generalized formula of the past history and future expectations given in his
paper will only consider the case when bt≠ dt. In his model xt has been expressed
as values of t +1 with different coefficients β 1 and β 2 and in the general form
which is given by
xt= -β 0+ Σ mi=1 β

11i

xt-i + Σ ni=1β 2 2i xt+i (2.5)

xt has been expressed as functions of t+1 and t-1.
Equation (2.5) will lead to some designated path of optimization for only a special
case when bt≠ dt are and it does not include all the possibilities such as when β
1=β 2.

We have shown when bt=dt the variance is not defined and the E(xt+1)=xt.
It is claimed that when b2>d2 with b1≥ d1 the net result is positive growth and when
b2<d2 with b1≥ d1 the future impact through demand pull is much stronger than the
past trend in innovation. This is true only if bt≠ dt. In this model, it is assumed
that birth and death of new economies take two absolute forms. i.e. being true or
false. We have considered a Neutrosophic design for three states being T,I,F.
We have an alternative approach for dealing with this model. In section, 3 we will
build our NeuroFuzzy and Neutrosophic system.
3. Fuzzy and Neutrosophic rules and three state Design for the birth and death
rate of new economies
The fuzzy rules in our model is given as follows:
IF bt is Positive-Big AND dt is Positive-Small THEN the control output Growth=1
(T)
IF bt is Positive-Small AND dt is Positive-Big THEN the control output Growth=2
(I)
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IF is Positive-Small AND dt is Positive-Small THEN the control output Growth=3
(T)
IF is Positive-Big AND dt is Positive-Big THEN the control output Growth=3 (F)
These functions results in a relationship matrix with a membership function
defined as µ 3R (bt,dt,growth)=µ A x B (bt,dt)-------> µ E(growth)===>( T,I, F)
µ 3R (bt,dt,growth) is the membership value of error element (bt), change in error
element (dt) and the resulting control action growth in the three dimensional
implication function ( A x B---->E).
The first step is to classify our neural model. We have used 90 samples and
applied Neutrosophic classification ( T,I,F) in three states ( T.I,F) , the
Neutrosophic approach is to cast out undesirable clusters in our training data.
The linguistic variables, terms, membership functions, rule blocks, rules and
interfaces have been incorporated, in our computation, the winner neuron is 4
meaning that in every training iteration 4 rules are applied. This was the optimum
for our model after 40 runs were executed. In our model, the average error of all
samples is computed and Neutrosophic error of the worse sample is determined.
These values indicate the dynamical changes of the birth and death of new
economies can be measured in a set of optimum target shooting in three distinct
forms ( T,I,F) . We have not included the long computational results in this short
paper.
4. Computational Method:
Now we need to build our NeuroFuzzy system. We have run 10000 iteration
using Fuzzytech software and as a result the parameters of our system has been
chosen as follows:
Maximum step=200
Maximum Deviation=3%
Average Deviation=.1
Neural network learning method:
Batch Random
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Step width =.03
Winner Neuron=4
Isodata cluster configuration
1 b(t) .03 .90 2 input
2 d(t) .01 .90 2 input
3 Growth 1 3 2 output
1 b(t) .03 .90 2 output
2 d(t) .01 .90 2 output
3 Growth 1 3 2 output
We have defined the defuzzification box and the best compromise is used in
most control applications. The rule block is 1 with random Dos value generator.
5.Conclusions:
Qualitatively, these examples demonstrate some of the potential power of
NeuroFuzzy and Netrosophic control as applied to new economies problems.
Rapid changes by the introduction of ever changing technology have made the
use of traditional statistical methods questionable. In financial markets one would
need to know the rate of growth of new economies at any given time to be able to
form a dynamical optimization pattern. The fine tuning of NeroFuzzy and
Neutrosophic controllers are intuitive and would likely further benefit from
automatic processing by neural networks or genetic algorithms. Future research
will focus on finding a systematic approach to tuning the NeuroFuzzy and
Neutrosophic controllers, which would be of great use in financial engineering
and risk optimizations and analyzing stock price behavior.
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Abstract: As an addenda to the previous papers on “Neutrosophy” and “Neutrosophic
Logic” from these proceedings, thirty-two new definitions are presented, derived from
neutrosophic set, neutrosophic probability, neutrosophic statistics, and neutrosophic
logic. Each one is independent, short, and cross-referenced like in a dictionary. They
constitute the author’s future exploration.
Keywords: Fuzzy set, fuzzy logic; neutrosophic logic;
Neutrosophic set, intuitionistic set, paraconsistent set, faillibilist
set, paradoxist set, pseudo-paradoxist set, tautological set, nihilist set,
dialetheist set, trivialist set;
Classical probability and statistics, imprecise probability;
Neutrosophic probability and statistics, intuitionistic probability
and statistics, paraconsistent probability and statistics, faillibilist
probability and statistics, paradoxist probability and statistics,
pseudo-paradoxist probability and statistics, tautological probability
and statistics, nihilist probability and statistics, dialetheist probability
and statistics, trivialist probability and statistics;
Neutrosophic logic, paradoxist logic (or paradoxism), pseudo-paradoxist
logic (or pseudo-paradoxism), tautological logic (or tautologism).
2000 MSC: 03E99, 03-99, 03B99, 60A99, 62A01, 62-99.
Introduction:
As a consequence to [1], [3], [4-7] we display the below unusual
extensions of definitions resulted/deviated from neutrosophics in
the Set Theory, Probability, and Logic. Some of them are listed
in the Dictionary of Computing [2]. Further development of these
definitions (including properties, applications, etc.) is in our
research plan.
1. Definitions of New Sets
====================================================
1.1. Neutrosophic Set:
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<logic, mathematics> A set which generalizes many existing classes
of sets, especially the fuzzy set.
Let U be a universe of discourse, and M a set included in U.
An element x from U is noted, with respect to the set M, as x(T,I,F),
and belongs to M in the following way: it is T% in the set
(membership appurtenance), I% indeterminate (unknown if it is in the
set), and F% not in the set (non-membership);
here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in the
non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively.
Therefore: -0 # inf(T) + inf(I) + inf(F) # sup(T) + sup(I) + sup(F) # 3+.
Generalization of {classical set}, {fuzzy set}, {intuitionistic set},
{paraconsistent set}, {faillibilist set}, {paradoxist set},
{tautological set}, {nihilist set}, {dialetheist set}, {trivialist}.
Related to {neutrosophic logic}.
====================================================
1.2. Intuitionistic Set:
<logic, mathematics> A set which provides incomplete
information on its elements.
A class of {neutrosophic set} in which every element x is
incompletely known, i.e. x(T,I,F) such that
sup(T)+sup(I)+sup(F)<1;
here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in
the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively.
Contrast with {paraconsistent set}.
Related to {intuitionistic logic}.
====================================================
1.3. Paraconsistent Set:
<logic, mathematics> A set which provides paraconsistent information
on its elements.
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A class of {neutrosophic set} in which every element x(T,I,F) has the
property that sup(T)+sup(I)+sup(F)>1;
here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in the
non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth, indeterminacy,
and falsity percentages respectively.
Contrast with {intuitionistic set}.
Related to {paraconsistent logic}.
====================================================
1.4. Faillibilist Set:
<logic, mathematics> A set whose elements are uncertain.
A class of {neutrosophic set} in which every element x has a
percentage of indeterminacy, i.e. x(T,I,F) such that inf(I)>0;
here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included
in the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively.
Related to {faillibilism}.
====================================================
1.5. Paradoxist Set:
<logic, mathematics> A set which contains and doesn't contain
itself at the same time.
A class of {neutrosophic set} in which every element x(T,I,F) has
the form x(1,I,1), i.e. belongs 100% to the set and doesn't
belong 100% to the set simultaneously;
here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in
the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[ , representing truth,
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively.
Related to {paradoxism}.
====================================================
1.6. Pseudo-Paradoxist Set:
<logic, mathematics> A set which totally contains and partially doesn't contain
itself at the same time,
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or partially contains and totally doesn’t contain itself at the same time.
A class of {neutrosophic set} in which every element x(T,I,F) has
the form x(1,I,F) with 0<inf(F)[sup(F)<1 or x(T,I,1) with 0<inf(T)[sup(T)<1,
i.e. belongs 100% to the set and doesn't belong F% to the set simultaneously, with
0<inf(F)[sup(F)<1,
or belongs T% to the set and doesn't belong 100% to the set simultaneously, with
0<inf(T)[sup(T)<1;
here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in
the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively.
Related to {pseudo-paradoxism}.
====================================================
1.7. Tautological Set:
<logic, mathematics> A set whose elements are absolutely
determined in all possible worlds.
A class of {neutrosophic set} in which every element x has the
form x(1+,-0,-0), i.e. absolutely belongs to the set;
here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included
in the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively.
Contrast with {nihilist set} and {nihilism}.
Related to {tautologism}.
====================================================
1.8. Nihilist Set:
<logic, mathematics> A set whose elements absolutely
don’t belong to the set in all possible worlds.
A class of {neutrosophic set} in which every element x has the
form x(-0,-0,1+), i.e. absolutely doesn’t belongs to the set;
here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included
in the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively.
The empty set is a particular set of {nihilist set}.
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Contrast with {tautological set}.
Related to {nihilism}.
====================================================
1.9. Dialetheist Set:
<logic, mathematics> /di:-al-u-theist/ A set which contains at
least one element which also belongs to its complement.
A class of {neutrosophic set} which models a situation
where the intersection of some disjoint sets is not empty.
There is at least one element x(T,I,F) of the dialetheist set
M which belongs at the same time to M and to the set C(M),
which is the complement of M;
here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in the
non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively.
Contrast with {trivialist set}.
Related to {dialetheism}.
====================================================
1.10. Trivialist Set:
<logic, mathematics> A set all of whose elements also belong
to its complement.
A class of {neutrosophic set} which models a situation
where the intersection of any disjoint sets is not empty.
Every element x(T,I,F) of the trivialist set M belongs at the
same time to M and to the set C(M), which is the
complement of M;
here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets,
included in the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing
truth, indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively.
Contrast with {dialetheist set}.
Related to {trivialism}.
====================================================
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2. Definitions of New Probabilities and Statistics
====================================================
2.1. Neutrosophic Probability:
<probability> The probability that an event occurs is (T, I, F),
where T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in the
non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively.
Therefore: -0 # inf(T) + inf(I) + inf(F) # sup(T) + sup(I) + sup(F) # 3+.
Generalization of {classical probability} and {imprecise probability},
{intuitionistic probability}, {paraconsistent probability}, {faillibilist
probability}, {paradoxist probability}, {tautological probability},
{nihilistic probability}, {dialetheist probability}, {trivialist probability}.
Related with {neutrosophic set} and {neutrosophic logic}.
The analysis of neutrosophic events is called Neutrosophic Statistics.
====================================================
2.2. Intuitionistic Probability:
<probability> The probability that an event occurs is (T, I, F),
where T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in the
non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively,
and n_sup = sup(T)+sup(I)+sup(F) < 1,
i.e. the probability is incompletely calculated.
Contrast with {paraconsistent probability}.
Related to {intuitionistic set} and {intuitionistic logic}.
The analysis of intuitionistic events is called Intuitionistic Statistics.
====================================================
2.3. Paraconsistent Probability:
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<probability> The probability that an event occurs is (T, I, F),
where T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in the
non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively,
and n_sup = sup(T)+sup(I)+sup(F) > 1,
i.e. contradictory information from various sources.
Contrast with {intuitionistic probability}.
Related to {paraconsistent set} and {paraconsistent logic}.
The analysis of paraconsistent events is called
Paraconsistent Statistics.
====================================================
2.4. Faillibilist Probability:
<probability> The probability that an event occurs is (T, I, F),
where T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in the
non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively,
and inf(I) > 0,
i.e. there is some percentage of indeterminacy in calculation.
Related to {faillibilist set} and {faillibilism}.
The analysis of faillibilist events is called Faillibilist Statistics.
====================================================
2.5. Paradoxist Probability:
<probability> The probability that an event occurs is (1, I, 1),
where I is a standard or non-standard subset, included in the
non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing indeterminacy.
Paradoxist probability is used for paradoxal events (i.e. which
may occur and may not occur simultaneously).
Related to {paradoxist set} and {paradoxism}.
The analysis of paradoxist events is called Paradoxist Statistics.
====================================================
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2.6. Pseudo-Paradoxist Probability:
<probability> The probability that an event occurs is either (1, I, F) with
0<inf(F)[sup(F)<1, or (T, I, 1) with 0<inf(T)[sup(T)<1,
where T,I,F are standard or non-standard subset, included in the
non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing the truth, indeterminacy, and
falsity percentages respectively.
Pseudo-Paradoxist probability is used for pseudo-paradoxal events (i.e. which
may certainly occur and may not partially occur simultaneously,
or may partially occur and may not certainly occur simultaneously).
Related to {pseudo-paradoxist set} and {pseudo-paradoxism}.
The analysis of pseudo-paradoxist events is called Pseudo-Paradoxist Statistics.
====================================================
2.7. Tautological Probability:
<probability> The probability that an event occurs is more than one,
i.e. (1+, -0, -0).
Tautological probability is used for universally sure events (in all
possible worlds, i.e. do not depend on time, space, subjectivity, etc.).
Contrast with {nihilistic probability} and {nihilism}.
Related to {tautological set} and {tautologism}.
The analysis of tautological events is called Tautological Statistics.
====================================================
2.8. Nihilist Probability:
<probability> The probability that an event occurs is less than zero,
i.e. (-0, -0, 1+).
Nihilist probability is used for universally impossible events (in all
possible worlds, i.e. do not depend on time, space, subjectivity, etc.).
Contrast with {tautological probability} and {tautologism}.
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Related to {nihilist set} and {nihilism}.
The analysis of nihilist events is called Nihilist Statistics.
====================================================
2.9. Dialetheist Probability:
<probability> /di:-al-u-theist/ A probability space where at least
one event and its complement are not disjoint.
A class of {neutrosophic probability} that models a situation
where the intersection of some disjoint events is not empty.
Here, similarly, the probability of an event to occur is (T, I, F),
where T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included
in the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively.
Contrast with {trivialist probability}.
Related to {dialetheist set} and {dialetheism}.
The analysis of dialetheist events is called Dialetheist Statistics.
====================================================
2.10. Trivialist Probability:
<probability> A probability space where every event and its
complement are not disjoint.
A class of {neutrosophic probability}which models a situation
where the intersection of any disjoint events is not empty.
Here, similarly, the probability of an event to occur is (T, I, F),
where T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included
in the non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively.
Contrast with {dialetheist probability}.
Related to {trivialist set} and {trivialism}.
The analysis of trivialist events is called Trivialist Statistics.

71

====================================================
3. Definitions of New Logics
====================================================
This definition is not quite new but because the next ones are connected to
it we recall it:
3.1. Neutrosophic Logic:
<logic, mathematics> A logic which generalizes many existing classes
of logics, especially the fuzzy logic.
In this logic each proposition is estimated to have the percentage of truth in
a subset T, the percentage of indeterminacy in a subset I, and the percentage
of falsity in a subset F;
here T,I,F are real standard or non-standard subsets, included in the
non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing truth,
indeterminacy, and falsity percentages respectively.
Therefore: -0 # inf(T) + inf(I) + inf(F) # sup(T) + sup(I) + sup(F) # 3+.
Generalization of {classical or Boolean logic}, {fuzzy logic},
{multiple-valued logic}, {intuitionistic logic}, {paraconsistent logic},
{faillibilist logic, or failibilism}, {paradoxist logic, or paradoxism},
{pseudo-paradoxist logic, or pseudo-paradoxism}, {tautological logic, or
tautologism}, {nihilist logic, or nihilism}, {dialetheist logic, or dialetheism},
{trivialist logic, or trivialism}.
Related to {neutrosophic set}.
====================================================
3.2. Paradoxist Logic (or Paradoxism):
<logic, mathematics> A logic devoted to paradoxes, in which each
proposition has the logical vector value (1, I, 1);
here I is a real standard or non-standard subset, included in the
non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing the indeterminacy.
As seen, each paradoxist (paradoxal) proposition is true and false
simultaneously.
Related to {paradoxist set}.
====================================================
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3.3. Pseudo-Paradoxist Logic (or Pseudo-Paradoxism):
<logic, mathematics> A logic devoted to pseudo-paradoxes,
in which each proposition has the logical vector value:
either (1, I, F), with 0<inf(F)[sup(F)<1,
or (T, I, 1), with 0<inf(T)[sup(T)<1;
here I is a real standard or non-standard subset, included in the
non-standard unit interval ]-0, 1+[, representing the indeterminacy.
As seen, each pseudo-paradoxist (pseudo-paradoxal) proposition is:
either totally true and partially false simultaneously,
or partially true and totally false simultaneously.
Related to {pseudo-paradoxist set}.
====================================================
3.4. Tautological Logic (or Tautologism):
<logic, mathematics> A logic devoted to tautologies, in which each
proposition has the logical vector value (1+, -0, -0).
As seen, each tautological proposition is absolutely true (i. e, true in all
possible worlds).
Related to {tautological set}.
====================================================
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Abstract:
This study actually draws from and builds on “Benford’s law and its application in
financial misrepresented of a data ” (Kumar and Bhattacharya, 2001). here we have
simply added a neutrosophic dimension to the problem of determining the conditional
probability that a financial misrepresentation of the data set, has been actually committed,
given that no Type I error occurred while rejecting the null hypothesis H0: the observed
first-digit frequencies approximate a benford distribution; and accepting the alternative
hypothesis H1: the observed first-digit frequencies do not approximate a benford
distribution.
Keywords: Financial misrepresented data set, Benford’s law, probability distributions,
neutrosophic probability
Introduction:
1. Testing for manipulation in a set of accounting data.
Kumar and Bhattacharya, 2001, proposed a Monte Carlo adaptation of Benford’s law.
There has been some research already on the application of Benford’s law. However,
most of the practical work in this regard has been concentrated in detecting the first digit
frequencies from the account balances selected on basis of some known audit sampling
method and then directly comparing the result with the expected Benford frequencies.
We have voiced slight reservations about this technique in so far as that the Benford
frequencies are necessarily steady state frequencies and may not therefore be truly
reflected in the sample frequencies. As samples are always of finite sizes, it is therefore
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perhaps not entirely fair to arrive at any conclusion on the basis of such a direct
comparison, as the sample frequencies won’t be steady state frequencies.
However, if we draw digits randomly using the inverse transformation technique
from within random number ranges derived from a cumulative probability distribution
function based on the Benford frequencies; then the problem boils down to running a
goodness of fit kind of test to identify any significant difference between observed and
simulated first-digit frequencies. This test may be conducted using a known sampling
distribution like for example the Pearson’s χ² distribution. The random number ranges
for the Monte Carlo simulation are to be drawn from a cumulative probability distribution
function based on the following Benford probabilities given in Table I.
Table I
First

Significant 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Digit
Benford

0.30

0.17

0.12

0.09

0.07

0.06

0.05

0.05

0.04

Probability

1

6

5

7

9

7

8

1

6

The first-digit probabilities can be best approximated mathematically by the log-based
formula as was derived by Benford: P (First significant digit = d) = log10 [1 + (1/d)].

2. Computational Algorithm:
Define a finite sample size n and draw a sample from the relevant account balances
using a suitable audit sampling procedure
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1. Perform a continuous Monte Carlo run of length λ* ≈ (1/2ε)2/3 grouped in
epochs of size n using a customized MS-Excel spreadsheet.
2. Test for significant difference in sample frequencies between the first digits
observed in the sample and those generated by the Monte Carlo simulation by
using a “goodness of fit” test using the χ² distribution. The null and alternative
hypotheses are as follows:
H0: The observed first digit frequencies approximate a Benford distribution
H1: The observed first digit frequencies do not approximate a Benford
distribution
This statistical test will not reveal whether or not a data misrepresentation has
actually been committed. All it does is establish at a desired level of confidence, that the
accounting data has not been manipulated (if H0 cannot be rejected).
However, given that H1 is accepted and H0 is rejected, it could imply any of the
following events:
I. There is no manipulation - occurrence of a Type I error i.e. H0 rejected when true.
II. There is manipulation and such manipulation is definitely misrepresented.
III. There is manipulation and such manipulation may or may not be misrepresented
IV. There is manipulation and such manipulation is definitely not misrepresented

3. Neutrosophic Extension:
Neutrosophic probabilities are a generalization of classical and fuzzy probabilities
and cover those events that involve some degree of indeterminacy. It provides a better
approach to quantifying uncertainty than classical or even fuzzy probability theory.
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Neutrosophic probability theory uses a subset-approximation for truth-value as well as
indeterminacy and falsity values. Also, this approach makes a distinction between
“relative true event” and “absolute true event” the former being true in only some
probability sub-spaces while the latter being true in all probability sub-spaces. Similarly,
events that are false in only some probability sub-spaces are classified as “relative false
events” while events that are false in all probability sub-spaces are classified as “absolute
false events”. Again, the events that may be hard to classify as either ‘true’ or ‘false’ in
some probability sub-spaces are classified as “relative indeterminate events” while events
that bear this characteristic over all probability sub-spaces are classified as “absolute
indeterminate events”.
While in classical probability n_sup ≤ 1, in neutrosophic probability n_sup ≤ 3+ where
n_sup is the upper bound of the probability space. In cases where the truth and falsity
components are complimentary, i.e. there is no indeterminacy, the components sum to
unity and neutrosophic probability is reduced to classical probability as in the tossing of a
fair coin or the drawing of a card from a well-shuffled deck.
Coming back to our original problem of financial misrepresented of a data set, let E be
the event whereby a Type I error has occurred and F be the event whereby a
misrepresented set is actually detected. Then the conditional neutrosophic probability
NP (F | Ec) is defined over a probability space consisting of a triple of sets (T, I, U).
Here, T, I and U are probability sub-spaces wherein event F is t% true, i% indeterminate
and u% untrue respectively, given that no Type I error occurred.
The sub-space T within which t varies may be determined by factors such as past records
of the misrepresented data set in the organization and effectiveness of internal control
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systems. On the other hand, the sub-space U may be determined by factors like personal
track records of the employees in question, the position enjoyed and the remuneration
drawn by those employees. For example, if the magnitude of the embezzled amount is
deemed too frivolous with respect to the position and remuneration of the employees
involved. The sub-space I is most likely to be determined by the mutual inconsistency
that might arise between the effects of some of the factors determining T and U.

4. Conclusion:
No doubt then that the theory of neutrosophic probability opens up a new vista of
analytical reasoning for the techno-savvy forensic accountant. In this paper, we have only
posit that a combination of statistical testing of audit samples based on Benford’s law
combined with a neutrosophic reasoning could help the forensic accountant in getting a
better fix on the quantitative possibility of actually dealing with misrepresented financial
data set. This is an emerging science and thus holds a vast potential of future research
endeavours the ultimate objective of which will be to actually come up with a reliable,
comprehensive computational methodology to track down the misrepresented financial
data. We believe our present effort is only one initial step in that direction.
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Abstract: The paper presents a fresh new start on the neutrality of neutrosophy in
that “both A and Non-A” as an alternative to describe Neuter-A in that we conceptualize
things in both intentional and unintentional background. This unity of opposites
constitutes both objective world and subjective world. The whole induction of such
argument is based on the intensive study on Buddhism and Daoism including I-ching. In
addition, a framework of contradiction oriented learning philosophy inspired from the
Later Trigrams of King Wen in I-ching is meanwhile presented. It is shown that although
A and Non-A are logically inconsistent, but they are philosophically consistent in the
sense that Non-A can be the unintentionally instead of negation that leads to confusion. It
is also shown that Buddhism and Daoism play an important role in neutrosophy, and
should be extended in the way of neutrosophy to all sciences according to the original
intention of neutrosophy.
Keywords: Neutrosophy, Multi-valued logic, I-ching, Buddhism, Dao, Yin-yang,
Creativity, Contradiction, Illusion, Learning
2000 MSC: 03B60, 03B42
2. Objective world and subjective world
The common confusion about the objective world is: it is just what we see and feel. This
is however very wrong. In fact, this is rather a belief than an objective reflection, and
varies among different people, because none of us can prove it. In his paper “To be or not
to be, A multidimensional logic approach” Carlos Gershenson [2] has generalized proofs:
Everything is and isn't at a certain degree. (i.e., there is no absolute truth or
false);
Nothing can be proved (that it exists or doesn't) (i.e., no one can prove whether
his consciousness is right);
I believe, therefore I am (i.e., I take it true, because I believe so).
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It is something, but not that figured in our mind. This is the starting point in Daoism
(Liu [2]).
Daodejing begins with: “Dao, daoable, but not the normal dao; name, namable,
but not the normal name.” We can say it is dao, but it doesn’t mean what we say.
Whenever we mention it, it is beyond the original sense.
Daodejing mainly deals with the common problem: “What/who creates
everything in the world we see and feel?” It is dao: like a mother that bears things
with shape and form. But what/who is dao? It is just unimaginable, because
whenever we imagine it, our imagination can never be it (we can never completely
describe it: more we describe it, more wrong we are). It is also unnamable, because
whenever we name it, our concept based on the name can never be it.
Daoism illustrates the origin of everything as such a form that doesn’t show in
any form we can perceive. This is the reason why it says, everything comes from
nothingness, or this nothingness creates everything in forms in dynamic change.
Whatever we can perceive is merely the created forms, rather than its genuine
nature, as if we distinguish people by their outer clothes. We are too far from
understanding the nature, even for the most prominent figures like Einstein.
Therefore Name and Non-Name coexist pertaining to an object:
Object = both Name and Non-Name.
Then what should we do subjectively? Very simple: both intentionally and
unintentionally. Intentional conception relates to all the connotation and extension
pertaining to Name, and unintentional one to Non-Name.
There are alternative interpretations on Non-Name: unintentionally and
negatively. This is crucial in our confusion.
This is the contradiction between creativity and implementation, as is stated below.
3. Neutrosophy
Neutrosophy is a new branch of philosophy that studies the origin, nature, and scope
of neutralities, as well as their interactions with different ideational spectra.
It is the base of neutrosophic logic, a multiple value logic that generalizes the fuzzy logic
and deals with paradoxes, contradictions, antitheses, antinomies.
Characteristics of this mode of thinking:
- proposes new philosophical theses, principles, laws, methods, formulas, movements;
- reveals that world is full of indeterminacy;
- interprets the uninterpretable;
- regards, from many different angles, old concepts, systems:
showing that an idea, which is true in a given referential system, may be false in another
one, and vice versa;
- attempts to make peace in the war of ideas,
and to make war in the peaceful ideas;
- measures the stability of unstable systems,
and instability of stable systems.
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Let's note by <A> an idea, or proposition, theory, event, concept, entity, by <Non-A>
what is not <A>, and by <Anti-A> the opposite of <A>. Also, <Neut-A> means what is
neither <A> nor <Anti-A>, i.e. neutrality in between the two extremes. And <A'> a
version of <A>.
<Non-A> is different from <Anti-A>.
Main Principle:
Between an idea <A> and its opposite <Anti-A>, there is a continuum-power spectrum of
neutralities <Neut-A>.
Fundamental Thesis of Neutrosophy:
Any idea <A> is T% true, I% indeterminate, and F% false, where T, I, F _ ] -0, 1+ [.
Main Laws of Neutrosophy:
Let <α> be an attribute, and (T, I, F) _ ] -0, 1+ [3. Then:
- There is a proposition <P> and a referential system {R}, such that <P> is T% <α>, I%
indeterminate or <Neut-α>, and F% <Anti-α>.
- For any proposition <P>, there is a referential system {R}, such that <P> is T% <α>, I%
indeterminate or <Neut-α>, and F% <Anti-α>.
- <α> is at some degree <Anti-α>, while <Anti-α> is at some degree <α>.
4. Creativity and implementation
We can model our mind in the alternation of yin and yang that is universal in everything
(Feng Liu):
Yang pertains to dynamic change, and directs great beginnings of things; yin to
relatively static stage, and gives those exhibited by yang to their completion.
In the course of development and evolution of everything yang acts as the
creativity (Feng Liu) that brings new beginnings to it, whereas yin implements
it in forms as we perceive as temporary states. It is in this infinite parallelism
things inherit modifications and adapt to changes.
On our genuine intelligence — creativity (Liu [4])
In the query about the figure on the left, whenever we hold the
answer as a circle, we are inhibiting our creativity. Nor should we
hold that it is a cake, a dish, a bowl, a balloon, or the moon, the sun,
for we also spoil our creativity in this way. Then, what is it?
“It is nothing.”
Is it correct? It is, if we do not hold on to the assumption “it is
something”. It is also wrong, if we persist in the doctrine “the figure is
something we call nothing.” This nothing has in this way become
something that inhibits our creativity. How ridiculous!
Whenever we hold the belief “it is …”, we are loosing our
creativity. Whenever we hold that “it is not …”, we are also
loosing our creativity. Our true intelligence requires that we
completely free our mind — neither stick to any extremity nor to “no
sticking to any assumption or belief”. This is a kind of genius or gift
rather than logic rules, acquired largely after birth, e.g., through
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Buddhism practice. Note that our creativity lies just between
internationality and uninternationality.
Not (it is) and not (it is not),
It seems nothing, but creates everything,
Including our true consciousness,
The power of genius to understand all.
The further insight on contradiction compatible learning
philosophy inspired from the Later Trigrams of King Wen of Iching shows that:
When something (controversial) is perceived (in Zhen), it is
referred (in Xun) to various knowledge models and, by
assembling the fragments perceived from these models, we
reach a general pattern to which fragments attach (in Li), as
hypothesis, which needs to be nurtured and to grow up (Kun) in
a particular environment. When the hypothesis is mature
enough, it needs to be represented (in Dui) in diverse situations, and to expand
and contradict with older knowledge (in Qian) to make update, renovation,
reformation or even revolution in knowledge base, and in this way the new
thought is verified, modified and substantialized. When the novel thought takes
the principal role (dominant position) in the conflict, we should have a rest (in
Kan) to avoid being trapped into depth (it would be too partial of us to persist
in any kind of logic, to adapt to the outer changes). Finally the end of cycle (in
Gen).
I-ching [in Chinese: Yi Jing] means: Yi = change, Jing = scripture. It
mainly deals with the creation, evolution (up and down) of everything in such
perspective that everything is an outer form of a void existence, and that
everything always exists in the form of unity (compensation,
complementation) of opposites…
This philosophy shows that contradiction acts as the momentum or
impetus to learning evolution. No controversy, no innovation. This is the
essentially of neutrosophy (Florentin Smarandache).
In the cycle there is unintentionally implied throughout it:
Where do the reference models relating to the present default model
come from? They are different objectively.
How can we assemble the model from different or even incoherent
or inconsistent fragments?
If we always do it intentionally, how does the hypothesis grow on
its own, as if we study something without sleep?
How can our absolute intention be complemented without
contradiction?
Is it right that we always hold our intention?
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There is only one step between truth and prejudice — when
the truth is overbelieved regardless of constraint in situations, it
becomes prejudice.
Is there no end for the intention? Then, how can we obtain a
concept that is never finished? If there is an end, then it should be
the beginning of unintentionally, as yin and yang in Taiji figure.
Unintentionally can be alternately derived when the intention
is repeated over and over so that it becomes an instinct. It is even
severe that we develop a fallacy instinct.
5. Completeness and incompleteness: knowledge and practice
There always is contradiction between completeness and incompleteness of knowledge.
In various papers presented by Carlos Gershenson he proves this point. Same in Daoism
and Buddhism. This contradiction is shown in the following aspect:
a) People are satisfied with their knowledge relative to a default, well-defined
domain. But later on, they get fresh insight in it.
b) They face with contradictions and new challenges in their practice and further
development.
This reflects in our weakness that:
Do we understand ourselves?
Do we understand the universe?
What do we mean by knowledge, complete whole or incomplete? Our silliness
prompts us to try the complete specifications, but where on earth are they (Gershenson
[1])? Meanwhile, our effort would be nothing more than a static imitation of some
dynamic process (Liu [3]), since human understands the world through the
interaction of the inter-contradictory and inter-complementary two kinds of
knowledge: perceptual knowledge and rational knowledge - they can’t be split
apart.
In knowledge discovering, there are merely strictly limited condition that focus
our eyes to a local domain rather than a open extension, therefore our firsthand
knowledge is only relative to our default referential system, and extremely
subjective possibly.
Is it possible to reach a relatively complete piece at first? No, unless we were
gods (we were objective in nature).
Then we need to perceive (the rightness, falseness, flexibility, limitation, more
realistic conception, etc.) and understand the real meaning of our previous
knowledge — how: only through practice (how can we comprehend the word
“apple” without tasting it?)
Having done that, we may have less subjective minds, based on which the
original version is modified, revised, and adapted as further proposals.
Again through practice, the proposals are verified and improved.
This cycle recurs to the infinite, in each of which our practice is extended in a
more comprehensive way; the same to our knowledge.
Discover the truth through practice, and again through practice verify and
develop the truth. Start from perceptual knowledge and actively develop it into
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rational knowledge; then start from rational knowledge and actively guide
revolutionary practice to change both the subjective and the objective world.
Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats
itself in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and
knowledge rises to a higher level.
Through practice, we can
verify our knowledge
find the inconsistency, incompleteness of our knowledge, and face new
problems, new challenges as well
maintain critical thought
Therefore knowledge is based on the infinite critics and negation (partial or
revolutionary) on our subjective world. It is never too old to learn.
6. Conclusion
Whenever we say “it is”, we refer it to both subjective and objective worlds.
We can creatively use the philosophical expression both A and non-A to describe
both subjective world and objective worlds, and possibly the neutrality of both.
Whenever there is “it is”, there is subjective world, in the sense that concepts always
include subjectivity. So our problem becomes: is “it” really “it”? A real story of Chinese
Tang dynasty recorded in a sutra (adapted from Yan Kuanhu Culture and Education
Fund)shows that:
Huineng arrived at a Temple in Guangzhou where a pennant was being
blown by wind. Two monks who happened to see the pennant were debating
what was in motion, the wind or the pennant.
Huineng heard their discussion and said: “It was neither the wind nor the
pennant. What actually moved were your own minds.” Overhearing this
conversation, the assembly (a lecture was to begin) were startled at Huineng’s
knowledge and outstanding views.
When we see pennant and wind we will naturally believe we are right in our
consciousness, however it is subjective. In other words, what we call “the
objective world” can never absolutely be objective at all.
Whenever we believe we are objective, this belief however is subjective too.
In fact, all these things are merely our mental creations (called illusions in
Buddhism) that in turn cheat our consciousness: There is neither pennant nor
wind, but our mental creations.
The world is made up of our subjective beliefs that in turn cheat our
consciousness. This is in fact a cumulative cause-effect phenomenon.
Everyone can extricate himself out of this maze, said Sakyamuni and all the
Buddhas, Bodhisattvas around the universe, their number is as many as that of
the sands in the Ganges (Limitless Life Sutra).
References:

86

[1] C. Gershenson, Comments to Neutrosophy, Proceedings of the First International
Conference on Neutrosophy, Neutrosophic Logic, Set, Probability and Statistics,
University of New Mexico, Gallup, December 1-3, 2001,
http://www.gallup.unm.edu/~smarandache/CommentsToNeutrosophy.pdf
[2] C. Gershenson, To be or not to be, A multidimensional logic approach,
http://jlagunez.iquimica.unam.mx/~carlos/mdl/be.html .
[3] F. Liu, Dynamic Modeling of Multidimensional Logic in Multiagent Environment,
2001 International Conferences on Info-tech and Info-net Proceedings, IEEE Press,
People’s Post & Telecommunications Publishing House China, 2001, pp. 241-245
[4] F. Liu, Name, Denominable and Undenominable, — On Neither <A> Nor <AntiA>, Proceedings of the First International Conference on Neutrosophy, Neutrosophic
Logic, Set, Probability and Statistics, University of New Mexico, Gallup, December
1-3, 2001, http://www.gallup.unm.edu/~smarandache/FengLiu.pdf .
[5] F. Smarandache, A Unifying Field in Logics: Neutrosophic Logic. / Neutrosophy,
Neutrosophic Set, Neutrosophic Probability (second edition), American Research
Press, 1999, http://www.gallup.unm.edu/~smarandache/eBook-neutrosophics2.pdf .
[6] Yan Kuanhu, Culture and Education Fund: The Pictorial Biography of The Sixth
Patriarch Master Huineng, Shanghai Ancient Books Press, 2000.

87

Logic: a Misleading Concept.
A Contradiction Study toward Agent’s Logic Ontology
Feng Liu
Department of Management Science and Engineering
Shaanxi Economics and Trade Institute (South Campus)
South Cuihua Road, Xi'an, Shaanxi, 710061, P. R. China
E-mail: liufeng49@sina.com
Florentin Smarandache
Department of Mathematics
University of New Mexico, Gallup, NM 87301, USA
E-mail: smarand@unm.edu
Abstract: The paper presents a fresh new comprehensive ideology on
Neutrosophic Logic based on contradiction study in a broad sense: general critics on
conventional logic by examining the essence of logic, fresh insights on logic definition
based on Chinese philosophical survey, and a novel and genetic logic model as the
elementary cell against Von Neumann oriented ones based on this novel definition. As
for the logic definition, the paper illustrates that logic is rather a tradeoff between
different factors than truth and false abstraction. It is stressed that the kernel of any
intelligent system is exactly a contradiction model. The paper aims to solve the chaos of
logic and exhibit the potential power of neutrosophy: a new branch of scientific
philosophy.
Keywords: Contradiction, Neutrosophy, Neutrosophic Logic, Learning,
Perception, Multidimensional Logic, Social Intelligence, Illusion, Creativity
2000 MSC: 03B60, 03B42
1.

Background

Although it is commonly believed that intelligence is a social activity, and it is therefore
represented in multiagent forms, but its kernel, the logic of agents, remains controversial
with its static, monolateral or homogeneous forms.
This reflects in their behaviors as: our agents appear social in outer forms but
autarchic in nature, for this kind of multiagent system can never deal with controversies,
critics, conflicts or something with flexibility. Our multiagent system has become a sort
of software engineering or system engineering of fresh forms, failing to implement our
presumed social intelligence.
In the long-term exploration, one realizes that the problem takes its root in the
misleading definition of logic. Even the simplest logic such as “The earth turns around
the sun” and “I’ll visit him if it doesn’t rain and he is in” can lead to ambiguous or
contradictory actions of agent (Liu [7]). Limited to the length, I’ll present in this paper
only a framework to launch our discussion, as follows:
Fact: a belief rather than truth
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Logic: dependent of situations, not absolute
Logic is negating itself
Logic is only one perspective of learning, not an independent entity
As a part of learning, logic is dynamic
As a part of learning, logic is multilateral
Logic is always partial
Illusion and creativity
Many scientists argue about the need to model human intelligence in the general
level. The argument lies in our vague understanding of intelligent system (Liu [6]).
Intelligent system should be, in our opinion, a tradeoff machine in order to adapt to its
environment. Then a specific model becomes such a tradeoff between ideal philosophic
model and practical system model, in the hierarchy from philosophic layer down to a
specific application or situation constraint implementation. I’ll show this philosophy in
step ward way, as follows.
2.

Neutrosophy

Neutrosophy is a new branch of philosophy that studies the origin, nature, and scope
of neutralities, as well as their interactions with different ideational spectra.
It is the base of neutrosophic logic, a multiple value logic that generalizes the fuzzy logic
and deals with paradoxes, contradictions, antitheses, antinomies.
Characteristics of this mode of thinking:
proposes new philosophical theses, principles, laws, methods, formulas,
movements;
- reveals that world is full of indeterminacy;
- interprets the uninterpretable;
- regards, from many different angles, old concepts, systems: showing that an
idea, which is true in a given referential system, may be false in another one, and
vice versa;
- attempts to make peace in the war of ideas, and to make war in the peaceful
ideas;
- measures the stability of unstable systems, and instability of stable systems.
Let's note by <A> an idea, or proposition, theory, event, concept, entity, by <Non-A>
what is not <A>, and by <Anti-A> the opposite of <A>. Also, <Neut-A> means what is
neither <A> nor <Anti-A>, i.e. neutrality in between the two extremes. And <A'> a
version of <A>.
<Non-A> is different from <Anti-A>.
Main Principle:
Between an idea <A> and its opposite <Anti-A>, there is a continuum-power spectrum of
neutralities <Neut-A>.
Fundamental Thesis of Neutrosophy:
Any idea <A> is T% true, I% indeterminate, and F% false, where T, I, F _ ] -0, 1+ [.
Here ] -0, 1+ [ is a non-standard unit interval, with –0={0-ε, ε is a positive infinitesimal
number} and 1+={1+ε, ε is a positive infinitesimal number}.
Main Laws of Neutrosophy:
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Let <α> be an attribute, and (T, I, F) _ ] -0, 1+ [3. Then:
- There is a proposition <P> and a referential system {R}, such that <P> is T% <α>, I%
indeterminate or <Neut-α>, and F% <Anti-α>.
- For any proposition <P>, there is a referential system {R}, such that <P> is T% <α>, I%
indeterminate or <Neut-α>, and F% <Anti-α>.
- <α> is at some degree <Anti-α>, while <Anti-α> is at some degree <α>.
3.

Fact: a Belief rather than Truth

We start with an ancient problem based on the following contradiction:
● The sun turns around the earth.
● The earth turns around the sun.
Of cause nearly everyone of us would answer: the later is absolute right. Note that this is
merely a belief, because in Copernicus’s age the majority believed in the former. Has
anyone proved nowadays whether the former is incorrect? If yes, he must have assumed
that the sun is relatively fixed. Unfortunately this is also his belief, because none of us
has ever proved the absoluteness of his consciousness: when we see something, is it
really something or just we believe that there is something (we really touch something or
we really believe it is something we touched)? Or more specifically, is it an object or just
we hold long this same belief? Do we really exist as in form we see or just we believe so?
I have to introduce a heard experiment to show this point.
A blindfold person is told to be experimented with an iron burnt hot. And
through a chronic preparation before him, the iron is burnt fervid, and he is told
that the iron is gradually moved closer and closer to him.
“Yes, I am feeling hotter and hotter, …… really hot, extremely, ……”
The gradual process goes on and on, until suddenly, he is instructed to have his
skin burnt.
“Oh……”, his skin really burnt.
When he opened his eyes, there is nothing but the scorch in him—there is no
fire nor iron, but merely his imagination—it is strong enough to cause the effect.
I experienced another experiment in which four of us were pointing to a carefully set
small wooden stool while rotating around it. According our mutual will, the stool turned
itself in the same direction we turned!
Another fact (shown in a qigong journal quite a number of years ago, the following is
based on our memory) shows the same thing:
There is a qigong (commonly believed as some mental or physical exercise in
order to gather the “energy” from nature, qi (there are such a kind of substance in
Chinese medicine which is unseen but really affects our body), or the concentrative
power of will to maintain health from disease, it is not a feasible way to us) expert in
China who, through chronic practice, can “brake” a steel saw blade with nothing but
his will, and he had been succeeding in it nearly every time, even in many qigong
reports.
Once he re-showed the same talent to the huge audience with great curiosity. He
ordered: “break”, but unexpectedly, the blade remain exact the same as before, and
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the following tries turned out to be the same failures. The atmosphere became
extremely unfavorable.
Fortunately however, the chairman of the qigong report is experienced, and asked
the audience to cooperate: more you are confident, more successful the experiment.
Magically, the expert broke the blade with a single command.
Conclusion:
We have to confess from the three experiments that fact is really our belief—if a
single belief is not powerful enough to convince us, the mutual belief, especially of all
the human beings, is definitely strong enough to illude ourselves. While this cause-effect
goes on and on, we are unconsciously trapped in the inextricable web of deceit designed
by ourselves.
Only wise man can see through this kind of deceit, e.g., Master Huineng in Chinese
Tang dynasty when he saw an argument about a pennant aflutter: whether the wind was
moving or the pennant.
“Neither. What actually moved were your own minds.”(Liu [9], see also Yan
Kuanhu [3])
Everyone can become wise when understands this cause-effect, which is the basic
point of Buddhism (Chin Kung [1])
4.

Logic: Dependent of Situations, not Absolute

Take the logic 1+1=2 for example. Is it correct? Consider
black+white=?, explosive+fire=?, warm+cold=?, theory+practice=?, and
yin+yang = ?
Does the idiom “Blind People Touching an Elephant” really refer to blind men and
elephant?
Blind People Touching an Elephant, a story from the Mahapra Janaparamita
Sutra:
The story shows that the same elephant can be interpreted as such
different things as turnip, dustpan, pestle, bed, jar and rope by different blind
people who touch it in turn. The first one touches the tusk, the second the ear, the
third the foot, the fourth the back, the fifth the belly, and the last the tail.
Based on their different beliefs, the same elephant conveys diverse logics.
Conclusion:
Logic is more a kind of mental behavior than an objective understanding, i.e., it is
more a belief rather than truth; this belief is based on “facts” which are also beliefs.
This belief is subject to dynamic changes with situations, and more general belief
(general understanding) relative to more general situations could be too flexible to grasp
(e.g., Dao=yin+yang), therefore logic suggests varying explanations based on
particularity of situations.
5.

Logic is Negating Itself
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Logic comes as mental reflection and leads to new reflection. So, it is not the problem
of logic (validity) but the ways we reflect it, otherwise it would become the Chinese
room experiment.
J. R. Searle shows this “Chinese room problem” in his paper “Minds, brains and
programs”:
We set an Englishman which does not know Chinese, in a closed room, with
many symbols of the Chinese language, and a book of instructions in English of
how to manipulate the symbols when a set of symbols (instructions) is given. So,
Chinese scientists will give him instructions in Chinese, and the Englishman
will manipulate symbols in Chinese, and he will give a correct answer in
Chinese. But he is not conscious of what he did. We suppose that a machine
behaves in a similar way: it might give correct answers, but it is not conscious of
what it is doing.
Another argument on validity of logic is based on a Chinese idiom: Cutting a Mark
on the Boatside to Retrieve a Sword (Young):
Once, a man of the State of Chu (ancient China) took a boat to cross a river. It
so happened that his sword slipped off and fell into the water. Immediately he cut
a mark on the side of the boat and assured himself: “This is where I have dropped
my sword.”
By and by the boat came to the destination and stopped. The man plunged into
the stream at the point indicated by the incised mark trying to retrieve the lost
sword.
The boat has moved on, but not the sword. To recover his sword this way—
the man is indeed muddle-headed .
This prompts us to doubt whether logic is always applicable to other circumstances as
we know situation is subjective to constant change. It can be successful in closed systems
where every state is well defined, but how about open ones?
Daodejing (Wang Bi, Guo Xiang) begins with: “Dao, daoable, but not the normal
dao.” Referring to the natural law, we can say it is dao, but it doesn’t mean what we say.
Whenever we mention it, it is beyond the original sense.
In Daodejing the creator of everything is defined as dao: like a mother that bears
things with shape and form. But what/who is dao? It is just unimaginable, because
whenever we imagine it, our imagination can never be it (we can never completely
describe it: more we describe it, more wrong we are). Daoism illustrates the origin of
everything as such a form that doesn’t show in any form we can perceive. Whatever we
can perceive is merely the created forms, rather than its genuine nature, as if we know
people by their outer looks rather than by their inner intentions. We are too far from
understanding the nature.
Daodejing suggests that logic in the most original extremity is shapeless in
nature: it is unbodied, invisible, inexpressible, or even intangible.
● We frequently have such a feeling in learning English as a foreign language that
there is no fixed meaning but an intangible impression or feeling to a word: the
meaning varies with situations, contexts or even ages so that we can never assure
our comprehension. In fact, it is due to the unbridled usage in logic made by
people of different ages and districts—there is always creativity implied in the
word so that we can rely on nothing more than our own creativity.
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● Wherever there is logic, there is also the corresponding comprehensive
understanding to logic: also based on our creativity relative to the different
existences of human beings. Due to the diversity of comprehension,
interpretation and creativity to the same logic, there are varying versions of
perception (or conception) to the same logic.
Whenever we say “it is” by logic, we are subjective—how can we assure our
objectiveness? We may have developed it from some strictly limited domain under
constrained conditions, or it is merely a haphazard, because we can only observe limited
cases in our limited lives. How can we convey the logic to those with different
backgrounds, even with the slightest difference? How can we then assure the determinacy
of its truthness? Is that the reason that majority of people hold it (e.g., Darwin’s evolution
theory and the functional difference between left and right brain—both are controversial
in fact)? In fact none of the logics can be proved, even of we exist or not (Gershenson).
There is no truth and false actually: there is because the outcome has to meet
someone’s desire—they are merely the attributes of a tradeoff. One false dead can be true
in another perspective, e.g., eating much is good, because of the excellent taste and
nourishment, but it is also bad when he gets weighted. Neutrosophy (Smarandache)
shows that a true proposition to one referential system can be false to another.
Conclusion:
Validity of logic depends on the way we reflect it, not logic itself. Logic never proves
itself.
Logic is a matter of tradeoff (balance) between contradictory factors. There
seems no absolute correctness or falseness independent of environment.
There is dao, but not the kind we mentioned, accordingly, there is logic but not
what we specified.
6.

Logic is only One Perspective of Learning, not an Independent Entity

Logic comes from perception and leads to new perception. It is shown that human
understands the world through the interaction of the inter-contradictory and intercomplementary two kinds of knowledge: perceptual knowledge and rational
knowledge——they can’t be split apart.

93

Logic is created through perception in which void, intangible feelings or
impressions have been nurtured, brought up and developed into a mental model.
The logic born is nothing more than a subjective hypothesis at primitive stage—it is
not within the sense of truthness and falseness.
However, the terms (symbols) and syntax (rules) is only understood by perception
through practice. How can we imagine a bookworm who well reads books but has no
experience?
Where are truth and false born? There are no such beliefs at the first stage of practice
in fact (Daodejing):
When beauty is abstracted (Peter A. Merel)
Then ugliness has been implied;
When good is abstracted
Then evil has been implied.
So alive and dead are abstracted from nature,
Difficult and easy abstracted from progress,
Long and short abstracted from contrast,
High and low abstracted from depth,
Song and speech abstracted from melody,
After and before abstracted from sequence.
So it is that existence and non-existence give birth the one to (the idea of) the
other (James Legge); that difficulty and ease produce the one (the idea of) the
other; that length and shortness fashion out the one the figure of the other; that
(the ideas of) height and lowness arise from the contrast of the one with the
other; that the musical notes and tones become harmonious through the relation
of one with another; and that being before and behind give the idea of one
following another.
Accordingly (back to authors), the division between truth and false comes
from practice: there is truth, because the outcome is desired, and vice versa to
false. Furthermore, without false, where comes the truth? And without truth,
where comes the false? Human has been unintentionally comparing, weighing,
balancing and trading off between favorable and unfavorable, desired and
undesired, based on his prompt subjective and objective situations, hence comes
the abstraction (distinction).
Therefore, the distinction (or abstraction) of truth and false is nothing
more than desires that are subject to constant change.
Conclusion:
Truth is born from false and false from truth. They are exactly the measurement
of men’s practice. This measurement is by no means isolated from practical
situations.
Discover the truth through practice, and again through practice verify and
develop the truth. Start from perceptual knowledge and actively develop it into
rational knowledge; then start from rational knowledge and actively guide
revolutionary practice to change both the subjective and the objective world.
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Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats
itself in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and
knowledge rises to a higher level.
Accordingly, we need to represent learning in integral form:
Learning=∫d(perception)· d(logic)= ∫d(perception(object))· d(logic(object))
in time, space and situation domains, or in compound form:
Learning=∫d(perception· logic)
since perception and logic are interchangeable and inter-transformable (they melt each
other), or they are decomposable in the same manner as learning.
7.

As a Part of Learning, Logic is Dynamic

Logic depends on perception which is subject to dynamic change with environment, i.e.,
the truth value swings.

For the logic (Liu [7]):
“I’ll visit him if it doesn’t rain and he is in.”
To avoid being trapped in an instant case that “the clouds promise impending rain” or
“there is no answer at the moment I ring the door”, we need to learn the long-term trend
like “does it rain whole day” or “does he keep his promise”, to make a feasible plan (wait
or return).
Conclusion:

Learning=∫d(perception· logic)
in all its time, space and situation domains. Whenever we persist in some instant or
partial look, we loose the whole. Furthermore, whenever we are satisfied with onesided view, we also loose it.

8.

As a Part of Learning, Logic is Multilateral

Human is normally too confident of himself, no matter how partial or monolateral he is,
so that he always misleads himself.

A ball with a black hemisphere and a white hemisphere
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He may then solve such contradiction by standing on some other perspective.
However, he doesn’t succeed until he reaches the opposite side. This is where our yinyang philosophy starts.

Two kinds of partial reasoning are alternatively fired
The incompleteness of human mind (by no means can we assert the perfectness of
human being) indicates that human always reasons in partial mode, i.e., positively
partial at one time and negatively partial at another, as indicated by taiji figure. There
are plenty of reasons:
As a holograph of the universe, human behaves in rhythmed way, e.g.: positive
mode, negative mode, positive, negative… and so on, with each mode
complementing and inhibiting the opposite one.
Just because human sometimes stands on positive perspective and then the other,
the truth value (it is, not it is) is in constant change, as shown in dynamic state to
us.
There remains a learning procedure hidden in the above bilateral logic: human has
to balance the bilateral reasoning to adapt to his present or long-term situations, or
meet his needs.
It is from this inter-complementary and inter-inhibitory contradiction: the bilateral
model, that multilateral system is generated, according to Chinese yin-yang
philosophy or I-ching (in Chinese: Yijing, also known as the Book of Changes).
We can never base intelligence on the individual behavior, and this is the reason why
we need group or society to exchange our views. This is also the underlying essence of
multiagent approach that tries to simulate a society.
Based on our intensive exploration in Chinese philosophic perspective, a prototype of
logic cell is presented as an inter-complementary pair: the positive and the negative
logic engines represent positive partial reasoning and negative partial reasoning
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respectively, and a learning mechanism tries to assemble them to figure out the trend,
based on its present and long-term situations, and make choices among various
possibilities, e.g., to try a plan among a couple of possible plans. Suppose that each logic
engine is decomposable in the same manner, which clones the entire system.
It starts with default logic—although believed absolutely valid, it is actually partial in
nature as we know that human is by no means complete as long as he thinks in logic. This
partial activity is warmed up and up until some time (one day) contradiction arises. This
contradiction, growing up and up in previous partial mode, gives rise to negative
reasoning, which later on inhibits the original logic. This inter-complementary process
continues as the loop goes on and on, during which the contradiction tends to be
neutralized. However, this is only a temporary balance when the two engines reach an
agreement. New contradiction comes with the constant change in environment or
situations outside. There still remains a chronic cycle hidden in the rhythm for long-term
resolution. It is also important to note that this is a genetic proliferation in both time and
space complexity, for it can clone all its subsystems.
More intensive study is being carried out in neutrosophy.
Conclusion:
A practical reference frame should originate from a single contradiction or yin-yang
(see Daodejing or I-ching).
Every existence is of bilateral character, or double characters, with each
opposing and complementing the other to form a unity.
d(object) =
∂(object)
d(positive engine) +
∂ (object)
d(negative engine)
∂ (positive perspective)
∂ (negative perspective)

d(object) ____ d(reference frame)
= ∂ (object) d(yang) + ∂ (object) d(yin) =
∂ (yang)
∂ (yin)
d(reference frame)

Whenever we hold logic, we have already been standing on a default perspective. Is there
universal logic? No, unless we reconceptualize it in an opposite perspective, e.g., Daoist
or Buddhist view.
Conclusion:
When we hold logic, we have already believed that it is something. This belief in turn
inhibits our negative consciousness that it may be something else (to some degree) or it
can be another thing simultaneously (to some extent). We are in this way trapped. So:
“It is never too old (for a machine) to learn.”
9.

Concluding Remarks: Illusion and Creativity

It has long been illustrated in Daodejing (Wang Bi, Guo Xiang) that whenever we capture
dao as the natural law, universal method or logic, etc., what we capture can never be it.
Therefore:
Although we can learn logic, we can never capture it.
Whenever we do, what we capture is merely a distortion.
A famous poem from "Topic to Xilin Wall" by Su Shi, a great poet in the Chinese
Song Dynasty:
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A great mountain by vertical and horizontal view,
Far, near, high, low, and each not same.
I can't see the true face of Lushan,
Because I am just in there.
We cannot criticize ourselves just because we habitually and absolutely believe in
ourselves. Accordingly, we cannot keep a critical mind to our so called truth just because
we habitually and absolutely believe in so called truth. Is there really some kind of
(absolute) truth on earth?
One time in Tang dynasty China, the Fifth Patriarch of Buddhism announced to
his disciples that everyone write a verse to show his insight of the Buddhist
wisdom.
At this, the most eligible one presented on the wall the verse:
Our body be a Bodhi tree,
Our mind a mirror bright,
Clean and polish frequently,
Let no dust alight.
Just as a choreman in the mill of the temple, Huineng answered it with his own:
There is no Bodhi tree,
Nor stand of a mirror bright,
Since all is void,
Where can the dust alight?
Whenever we hold the belief “it is …”, we are loosing our creativity. Whenever
we hold that “it is not …”, we are also loosing our creativity. Our genuine intelligence
requires that we completely free our mind - neither stick to any extremity nor to “no
sticking to any assumption or belief” (Liu [8]).
As we mentioned previously, whenever there is truth, there is also false that is born
from/by truth—this abstraction (distinction) is fatal to our creativity.
Meanwhile, our creativity is nothing similar with things created (i.e., in the sense if
truth and false). It must be void in form (no definite form), something like dao, since
whenever we hold it, it is not our creativity. Nor does it mean to destroy everything (there
is nothing to destroy nor such action, if there was, it is no longer void).
There is nothing to destroy, nor anything to create.
If there is, it is rather our illusion than our creativity.
Because everything believed existing, true or false, is nothing more than our mental
creation, there is no need to pursuit these illusions, as illustrated in the Heart Sutra [3]:
When Bodhisattva Avalokiteshvara was practicing the profound Prajna
Paramita, he illuminated the Five Skandhas and saw that they are all empty, and he
crossed beyond all suffering and difficulty.
Shariputra, form does not differ from emptiness; emptiness does not differ from
form. Form itself is emptiness; emptiness itself is form. So too are feeling,
cognition, formation, and consciousness.
Shariputra, all Dharmas are empty of characteristics. They are not produced,
not destroyed, not defiled, not pure; and they neither increase nor diminish.
Therefore, in emptiness there is no form, feeling, cognition, formation, or
consciousness; no eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, or mind; no sights, sounds,
smells, tastes, objects of touch, or Dharmas; no field of the eyes up to and
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including no field of mind consciousness; and no ignorance or ending of ignorance,
up to and including no old age and death or ending of old age and death. There is
no suffering, no accumulating, no extinction, and no Way, and no understanding
and no attaining.
Because nothing is attained, the Bodhisattva through reliance on Prajna
Paramita is unimpeded in his mind. Because there is no impediment, he is not
afraid, and he leaves distorted dream-thinking far behind. Ultimately Nirvana! All
Buddhas of the three periods of time attain Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi through
reliance on Prajna Paramita. Therefore know that Prajna Paramita is a Great
Spiritual Mantra, a Great Bright Mantra, a Supreme Mantra, an Unequalled
Mantra. It can remove all suffering; it is genuine and not false. That is why the
Mantra of Prajna Paramita was spoken. Recite it like this:
Gaté Gaté Paragaté Parasamgaté
Bodhi Svaha!
Conclusion:
Everyone can extricate himself out of the maze of illusion, said Sakyamuni and all
the Buddhas, Bodhisattvas around the universe, their number is as many as that of the
sands in the Ganges (Limitless Life Sutra, Chin Kung).
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THE INTANGIBLE ABSOLUTE TRUTH
Gh. C. Dinulescu-Campina
Str. Bucea, No. 4, Bl. 38, Ap. 31
2150 Campina, Prahova, Romania
In the work ″The Modelling of Rationality″ on the basis of my own MESER licence,
I have raised a new spiritual doctrine sustained by scientific and logical hypotheses.
The perception of the soundness of the mentioned concept proceeds both from the
Leibnizian principle concerning the sufficient reason, and from Einstein′s principle
regarding internal perfection and the external acknowledgement of a new theory but, like
any responsible ″creators″, I felt the need to also consider the expression of the feeling of
uncertainty, mine first.
Although I had found many external confirmations in our great forerunners′ ideas and
theories, I have not had a proven substantiation yet (which is not by all means necessary
with philosophical hypotheses) of the hypotheses that I have forwarded, until I got
acquainted with the ideas of the mathematician and philosopher Florentin Smarandache the creator of Neutrosophy - as a branch of Philosophy, that studies the origin, the
character, the aim and the interactions of the ″objects″ from the idealistic spectre.
I′ve found out that the Neutrosophy Theory, belonging to the mentioned thinker, based on a
non-Manichean logic - that is, the trivalent logic- sets up as the scientifically demonstrated
fundament for the great majority of the hypotheses I have set forth in ″The Modelling of
Rationality″.

Essentially, Professor Smarandache′s Neutrosophy stipulates that for any idea <A> there
is also an idea <Anti-A> that does not mean <Non-A>. The fundamental thesis of
Neutrosophy is: if <A> is t% true and f% false, as bivalent extremes, it is necessarily i%
indeterminate (=achievable, to outline its probabilistic connotation), to the effect that,
t+i+f [ 300+ (or t%+i%+f% [ 3+) which gives a slightly altered meaning to some
common concepts such as, for example, the one of complementarity.To this effect, the
complementary of t is not f, but i+f, while the complementary of f is not t, but t+i.
Florentin Smarandache′s theory of Neutrosophy suggests also the fact that any hypothesis
has a nature of extremeness (it also allows an anti-hypothesis) which is not bad because
the law t+i+f=100 must be considered dialectically, where both t and f tend to be
decreasing (without annuling each other) to the advantage of i. Far from the idea that any
hypothesis should not have a nature of extremeness, just such a nature is desirable to
generate polemics which, in case of confrontation, draws nearer t and f to one another,
aiming at the neutral equilibrium of the t+f+i=100 relationship, that provides the
opportunity of accomplishment. (As regards the opportuneness of polemics, I would like
to mention that the author of neutrosophy hasn′t yet accepted the ″realizable″ alternative
as ″indeterminate″, nor the impossibility for t and f to make null one another.)
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The theory of Neutrosophy makes obvious the relative nature of the truth and the false,
only the neutral nature tending to the absolute owing to its force of accomplishment.
THANKS TO THE SPECIFICATIONS THAT ARE STIPULATED IN SMARANDACHE′S
NEUTROSOPHY, SOME HYPOTHESES OF THE MESER CONCEPT SUCH AS: THE
COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE, BETWEEN THE DIVINE
CREATION AND THE INTRA-SPECIFIC EVOLUTION, THE NON-CONTRADICTION BETWEEN
SCIENCE AND RELIGION, BETWEEN MATERIALISM (SUBSTANTIALISM) AND IDEALISM,
BETWEEN GNOSTICISM AND AGNOSTICISM, PROVE TO BE RATIONAL AND THEREFORE REAL,
WHILE THE PARADOXES BECOME JUSTIFIED.
Directly related to the intangibility of absolute truth, and tackling the issues of the aim of
knowledge, according to the neutrosophical fashion, the MESER concept identifies two
modalities: scientific knowledge - that specialised knowledge ″more and more from that
<<less and less>> and philosophic, encyclopaedic knowledge ″less and less from that
<<more and more>>″. If the first modality of knowledge is limited especially by the
possibilities of communication, the second one is also limited by the insufficient power of
comprehension of the human mind. The equilibrium between the two directions which, in
the last analysis, signifies the way to the truth, is determined by the divine laws of
dissociation, purification (the selection and the erasing of the seals) and those of monadic
recomposition - laws that ascertain for knowledge as a whole, a social character,
expressed by the syntagm ″more and more from that <<more and more>>, rendered by
the well-known paradox ″the more you learn, the less you know.″
After all, the fundamental law of Neutrosophy is a successful attempt for resolving the
paradox of knowledge and confirm the thesis that the absolute truth is intangible not in a
derogatory way but in an optimistic one, approved and revealed by (and through) the will
of God.
Being operative even in the case of particular interpretations, as is the case of the present
one, Smarandache′s neutrosophy confirms (according to Einstein theory) its validity, be it
only for the fact that it suggests new methods and modalities for evaluation, new
interpretative perspectives.

On time
In the paradigmatic construction of the spatiotemporality, the MESER concept has
recourse to the necessary hypothesis according to which substantial reality – the one
disseminated through the divine will within into material reality and anti-material reality
possesses that ″retrograde movement″ from right to left, in respect to the spiritual reality.
Independently of the behaviour of any rational (or not) materialized entity, the above
mentioned retrograde movement meaning for each of those the outlining of its
″embodied″ existence, represents what is defined as that impalpable philosophical
category called TIME.
One can assume that this movement related to the spiritual reality as a benchmark is
characterized by uniformity (constant ″speed″) – hence the perception of superior rational
entities (humanoids) on that uniform ″flow″ of time and on its reversibility.
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Physical movement − that movement of any entity in respect to substantial reality as a
benchmark, with parameters (speed, for example) that cannot be compared to those of the
hypothetical retrograde movement of substantial reality − cannot change that apodictic
character of the uniform time flow impression. From the time when physical movement,
though, acquires parameters comparable to those of the retrograde movement (such as
one of the so called cosmic speeds), one can speak of a different modality (slowed down)
of time flow.
Speculations on time expansion (substantiated by the famous Einsteinian theory of
relativity), already apodictic by virtue of their scientific support, concede that each entity
bears its own time. A spaceship wandering through the immensity of substantial reality,
using that already feasible cosmic speed, is a bearer of its time − a time characterized by
an incredible and yet paradoxical dilatation in respect to the time of the departure station.
Upon return of such a spaceship from a voyage of only a couple of years, one could
notice that at the departure station several generations have already ″passed″. The
voyagers of such a spaceship do not notice the dilatation of their own time (the
spaceship″s time) but, on the contrary, the contraction of the time of the station.
Each rational entity fails to perceive the change of its own time, it only perceives the
dilatation and contraction respectively, of the time of another entity in respect to one′s
own time.
Admitting that time is the overall movement of substantial (material) reality in respect the
eminently spiritual (nonsubstantial) reality, but also the movement of any material entity
in respect to the substantial reality (physical movement) we infer that the former, i.e.
time, does not exist within the non-substantial reality. What is more, one can state with
minimal risks, that time and space are ″mere voyagers″ within the spiritual reality.
The absence of time (and space) from the spiritual reality does not involve the absence of
movement from that reality. On the contrary, the spiritual reality supposes, of necessity,
the movement of nonsubstantial entities, that a-causal movement (from the physical point
of view), the permanent stochastic movement of entities (entelechies), eminently
spiritual, governed by haphasard (as a perfect law) – the only workable law, both within
the spiritual reality and within the substantial one (material or anti-material).
As regards its triple polarity (spatiality, duration and order) one can point out that the
spatiotemporality is governed by order (resulted from haphazard), time and space being
the ″gifts″ with which God endowed the spatiotemporality when He created the matter
and anti-matter, by their dissemination from the spiritual reality.
In order to tackle the tricky and delicate problem of what is called reversibility of time,
some considerations stand out:
− I have defined time as that retrograde movement of substantial reality, having as a
benchmark the spiritual reality where the material, and antimaterial, respectively, reality
″floats″ osmotically. According to the MESER axiom for the spatiotemporality, that
retrograde movement was taken into consideration out of the need to justify the ″voyage″
of any entity, specifically of the ″live″ entity, between the primary limit and the
secondary limit of material reality, that is from birth to that ″extreme and insurmountable
possibility″ as Otto Poggeler defines corporeal death, or, in another manner, to justify
″consumption″ as a duration of that factual experience called DASEIN by M. Heidegger.
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− As an element of the spatiotemporality, any rational (or not) entity has, in respect to
spiritual reality, a ″relative stability″ (besides the inner Brownian movement of those in
the same Brownnian style due to one′s own will − the free will), having no reasons or
capabilities to cross the manifest (substantial) reality in between its two limits.
− The ″retrograde movement″ and the ″relative stability″ confirm the supposition that any
entity is a bearer of its own time within the material reality and that the former, time,
does not exist within the spiritual reality.
− If material reality as a whole has a retrograde motion, any entity (and specifically the
live one) has a contrary movement. To this effect, one can deem that the entities,
whichever they are, ″travel″ uniformly towards the future within the substantial reality
and undergo a perpetual present in respect to the spiritual reality, as long as they are
embodied (materially split).
The foregoing considerations lead to the conclusion that the hypothesis of the retrograde
movement, as a time defining hypothesis, as well as that of the relative stability do not
grant to an entity the possibility to travel in a retrograde fashion (into the past), thus any
possibility to explain an assumed temporal reversibility is ruled out.
By invoking the Einsteinian theory of relativity according to which temporal dilatation by
travelling with cosmic speeds, or temporal contraction, as perceived by the rational
entities left behind at the ″station″ (from which the spacecraft departed and to which it
returned), are possible, there is no way to speak of a hypothetical reversibility of time.
Indeed, for a rational entity at the station, a travelling entity is by no means ″made
younger″ and in its turn it sees itself in no other way than ″made older″. The same
travelling entity has almost null chances to find any living, and by no means younger,
rational entity from among those left at the station.
In order to detect in the temporal ″dilatation-contraction″ a reason ″pro″ time
reversibility, one should image an experiment during which the ″arrival″ from, should
precede the ″departure″ for, the cosmic journey. This could be ″possible″ if the departure
and arrival stations were appropriately placed next to the ″line of date change″, if the
entire journey were to last less than 24 hours (time-keeping at the station) and if the socalled ″conventional time″ were involved. In real time, this is nevertheless not possible,
no matter what other additional condition were involved.
Finally, we come to the stage of assessing what means the hypothetical spiritual journey
in time (in this case, into the past) − that one made possible by the convenient travel,
through that plausible time tunnel, of the soul (the eminently spiritual part of the rational
entity), with the possibility to access a certain moment of the past by that entity. This
access to the past does not mean a reverse ″restoration″ of time, but, in the best of cases,
only a re-covering of a duration from the accessed moment towards a possible different
future (that can be ″past″ in respect to the commencement of the journey through the
tunnel). Obviously, neither the spiritual journey in time provides any reasons to consider
that time could be reversible. All (known) modalities of temporal modification that have
been invoked − retrograde movement, travel with cosmic speeds, spiritual journey in time
− are nevertheless conductive to the idea that: ″Fugit irreparabile tempus″.
According to the neutrosophic theory (F. Smarandache: Neutrosophy) based on trivalent
logic, any scientific hypothesis features an extreme character to the effect that it
necessarily has also an anti-hypothesis; moreover, to achieve complementarity, the two
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extremes must also incorporate that indecisive part. By virtue of the above mentioned
principle, that is eminently dialectic, the thesis on time irreversibility, as any other one,
must be deemed merely as a possible truth, becoming such (or the opposite) only after the
acquisition, by reason of some laws, of that ″neutral equilibrium″ that supposes a possible
reformulation and necessarily, an extension of the respective theory in as much as
possible, closely connected domains of definition. From among all involved theories for
substantiating the thesis on time irreversibility, the one that lends itself mostly to
reformulation, and that might lead to a contrary conclusion, seems to be exactly the one
with the soundest scientific rationale − the Einsteinian theory of relativity, that Einstein
himself did not consider as final.
If in 1905 the theory of relativity had an unprecedented impact on the scientific world,
even before the brilliant Niels Bohr could formulate his objections (as Einstein used to
behave in respect to Bohr), Einstein had an insight that his theory was based on much too
restrictive ″preliminary conditions″. In 1916 he was ″compelled″ to reformulate his
hypotheses within the framework of the ″generalized relativity theory″, renaming the
initial one as ″limited relativity theory″.
As the relativistic theory of Einstein is based on the hypothesis on the maximum absolute
value of the ″C″ constant, and as of late (November 2000) three scientists (a Romanian
and two Americans) have demonstrated that some phenomena take place at speeds
exceeding that of light, it is predictable that the theory of relativity might be reformulated
and completed with that part that could be called the ″theory of absolute relativity″
dedicated to the phenomena occurring in the ″mega-cosmos″, ″giga-cosmos″ or
″angstrom-cosmos″ − hypothetical designations of some definition domains different
from the macrocosmos and microcosmos, already ″covered″ by the Einsteinian theory.
The extension and possible reformulation of the theory of relativity could supply
substantiating elements on a thesis on ″temporal reversibility″, but only if ″external
confirmations″ (according to the Einsteinian principle) and theoretical and practical
requirements (according to the Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason) for such an
approach are provided. In fact, anything is possible, the only absolute truth (figuratively)
being that expressed by the syntagm: ″nothing is final″.
On death
“Dasein is factual Being , power of Being, as anticipation of the extreme
possibility that can’t be surpassed – death.”
Otto Poggeler
According to Heidegger in “Sein und Zeit”, the possibility of Being has its origin into an
ultimate possibility that cancels, post factum even the possibility of Being itself. With his
term of dasein, Heidegger always brings to the fore existence as a fatality, without
explicitly denying its fate as an obligation, either imperative or assumed, nevertheless in
vain.
Implicitly, Heidegger is preoccupied, concerning the existence, by the sentimental side of
it, without insisting on its role in showing rationality as a great divine work, thus
deliberately avoiding to refer to a certain objective aspect.
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The MESER concept estimates that sensations as well as feelings, as attributes of
existence, are not a purpose but a means, which ensures creating products of rationality
through Being. The products of rationality – which are the purpose of Being, are not
thwarted, and neither is Being itself, by death; they remain as monadic seals and only the
divinity decides through its “Last Judgement” if the seal is to be “erased” or redistributed
towards other new spiritual entities, formed as a primary fund of the intellect of future
substantially splittable rational entities, which are in turn destined to create new rational
products.
While the Heideggerian dasein sees death as a fatality which thwarts the possibility of
Being, by obsessively bringing it out, the MESER concept (Speculative Existential
Model of the Rational Entity) considers death as an objective necessity, whose
imminence must not be pointed out in a paranoiac manner and which doesn’t cancel the
Being but submits it periodically to God’s judgement in order to be purified and
harmonized with the purpose of His Great Work.
As a subsequent theory to dasein, the MESER concept perceives it (with all due
consideration) as a model of sentimental approach (subjective and therefore
psychologistic) of the Being as a purpose ending with death; while the MESER concept
evaluates itself as an objective, rationalist model, which without denying the purpose
itself of Being, qualifies it as a path towards the construction of the divine work which is
universal rationality.
Although they seem to diverge , the two models are contingent and neither one
won’t be affected if the balance of truth inclines towards one or another.
Even though the two models would be, judging by bivalent logic, the extremes, each one
prevails based on an indisputable accurate logic.
According to the basic law of the Smarandachian neutrosophism (F. Smarandache,
University of New Mexico:Neutrosophy) t % + i % + f % [ 3+, however t (the undoubted
truth) and f (the undoubted falseness) both have the tendency to decrease (without
annulling) one for the advantage of the other or for the advantage of i (the irresoluteness,
the achievable ), having effects on creating a possible model, as much as operable, of
Being. Here t = sup T (truth), i = sup I (irresoluteness), f = sup F (falseness).
Dasein and MESER are compatible, each of them taking advantage on the other
one.
MESER supplies the basic scheme for a bygone Being, from the rational entity point of
view, as well as for a periodic and permanent Being, referring to rationality as Being in
general; while dasein refers mostly to the sentimental aspect of Being in its substantial
sequence. In other words, from the escatological point of view, dasein includes the theory
of death as final point of a subjective Being, ( which is true), while the MESER concept
refers to death as an intermezzo, as another beginning of Being in general.
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Abstract: Neutrosophy’s underlying construction is far more sophisticated than we can
imagine. I present in this paper a critical analysis on the logical description of <Neut-A>
based on multicultural joint venture, and reach a contradictory argument that the axiom is
rather a paradox than a valid definition. Starting with the fundamental issue in Daodejing,
the paper carries out a widespread discussion on conflicts in denominating things, from
yinyang philosophy to dialectics, from relativity of being to self-negating effect of
concepts, exhibiting the genuine essence of philosophy against distortion. Discussion of
feasible description of <Neut-A> (neutrosophy) is also presented, followed by a brief
distinction between human intelligence and machine intelligence. The paper aims to help
scientists reach the genuine nature hidden in the ideology of neutrosophy.
Keywords: Dao, Genuine Nature, Contradiction, Identity, Self-negation, Partial
Negation, Neutrosophy
1. Neutrosophy: a joint venture
It is not until recently that I came across the study of neutrosophy introduced by Florentin
Smarandache (1995). It seems a very brave challenge to a number of developed sciences
and technologies. However, from its intension and method of approach, I realized that it
touches the most arcane, abstruse, and mysterious philosophies such as Daoism and
Buddhism, and the toughest problems in the universe as difficult as uncovering the
universe. I am afraid how western intelligents can handle such mysteries.
As a Chinese, I feel obliged to spread out our exploration based on the multicultural
joint venture, with focus on the paradox “neither <A> nor <Anti-A>”, as illustrated in
step ward arguments, as shown below.
2. Name, denominable, but not the normal name
Daodejing (Wang Bi, Guo Xiang) begins with: “Dao, daoable, but not the normal dao;
name, namable, but not the normal name.” We can say it is dao, but it doesn’t mean what
we say. Whenever we mention it, it is beyond the original sense.
Daodejing mainly deals with the common problem: “What/who creates everything in
the world we see and feel?” It is dao: like a mother that bears things with shape and form.
But what/who is dao? It is just unimaginable, because whenever we imagine it, our
imagination can never be it (we can never completely describe it: more we describe it,
more wrong we are). It is also unnamable, because whenever we name it, our concept
based on the name can never be it.
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Daoism illustrates the origin of everything as such a form that doesn’t show in any
form we can perceive. This is the reason why it says, everything comes from nothingness,
or this nothingness creates everything in forms in dynamic change. Whatever we can
perceive is merely the created forms, rather than its genuine nature, as if we distinguish
people by their outer clothes. We are too far from understanding the nature, even for the
most prominent figures like Einstein.
You may then ask whether Laozi was genius enough to express it. Definitely no. It is
true that he was aware of the problem, or we can assume that he really understood it,
however, he could never describe it. Although Carlos Gershenson has presented this
argument in his paper as incomplete language, I am still afraid whether he can catch my
notion that the most complete and perfect language is no language.
An example is described in a story (Lanier Young, 1991) in the Mahapra
Janaparamita Sutra:
The Blind Men Trying to Size Up the Elephant: Once there was a
king who ordered his minister to bring in an elephant and let some
blind men touch the animal one by one. After every one of them
had their turn, the king asked them what they thought the elephant
was like. The one who had touched its tusk said it was like a turnip;
the next had touched its ear, and said it was a dustpan; the third its
foot, and said it was a pestle; the fourth its back, and said it was a
bed; the fifth its belly, and said it was a jar; and the last its tail, and
said it was a rope….
We can imagine that our perceptions are just as partial as those of the
blind people, then how can we name things that are believed known to
everyone but actually as mysterious as the elephant to the blind people? Do
we understand, for example, 1+1=2? We always believe so although it has
never been proved by the mathematical world. Even when it were proved,
how could we explain black+black or black+white?
Carlos Gershenson [1] presents: Not only silliness, but all adjectives can
only be <used|applied> in a relative way, dependant of a context. Language
is relative as well. How can we speak about absolute being, then? We can
and we cannot. We speak about it, but in that moment its absolute is relative.
For us, it is and it is not-incomplete. But that we cannot completely speak
about it, it is not a reason to stop speaking about it (as Wittgenstein would
early suggest in his Tractatus Logicus Philosophicus), because we can
incompletely represent its completeness... As Wittgenstein himself (but not
most of his followers...) realized, following the ideas in the Tractatus, we
would not be able to speak about anything... (languages are incomplete).
Language is used inside a context. Depending of this context the language
will be different.
Can language be completely transferred by telesthesia? Although I
acknowledge it is a better way of communication, but it also depends. For
example, how can we understand the hidden, underlying or implied meaning
of the transferred “words”? Is language transferable? I am afraid there is not
a definite answer. One reason might be that the same language can be
interpreted diversely by different people. This should be the reason why
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human failed to communicate properly with those in different languages, or
with other species on earth or in the space, even with Jesus.
Telesthesia truly exists universally in the Pure Land described in
Buddhism: People there communicate with each other by heart rather
than words. Further more, they can also “speak” to people everywhere
outside the “Pure Land” World which was founded by Amitabha. A
recent VCD video from Taiwan shows that a young man really came to
this world after his medical death, because he really made frequent
communication, after “death”, with his sister still in Taiwan as a young
Buddhist nun, not only did he answer all the questions of his sister, but
also made an unbelievable promise which was later on testified
astonishingly by his family on earth.
Just because there are no perfect words to express the most sincere truth that
uncovers our genuine nature, we can say nothing than Amitabha to
communicate. Although we know that in Buddhism it is almost equal to
saying nothing, but it implies saying everything.
As the conclusion, everything can be named, but never absolutely proper. It is a
name, but never a perfect name.
3. Name is always subjective, relative to the perception and perspective of observer
Has anyone been confused about “Am myself really myself”? An old person, when
gazing at the albums of his childhood, he always point to the photos and says: “It is me.”
How ridiculous!
At first, he is pointing to some paper cards rather than humans.
Secondly, what he is pointing to is an image of himself, not really himself.
Thirdly, provided that he were really pointing to a younger himself, but it
were really different from what he looks like presently——they are different
themselves objectively, or there are an infinite number of themselves
objectively.
Even at the present age, a smiling himself and an anxious himself definitely
look differently objectively.
They are all himself because humans subjectively take it for granted and
firmly believe so.
But, are all these pertaining to his body really himself? Definitely no,
because he will begin another life (in the next life cycle) after his medical
death. He never dies actually.
Incarnation, samsara, wheel of life, transmigration of souls, or eternal
cycle of birth and death, this is a basic phenomenon of every living
being in the universe including those in the heaven, except in the
Buddhist Pure Lands where everyone has escaped from his destiny,
according to Buddhism.
As the result, we don’t actually understand who we are, just use the names
subjectively.
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Another example lies in question: “What on earth is the following figure?”
To well educated students, it is a circle.
But to uneducated kids, it can be: “a cake, a dish, a bowl,
a balloon…, even the moon, the sun”.

Let’s reach our conclusion that name is merely our mental creation. It is rather a
belief than an objective being, and varies among different people.
We always believe “it is” but can’t prove it.
In his paper “To be or not to be, A multidimensional logic approach”
Carlos Gershenson [2] has generalized the proofs:
Everything is and isn't at a certain degree. (i.e., there is no absolute
truth or false);
Nothing can be proved (that it exists or doesn't) (i.e., no one can
prove whether his consciousness is right);
I believe, therefore I am (i.e., I take it true, because I believe so).
In fact, this belief of “it is” is always critical (Buddhism).
In Buddhist saying, all such beliefs are created by ourselves, for:
“I am human.”
I am because I always hold this belief, so persistently that I nearly
forget I can be Buddha as well.
Multidimensional logic has been surpassed by infinite-valued logic, then fuzzy logic, and
ultimately by neutrosophic logic.
4. Name itself implies anti-name
Whenever there is a name, it can never be a perfect name. Does it mean we are cheated
by or trapped in those created by ourselves? It does, and it doesn’t as well. First, there is
only relative name, no absolute name. Second, name actually acts as a tradeoff to unify
the diversity of concepts——whenever there is name, there is contradiction as well.
We can name something as black, but to distinguish it from white. We can
name a human, but to distinguish it from others.
Names are useful to distinguish things, but don’t absolutely describe natures,
as stated above.
Just because there is no absolute name or universal name, people would
denominate things in their different perspectives or perceptions.
As an example, a modulator/demodulator is named a mouse, just from its
casing that resembles a toy mouse.
Despite all these problems above, we need a common name, however, to
communicate. Therefore, we have to make balance, in the sense of
acceptance or rejection, among the diversity.
Carlos Gershenson [1] points out that: There will always absolute-be
injustice, because this one is relative. Since different people have
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different contexts (or we can use the word Seelenzustand (soul state), to
refer to the personal context, to distinguish from a general context)... So,
since people have different Seelenzustandes, we cannot speak of absolute
justice, so things will be just for the people with power... The lesscatastrophic panorama (and most naive...) would be that the people in the
power would have the less-incomplete Seelenzustandes, trying to contain
and understand as many Seelenzustandes as they can, so, if they are just,
in spite their relativity, they will be just as well for all the people whose
Seelenzustandes they contain.
Accordingly, contradiction is a universal phenomenon that can never be
avoided.
The universality or absoluteness of contradiction has a twofold meaning. One is
that contradiction exists in the process of development of all things, and the other is that
in the process of development of each thing a movement of opposites exists from
beginning to end.
Contradiction is the basis of the simple forms of motion (for instance,
mechanical motion) and still more so of the complex forms of motion.
Despite the anti-name property in space domain we have just discussed, this
contradiction also exists in time domain.
Mao Zedong also states that:
We Chinese often say, "Things that oppose each other also
complement each other." That is, things opposed to each other have
identity. This saying is dialectical and contrary to metaphysics. "Oppose
each other" refers to the mutual exclusion or the struggle of two
contradictory aspects. "Complement each other" means that in given
conditions the two contradictory aspects unite and achieve identity. Yet
struggle is inherent in identity and without struggle there can be no
identity.
In identity there is struggle, in particularity there is universality, and in
individuality there is generality. To quote Lenin, ". . . there is an absolute
in the relative."
He implies such a cycle: conflict——identity——new conflict——new
identity… to the infinite, in each cycle of which the conception
undergoes a partial negation of its original stage to a higher level, and in
this infiniteness of negations we make our revolutionary progresses in
knowledge, as to negate the original sense of “it is”. Hence comes the
expression “nothingness” to replace the original meaning “it is
something”.
The Buddhist terms: emptiness, void of the world of senses might
just come out of the endless negation of our partial consciousness
that has been believed absolutely valid.
Once we become aware of it, we are
awake. And once we keep the genuine
consciousness (without even the
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slightest partialness) in every fraction of moment and forever, we are
Buddhas.
As the result, neutrality comes as the outcome of conflict, and in turn,
conflict comes as the outcome of neutrality too. As shown in the taiji
form.
The more we hold on to our original belief “it is” (although partial),
the more mightily conflict arises, since we persist in a more
incomplete concept, or fragment, to represent the complete. The
same to the coming cycles. This is reflected in neutrosophy as the
law of inverse effect (F. Smarandache, 1998).
As conclusion, antagonism and neutrality are cause and effect to each other.
5. Representing the <Neut-A>
<Neut-A> comes as the consequence of the contradiction between <A> and <Anti-A>,
therefore we can say it is neither <A> nor <Anti-A>, but is it all this simple?
Once we finish <Neut-A> as <neither <A> nor <Anti-A>> in the first cycle,
then in the following cycle we come to the less incomplete concept as <Neut<Neut-A>>. However, there must be an element of consistency between
<Neut-A> and <Neut-<Neut-A>>, i.e.,
between <Neut-A> and <neither <Neut-A> nor <Anti-<Neut-A>>>
that acts as the gene of reproduction, i.e., there must be a consistency
between <B> and not <B> and not <C>
But where is it? Apparently they are not logically consistent! Once there is
nothing indeterminate that can pass down to the next “generation”, is it a
feasible philosophy?
<Neut-A> would alternately be expressed as both <A> and <Anti-A>, since it
shares characteristic of both <A> and <Anti-A> to some extent (I prefer
“extent” than “degree”).
Although yin and yang are opposite in taiji figure, they are unbreakable
friends in giving birth to novel form of development.
The point lies in the confusion between absolute-be and partial-be (or
absolute-not and partial-not). We can confirm or negate a being absolutely
and partially as well, but I am afraid we can never be genius enough to do it
absolutely unless in a well defined domain in which our perceptions are
relatively complete.
How can we properly express this partial approval/negation? In percentages?
Then how can we deal with such partial operations in fuzzy and neutrosophic
sets? It is quite another task.
Provided that a genius giant had successfully settled it in pure mathematics,
there would be no need then, I am afraid, to employ analog means. How
incredible!
A feasible alternative, I suggest, would be to put dynamic weight on concept
instead of statistic percentages, to combine neural technology. Or more
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specifically, to create a pattern neutrosophically from the threshold ideology
in neural network approaches.
As the conclusion, it is never too old for a machine to learn.
6. On our genuine intelligence——creativity
In the previous query about the figure on the left, whenever we hold the answer
as a circle, we are inhibiting our creativity. Nor should we hold that it is a cake,
a dish, a bowl, a balloon, or the moon, the sun,
for we also spoil our
creativity in this way. Then, what is it?
“It is nothing.”
Is it correct? It is, if we do not hold on to the assumption “it is something”. It is also
wrong, if we persist in the doctrine “the figure is something we call nothing.” This
nothing has in this way become something that inhibits our creativity. How ridiculous!
Whenever we hold the belief “it is …”, we are loosing our creativity. Whenever
we hold that “it is not …”, we are also loosing our creativity. Our true intelligence
requires that we completely free our mind——neither stick to any extremity nor to “no
sticking to any assumption or belief”. This is a kind of genius or gift rather than logic
rules, acquired largely after birth, e.g., through Buddhism practice.
Not (it is) and not (it is not),
It seems nothing, but creates everything,
Including our true consciousness,
The power of genius to understand all.
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2.

Background

Neutrosophy is defined as a new branch of philosophy that studies the origin, nature, and
scope of neutralities, as well as their interactions with different ideational spectra
(Florentin Smarandache, 1995). However the term neutrality needs to be discussed,
explained or redefined in multicultural background, since neutrosophy covers a large area
of studies and has to be based on the occidental and oriental joint venture (Liu [4]).
This mode of thinking includes:
1. proposes new philosophical theses, principles, laws, methods, formulas,
movements;
2. reveals that world is full of indeterminacy;
3. interprets the uninterpretable;
4. regards, from many different angles, old concepts, systems: showing
that an idea, which is true in a given referential system, may be false in
another one, and vice versa;
5. attempts to make peace in the war of ideas, and to make war in the
peaceful ideas;
6. measures the stability of unstable systems, and instability of stable
systems.
Methods of neutrosophic study involves:
- mathematization (neutrosophic logic, neutrosophic probability and statistics,
duality),
- generalization, complementarity, contradiction, paradox, tautology, analogy,
- reinterpretation.
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Neutrosophy touches the most arcane, abstruse, and mysterious philosophies
such as Daoism and Buddhism, and the toughest problems in the universe as
difficult as uncovering the universe.
Many issues on the explanation and description concern space domain, where I have
put my first analysis in a paper based on Daoism and Buddhism (Liu [4]). Here I am
going to show some points pertaining to time domain.
3.

Metabolism in the nature

As known to everybody, metabolism is a basic phenomenon of nature: something is
dying as the premonitor of another growth, and something growing as the outcome of
dying of another.
When plant is dying, it yields seeds to another growth that adapts more to the
geological situations like climate, soil and water.
Animal is alive when one part of the cells dying and another part growing, which
inherit its will.
Human beings generate themselves in the same way to inherit families,
knowledge and faith.
As in society, e.g., in Chinese dynasties, new forces grow as the dying of old
ones.
It is also said in Buddhism that the earth undergoes such cycles in its evolution:
the birth, the growing, prosperity, decrepitude and vanish, just as the existence of
plants in the sequence of spring, summer, autumn and winter.
More issues can be found in a forthcoming encyclopedia of Buddhism (the only
one based on modern society) which I am going to put into English.
The alternation of yin and yang is universal in everything:
Yin-yang is the basic form of everything and every course.
It is yin and yang that is meant by Dao (I-ching)).
There is Qian, symbolizing Heaven, which directs the great beginnings of
things, and Kun, symbolizing Earth, which gives them to their completion (Iching, James Legge).
Qian pertains to yang and Kun to yin. In the course of development and
evolution of everything Qian (yang) acts as the creativity (creativity is
mentioned in my conference paper, (Liu [4])) that brings new beginnings
to it, whereas Kun (yin) implements it in forms as we perceive as
temporary states. It is in this infinite parallelism things inherit
modifications and adapt to changes (author’s note).
There is always contradiction between them, which needs to be neutralized
in a new form.
Yin acts as the preservative force (inhibiting yang: when something is
shaped, it should have its own inertia against immediate change) that
resists modification, reformation or revolution exhibited by yang,
therefore, there should be conflict or struggle between these two forces
(author’s note):
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There are two states of motion in all things, that of relative rest
and that of conspicuous change. Both are caused by the struggle
between the two contradictory elements contained in a thing.
When the thing is in the first state of motion, it is undergoing only
quantitative and not qualitative change and consequently presents
the outward appearance of being at rest. When the thing is in the
second state of motion, the quantitative change of the first state
has already reached a culminating point and gives rise to the
dissolution of the thing as an entity and thereupon a qualitative
change ensues, hence the appearance of a conspicuous change.
Such unity, solidarity, combination, harmony, balance, stalemate,
deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity, attraction, etc., as
we see in daily life, are all the appearances of things in the state of
quantitative change. On the other hand, the dissolution of unity,
that is, the destruction of this solidarity, combination, harmony,
balance, stalemate, deadlock, rest, constancy, equilibrium, solidity
and attraction, and the change of each into its opposite are all the
appearances of things in the state of qualitative change, the
transformation of one process into another. Things are constantly
transforming themselves from the first into the second state of
motion; the struggle of opposites goes on in both states but the
contradiction is resolved through the second state. That is why we
say that the unity of opposites is conditional, temporary and
relative, while the struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is
absolute. (Z. Mao)
However, there is neutralism in them:
The fact is that no contradictory aspect can exist in isolation.
Without its opposite aspect, each loses the condition for its
existence. Just think, can any one contradictory aspect of a thing
or of a concept in the human mind exist independently? Without
life, there would be no death; without death, there would be no
life. Without "above", there would be no "below"; without
"below", there would be no "above". Without misfortune, there
would be no good fortune; without good fortune, there would be
no misfortune. Without facility, there would be no difficulty;
without difficulty, there would be no facility. Without landlords,
there would be no tenant-peasants; without tenant-peasants, there
would be no landlords. Without the bourgeoisie, there would be no
proletariat; without the proletariat, there would be no bourgeoisie.
Without imperialist oppression of nations, there would be no
colonies or semi-colonies; without colonies or semi-colonies, there
would be no imperialist oppression of nations. It is so with all
opposites; in given conditions, on the one hand they are opposed
to each other, and on the other they are interconnected,
interpenetrating, interpermeating and interdependent, and this
character is described as identity. In given conditions, all
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contradictory aspects possess the character of non-identity and
hence are described as being in contradiction. But they also
possess the character of identity and hence are interconnected.
This is what Lenin means when he says that dialectics studies
"how opposites can be . . . identical". How then can they be
identical? Because each is the condition for the other's existence.
This is the first meaning of identity (Z. Mao).
As an example, although landlords and tenant-peasants are
opposites, they have to rely on each other to coexist (author’s
note).
But is it enough to say merely that each of the contradictory
aspects is the condition for the other's existence, that there is
identity between them and that consequently they can coexist in a
single entity? No, it is not. The matter does not end with their
dependence on each other for their existence; what is more
important is their transformation into each other. That is to say, in
given conditions, each of the contradictory aspects within a thing
transforms itself into its opposite, changes its position to that of its
opposite. This is the second meaning of the identity of
contradiction (Z. Mao).
As an example, landlords can fall into tenant-peasants once
they loose their fortune and power, and vice versa when tenantpeasants gain fortune and power (author’s note). Or quite Mao
Zedong’s, “by means of revolution the proletariat, at one time
the ruled, is transformed into the ruler”.
Neutralism is derived when yin and yang combine each other into
compounds as illustrated in I-ching in the creation of trigrams, or
when yin and yang inter-consist each other in an infinite course:
yin, yang, yin in yang, yang in yin, yang in (yin in yang), yin in
(yang in yin), …, at last, they reach a balance as the new form or
new generation.
4. The metabolic universe
As stated in his book Gravitational Measurement in Time and Space — A Hypothesis of
Life and Sole, Jiang Xiufu has structured a kind of entirely new and total scientific
theory. Starting from the different theories in principle, he has revised the physical
theories developed since the 17th century completely and bodily. Also, from Aristotle’s
mechanics to Einstein’s special theory of relativity and from classical electrodynamics to
modern quantum mechanics, the book has generalized the thoughts of unified field theory
in a broadly comprehensive way and made a thoroughgoing change in the concepts of
today’s natural sciences. Part of the summary is shown bellow:
Universe is made up of matter: Whirl vortex body is the basic form of matter
existence. As viewed from its attribution of nature, all the motions are the position
changes of matter gains in space according to order (time). Whirl vortex bodies are
in the frictions among matter gains as well as in non-central collision, thus causing
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them to move along the inclined direction and also making themselves begin rotate
“left” or “right”. Thus the turbid, disordered, pointless and random rotating
motions begin to contract and rotate violently in the dominant “left” or “right”
whirl vortexes and congregate to form universe various steps and whirl vortex body
of different sizes… Therefore, the nearer to the center, the larger matter density
and the faster rotation velocity, the whirl vortex bodies have. And, the whorl vortex
bodies with small sizes have larger matter density and larger matter gains around
with the rotating linear velocity. The maximum internal energy is congregated in
electrons and atoms. In the super-density environment of electrons and atoms, the
time-space scale structures contracts to their limits. As a result, all the energy
exchanging process takes places and ends at an instance.
Whirl vortex steps and stairs in the matter world are in finite in time and space
so that we regard the universe as self generating and developing system of the
“left” and ‘right” vortex body in each step or stair. “Left whirling matter” and
“right whirling matter”----matter and anti-matter are the opposite of two sides
existed within the matter world. And the interdependence of the two sides upon
each other as well as both opposite and compensate each other. They
interdependent upon each other, inter-supply each other with that they need and
interconsume what they have. Accordingly, they themselves promote their own to
grow and die as well as change and develop in the eternal cycles.
Space is the form of matter existence.
Time is the attribution of matter motion.
The world unifications are their materiality.
The law of the unity of opposite is the basic law of the matter world: The
objects in physics are in continuous changes. On the one hand, they inter-act with
their surroundings and they have the history of growth and death; on the other
hand, the occurrence of the natural phenomenum of any kind is constrained by the
internal inherent contradictions of any matter. Therefore, physics should repel all
the rigid conceptions. There are no absolute rest and uniform straight line motion;
there are no motions without resistance, there are no absolute “positive and
negative as well as left and right”; there are no absolute time and space…; For this
reason, starting from the fixed facts, it is necessary to study physical logic and
physical concepts and their connotations and denotations of how to express the
history of transition, conversion and interaction in time and space, and the history
of constraining motion progress of conditions. Accordingly, using the dialectical
viewpoint to study physics is the only one of scientific thinking methods.
Spirit is the supreme form of matter motion.
This metabolism of matter exchange is illustrated as the basic form from existence of
matter (the principle of metabolism of whirl vortex body, of roles of recoil force,
gravitational field, electrical field, magnetic field, the principle of electromagnetic intercompensation, of roles of temperature field, of existence and evolution of whirl vortex
body), wave mechanics, electrodynamics, motion medium electrodynamics, trajectory of
stars, thermodynamics, to origin and evolution of life, thinking morphology and
supernatural sense. It is his most impressive dead to rederive the theory of relativity in the
simplest mathematical manner: finding the average (I met him once in Xi’an and hence
got the book).
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There are reasons why he failed to implement his hypothesis: he is not specialized in
physics, or the specialized experts are too materialistic. In fact, our physics uncovers no
more than ten percent of matter scientists are aware of, said by one of the most famous
experts in the world, a Nobel Prize winner. Furthermore, what we are studying (including
this hypothesis the author believes) are merely infant sciences comparative to those in the
Pure Lands, said by one of the most famous Buddhist masters living in the world.
5. Representing the metabolism
It will be one of the toughest tasks through out the world to maintain feasible
representations. However it is worthwhile to launch the discussion.
For an agent, we should distinguish between the subagents (e.g., sub elements, sub
sets, etc., assuming that the system is decomposable.): what is growing and what is antigrowing; what (aspects) in the environment contribute to the growth and anti-growth
respectively and the limits of each.
For example, how can one pass an exam. Provided that he is an excellent
student and his teacher is really good. This is his positive aspect in chief. However,
he is very easily interfered and distracted by things outside, e.g., friends, games,
music, movie, TV, etc. So the problem is: there are two sources (two kinds) in his
metabolism of knowledge, one is active and the other is anti-active. Now we
should focus on these contradictory aspects: positive and anti-positive.
First, we should analyze the positive aspect by means of learning: whether the
teacher improved his teaching, or whether the student puts more weight on his
study, in a dynamic figure.
Second, analyze the anti-positive aspect: whether he touches less the disturbing
source, or whether he puts less weight on this aspect, also in dynamic figure.
Third, simulate the neutral figure or curve by comparison, and/or through
learning examples in history, as to predict the future behavior.
This is the general clue presented in my paper Dynamic Modeling of
Multidimensional Logic in Multiagent Environment (Liu [3]), where “the learning
curve” is just what I mean by neutral representation.
This could probably be the conjunction point between neutrosophy and neural
science.
As conclusion, we would very likely base neutrosophy on dynamic learning
background, just as an idiom says: it is never too old to learn.
6. The final remark
I have just presented my discussion on neutrosophy in time domain. However we may
ask whether there is neutrality between space and time, or whether there is a relativity
theory that unifies time and space.
Limited to my knowledge so far, I can present the only one I know, it is
Buddhism — which combines time and space domains into a single
“holograph”, and combines the universe in it as well.
Unfortunately, we normally cannot reach that point before we come to the
Buddhist Pure Lands (as described in Buddhism, also mentioned in (Liu [4])),
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where everyone can see/foresee any moment in any life cycle of every being in
the universe.
Far more answers can be found in the encyclopedia mentioned in section 2.
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Abstract
Our world is run by a logic that has no room for values, by a
scientific methodology that disdains the very notion. In this paper
we try to redress the balance, extracting many modern scientific
findings and forms of philosophical reasoning from the field of
complex systems, to show that values can and should be made part
of an enhanced normative logic derived from Neutrosophy. This
can then be employed to quantitatively evaluate our beliefs based
on their dynamic effects on a full set of human values.
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1. Introduction
As we move into the 21st Century it is opportune to take a look at where we are as
humans and where we are going. The achievements of the 20th Century in material
matters are clear, yet this period has done little if anything to improve humanity as a
species, we still spend inordinate amounts of time on war and similar destructive
practices. The cry from all quarters seems to be that our lifestyles are becoming
unsustainable, that we have lost our values. Yet our world is run by a logic that has no
room for values, by a scientific methodology that disdains the very notion. Here we will
try to redress the balance, extracting many modern scientific findings and forms of
philosophical reasoning from the field of complex systems, to show that values can and
should be made part of an enhanced normative logic derived from Neutrosophy, which
can then be employed to quantitatively evaluate our beliefs based on their dynamic
effects on a full set of human values.
We start by looking in Section 2 at how we define values, and outline in Section 3 an
existing science of values. Section 4 introduces complex systems science and we look in
Section 5 at the need for a logic of wholes rather than parts. Section 6 looks at nonAristotelian logics and what a logic of values would require, whilst Section 7 relates
paradoxism to complexity notions. In Section 8 we look at the ideas of Neutrosophic
logic and relate them in Section 9 to synergy and unpredictability. Finally Section 10
looks at what is still needed to fulfil the goals laid out in this introductory paper. An
Appendix relates existing logics to the teleological fitness focus that we adopt.
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2. Putting Values into Science
Like most scientists growing up in a 'value-free zone' it has taken much time for me to
realise the self-deception involved in this stance. A recent paper [Lucas2000c] looks at
this in detail, and outlines a metascience that includes explicit values to complement the
implicit ones already included within the 'scientific method'.
Following on from an heavy involvement in the pursuit of complex systems science I
realised that what we called 'fitness' in our experiments (the same 'reproductive' concept
that is used in evolutionary biology) was actually a simplified overall value - survival.
From this it seemed clear that this could be broken down into many related values (water,
food, warmth etc.) all of which were necessary for survival or reproduction and all
ignored in the one-dimensional biological practice of 'population genetics'. These form a
complex of what I shall call ‘primal’ values and necessitate a teleological (agent driven)
form of science that bridges the objective/subjective divide. In this view these ‘values’
are simply ends derived from our evolutionary past, and what we can call ‘needs’ are our
genetic predispositions to actions (means) that can meet these ends, by enabling us to
generate fitness enhancing trajectories through life. Thus we can regard ‘values’ as static
descriptions of an organism’s goals and ‘needs’ as their dynamic equivalents.
From this insight two others followed, firstly that the number of our needs or values
increases with the complexity of the organism and with experience (adding flexibility to
better cope with environmental change) - successive stages adding higher values - what
I've called 'social' and 'abstract' value complexes (inspired by similar work by [Maslow]
and others). Each again contains many dimensions or variables. Secondly, that all these
needs need to balance dynamically, they do not exist in isolation but interact in nonlinear
ways, both amongst themselves and with their environmental contexts (i.e. we cannot
simply add their 'fitnesses' or fulfilments, they are epistatic).
3. Axiological Science
Looking around the Internet to identify work on values led me to discover Robert
Hartman and his Science of Axiology. Study of this neglected area of science suggests
that three types of valuing are possible. Firstly, we have the binary logic (classification)
type of valuing which concentrates on existence or being (ontology). Here we use an
either/or judgement, for example we ask is there a tree or not; is he an Arab or not ? This
is the 'label' style most common to our descriptive science and philosophy, where we
classify objects by lists of such traits or attributes. The second type of value is that of
quantity, where we define parameters by size or ranking (cardinal or ordinal numbers),
e.g. how heavy is it; is he taller ? This is the 'quantification' mode of valuing common to
mathematical science and economics, and is an extrinsic or external (relative fitness)
approach. For both of these 'objective' dimensions we assume (implicitly) a subject (or
group of subjects) that are 'doing' the valuing of something outside themselves (which
may, as in psychology, be another person's 'subjective' experience temporarily regarded
as an 'object' to be studied).
The third type of valuing is that currently outside most science, and that is the valuing of
wholes, or uniqueness. Here we treat all the values as a unique set of self-supporting
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attributes that contribute to a one-off absolute fitness or 'value-in-itself'. This is the
valuing we see in such approaches as love or art, where the subject is not broken down
into parts but ideally is accepted as an self-justifying whole. This is an intrinsic or
internal perspective and it is this type of overall viewpoint that we will concentrate on
here in trying to adapt Neutrosophy to valuation, where we will go beyond 'subject' and
'object' perspectives entirely and identify ourselves with the system from the inside as it
were - we 'become' the system and can then look towards 'our' self-development as a
contextually situated or ‘embodied’ entity.
The first thing that strikes about the [Hartman] approach is that it is an attempt to add
logic to values by using forms of [Cantor]’s transfinite sets (Aleph0, Aleph1 & Aleph2).
This is ingenious but creates a number of problems which recent work by axiologists
such as [Edwards], [Forrest] and [Moore] tries to address, the latter by adopting a finite
version of axiology based upon quantum theory. One of the focuses of such work
concentrates on ranking combinations of the 3 value dimensions, for example where we
employ intrinsic valuations of systemic entities (e.g. love of logic), which is denoted as
SI, or systemic disvaluations of extrinsic entities (e.g. excluding the poor), denoted ES.
There are 18 combinations of these, the positive aspects are called ‘compositions’ by
Hartman, the negative aspects ‘transpositions’. Another problem is in differentiating
between partial and full valuations, i.e. where we have 3 values met in a system
containing only 3 values, versus 3 values met in a system which has 5 (denoted here as
3in3 v 3in5). Whilst many aspects of this tradition will be included in what follows, we
shall instead adopt a different perspective based upon recent developments in the sciences
of complex systems.
4. Dynamical Systems and Complexity
Over the last two decades of the 20th Century considerable work has taken place in
bringing together and taking forward the study of complex systems, defined as systems
comprising many autonomous parts and interacting in complex ways. The foundations of
this transdisciplinary science go back to work in cybernetics (feedback and homeostasis)
and general systems theory by people such as [Wiener], [Ashby] and [von Bertalanffy] in
the mid 20th Century, and it was later influenced by work on ‘the pattern that connects’
by [Bateson]. Following the advent of inexpensive computers this has joined with
mathematical dynamical systems theory to form a science of complex systems in their
own right, with many topologically isomorphic specialisms appearing (e.g. neural
networks, cellular automata, artificial life, evolutionary computation, production
systems), for an overview see [Lewin] or [Waldrop]. All these areas consider nonequilibrium systems, where their histories and future trajectories through the possibilities
open to them become important, and this demands a more dynamic form of time-critical
logic, a logic of change.
Analysing such systems makes use of three critical concepts of complex systems, the first
is ‘state space’ which defines all the possible combinations of the system variables, e.g. 4
binary variables can combine in 16 ways, so state space (the possibilities) here comprises
16 points. It can be seen that this space escalates exponentially with both the number of
variables and number of states available for each variable. The second concept is that of
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an ‘attractor’, and here the connectivity of the system causes a subset of state space to be
preferred, the system will self-organize over time (circular causation) to concentrate on a
small area of state space which we call the attractor. Within this perspective there are
three types of attractor: point, cyclic and strange (or chaotic). Simplifying a little, the first
assumes a static ontology (systemic value); the second a changeable one, one dimension
plotted against time (extrinsic value); and the third occupies all the dimensions - system
wide (intrinsic value).
In highly complex (high dimensional) systems however there will be multiple attractors
present and this brings in the third concept, the idea of ‘edge-of-chaos’. Here the system
is found to move spontaneously away from either stability or chaos towards a
dynamically semi-stable intermediate state (equivalent to the phase-boundary in physics)
which comprises a power-law (fractal) distribution of both temporal fluctuations and
spatial structure. Analysis of this unstable boundary needs some mathematical
sophistication, yet mathematics and complex systems enjoy a difficult relationship. In
truth there is no sign as yet of a maths of complex systems that can adequately deal with
such complications, just a number of partial mappings that treat abstracted aspects of the
whole. I look at this in my introduction “Quantifying Complexity Theory” [Lucas2000b].
In these scenarios the specific connectivity proves crucial, and we can adopt many
perspectives, from simple on/off (systemic or Boolean), through weighted (extrinsic or
neural) to integral (intrinsic or chaotic). In complex systems science we find that a middle
connectivity (generating the ‘edge-of-chaos’) is needed to obtain the maximum fitness
from such value combinations [Kauffman].
5. The Need for an Intrinsic Logic
By equating values and complexity here I suggest that a maths for one may also form a
maths for the other, so we can attempt to evolve such a synthesis. From a psychological
standpoint we must I think discard infinities, based upon the practical problems for
humans in using such concepts computationally (and also in the difficulty in getting
people to relate to such mathematical paradoxes). So what have we left ? The Hartman 3
value stages is a good start. Systemic values can be regarded as philosophical
abstractions, my third value complex. Extrinsic values could be regarded as socially
driven scientific measurements, my second value complex, whilst Intrinsic values could
be regarded as primal values - the survival of the 'organism-in-itself'. It is interesting to
note that this way of looking at the matter reverses the standard idea in intellectual circles
that 'logic' is at the top of the 'pyramid' of our faculties. We see instead that by
intellectualising we remove value, firstly by neglecting the whole for the part, then by
reifying the categories into an either/or logic which goes on to form the basis of our
system of social values embodied in a legalism of dualist 'right' and 'wrong'. We invalidly
reduce intrinsic values to the lower systemic type in many aspects of our daily lives, as
seen in our one-dimensional prejudices and our behaviours of conflict and competition.
Given that logic is so highly regarded academically, one way out of this conundrum
would be to adopt an intrinsic form of logic, in other words one that can accept extrinsic
and systemic logics as special cases. But can we find one ? Fuzzy Logic, which
previously many have been inclined to consider, copes well with extrinsic values, we can
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specify a half apple logically FL(0.5,0.5), but it seems to deal all too poorly with value
combinations, a half AND a half = a half (using Zadeh’s intersection operator), i.e. a
similar problem to that found with adding infinities. Moore makes the point that fuzzy
logics require time, unlike systemic logics propositions are not universally 'true', logical
values change over time (a fresh apple FL(1,0) → eaten apple FL(0,1) ). I'd add the idea
that intrinsic logic requires context, it is dependent upon all the other values present, thus
needs to be an interactional form of logic, a connectionist logic. In complex systems the
idea of 'uniqueness' relates to our current specific position on the 'fitness landscape', in
other words it is dependent upon our history. This can be said to comprise a number of
systemic dimensions (axes) and a number of displacements (vectors), but the 'now' is
defined by how these all interact - what I would here call intrinsic fitness. This network
approach has significant advantages, since the number of extrinsic paths possible through
the network (the set of possible value relations) grows exponentially with size and
connectivity - a true measure of such intrinsic value would therefore approach infinity
(especially in humans), as desired by intuitive axiological approaches to the value of a
human life.
A further complication however relates to the concept of synergy, the idea that the whole
is more than the sum of the parts (I look at this in more detail along with fitness in my
introduction “Fitness and Synergy” [Lucas2000a]) - and this is I think precisely what we
are really looking for here. It relates to the complex systems notion of emergence, the
creating of new global properties (values) by the combination of parts. Thus no matter
how many extrinsic items you add, you don't get the emergent next stage unless you go
beyond aggregation and create suitable connectivity - a value add step. This idea also
allows us to compare intrinsic sets, a more ‘developed' person will have more values
('higher' needs or more discriminative ones), avoiding the ant= human problem of
equating the value of all life forms. But the potential v actual issue is important here also,
we must take into account that experience and education can convert potential (as in a
baby) into actual (an enlightened adult) and this possibility must also affect valuations.
Making synergy more specific perhaps, we can imagine a 'precision' axis where we can
specify a value in terms of bits, from 1 bit (binary) to infinite bits (irrational number). We
can also imagine a 'depth' axis where we can specify the number of values in the system
(again from 1 bit to infinite). This gives us an integral plane, or map at a single level. But
such interacting entities generate new emergent levels, so we have a further 'height'
dimension corresponding to these extra layers (visualise, say, atoms, molecules, cells,
organisms, societies, ecosystems, planet). We would regard this 'height' as comprising a
further ‘holarchic’ dimension beyond the three Hartman ones (precision, depth, plane which correspond to extrinsic, systemic and intrinsic values, but all relating to a single
holon [Koestler]). The size (volume) of this 'box' perhaps corresponds to the overall value
of the hypersystem [Baas] we are considering. Like the other solutions offered by Forrest
and Moore however it has a snag, the general idea of network analysis (and specifically
emergence) has proved to be mathematically intractable using all the normal techniques most complexity problems are related to graph theory and mathematically tend to be NPcomplete, insoluble in polynomial time e.g.[Crescenzi & Kann].
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6. Beyond Aristotle
For over 2000 years we have used and taught almost exclusively the classical logic of
Aristotle (and its modern Boolean equivalent), in which all issues must be 100% true or
100% false and there is no other possibility. That this causes immense problems when
applied to humans has been known for many decades. [Korsybski] identified this with the
confusion of ‘map’ and ‘territory’, this means that we try to force a limited model onto an
unlimited reality. From the discussion in this paper on values, we can see that this relates
to forcing a 1 bit systemic value (one dimensional) onto a multi-bit extrinsic value (two
dimensional) to which it cannot relate, and even worst to forcing the same dualist
evaluations onto intrinsically valued humans (four dimensional), a 2 level ‘category’ or
‘type’ error - showing the need for a ‘higher-order logic’ of at least 3 levels, a
mathematical meta-model [Palmer]. Given our general pre-occupation with Aristotelian
logic, it is sobering to discover just how many non-standard logics already exist e.g.
[Suber], so there are a number of less familiar possibilities that might be explored to find
a suitable method for a logic of values. And what would we want from such a logic ? I'd
suggest the following at least (taking into account Moore’s criticisms of Hartman):
a) Evaluate to a higher total value the more values (dimensions) exist, i.e. complexity
matters
b) Value intrinsic systems more than extrinsic variables, and those more than
systemic distinctions
c) Discard ‘Law of Excluded Middle’ - which prevents us specifying fuzzy truths
(extrinsic values)
d) Provide adequate resolution to deal with real variables, the full variety
encountered in life
e) Include a method of treating the ‘many’ as of higher/lower value than the ‘one’
(aggregation)
f) Allow for synergy, i.e. A + B can generate an emergent higher value C, a valueadd step
g) Differentiate between possibility, probability and actuality, i.e. future choice &
past history
h) Be context specific, i.e. allow truth to depend on time, space and
interactions/connectivity
i) Differentiate positive-sum & negative-sum trajectories, i.e. dynamical fitness
effects
j) Give an intuitively adequate rank ordering for SI, IE and the rest of the
combinations
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k) Add a measure of 'fulfilment' or personal development, i.e. 3in3 v 3in5, actuality
v possibility
l) Allow for circular causality, the multiple interconnected paths of real systems
thinking
m) Allow for obligations, the idea that we should not degrade the values of others
(morality)
This list seems to go beyond most forms of logic and includes aspects of many types of
logic whose implications and technicalities are a specialist task to unravel (see the
Appendix for a look at how these relate to our teleologically based fitness viewpoint).
Only a few attempts have yet been made to try to combine fuzzy thinking and the more
teleologically oriented logics, e.g. [Gounder & Esterline], which brings us perhaps to a
novel type of paraconsistent logic (for a quick overview of these see: [Priest & Tanaka]).
The one I have been looking at especially is Neutrosophic Logic [Smarandache] which is
unique in that it has three axes of logical validity. One is 'truth', one 'falsity' and one
'indeterminacy'. Now of course the latter immediately suggests a role for quantum theory,
and also allows for those paradoxes and contradictions that troubled Frege, Russell and
Gödel. Additionally in this logic we need not have normalised values (i.e. 0 to 1) we can
have 1 AND 1 giving 3 (or anything else), thus synergy seems possible, i.e. the
generation of new niches, new opportunities or alternatives. This logic was intended to
bridge the gap between literature/arts and science, so is already in the same area as we are
considering here, and discusses multiple-value sentences and ways of distinguishing
between relative and absolute truths.
7. A Philosophy of Stress
Before I consider this as a logic, perhaps I'd better say something about Neutrosophy as a
philosophy. The creator, mathematician Florentin Smarandache, was something of an
anarchist, a Romanian fighting against the repressive communist regime of Ceausescu in
the 1980's. Living a 'double-life' (the 'spin' culture of deceit now familiar to us all) helped
him to recognise paradox as crucial, so he came up with a philosophy in which one could
prove anything - and also disprove it ! He applied it widely to highlight contradictions combinations of opposites in stress, and founded the literary movement known as
‘paradoxism’. Despite the nihilism suggested, this does have much in common with
spiritual ideas (the figure/ground or Yin/Yang) and with complexity science (where we
balance static conscious ‘rational' order and dynamic unconscious 'irrational' chaos), and
so realise that as Smarandache said, "constants aren't and variables won't" - the two
descriptions are contextual or transient [Lucas1997]). For humans, if we are too static
then we stagnate and die, if we are too dynamic then we disintegrate and die,
paradoxically we must be both somewhat ordered to survive and somewhat chaotic to
grow. To be human is thus to be indeterminate, to live a contradiction. In an insight from
Eastern philosophy, we are not ‘either’ order ‘or’ chaos, but ‘both’ and ‘neither’.
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We could regard these two axes (of chaos and of order) as those of 'generalisation'
(artistic scope) - where we encompass everything but make no distinctions (mystical
awareness or intrinsic value perhaps), and 'specialisation' (scientific content) - where we
make 'cuts' or valuations across infinite reality, this would relate in dynamical systems
terms to taking Poincaré sections (low dimensional projections from a higher dimensional
whole). Thus both width and depth can be included, but not at the same time again
echoing quantum complementarity and granularity [Smith & Brogaard] - we can see
either the whole (dynamic wave) or the part (static particle). We can view the move from
'indeterminacy' to 'true/false' as the making of distinctions, the creation of opposite pairs
or dualisms, i.e. systemic values (something akin to [Spencer-Brown]'s 'Laws of Form'),
but each such division must exclude all the others in either/or logic. Thus our very act of
classifying the world generates its own stresses, a problem not unknown even within
conventional science e.g. [Kuhn], where new paradigms or syntheses are occasionally
necessary to transcend the tensions of suppressed inconsistencies and contradictions.
8. Contextual Neutrosophic Logic
Neutrosophic logic itself allows <A>, <Not-A>, <Anti-A> and <Neut-A>. The first two
are standard Aristotelian, <Anti-A> is Hegelian (included in <Not-A>) whereas <NeutA> includes all the other possibilities, i.e. the set of distinctions ignored when looking at
opposites (e.g. if <A> is 'white', <Anti-A> is 'black', <Neut-A> includes blue, red, yellow
etc., <Not-A> is <Neut-A> + <Anti-A>). The values however are neither binary nor
fuzzy but are intervals, allowing vagueness (e.g. it could be 30-40% 'white', 10-20%
'black' and 40-60% 'unspecified'). Another idea included is that of Multispace, where a
set M of structure S1 is said to contain also many subsets with different structures S2..Sk
not included in S1 - a sort of fractal hierarchy similar both to the layers mentioned earlier
and to the structure at the ‘edge-of-chaos’.
One of the main tenets of this form of logic is that for any combination of the three
dimensions NL(T, I, F) a context or 'referential system' can be generated to make the
statements valid. Thus 'truth' can not be applied to all possible worlds, and whether any
statement is 'true' in our human world becomes an empirical matter and not an issue of
logical analysis. This idea allows us I think to effectively distinguish between intrinsic
and extrinsic/systemic value schemes, in that the set of worlds in which a value is 'true'
changes with complexity, i.e. context. Within any intrinsic system, any extrinsic value or
systemic distinction will fail 'truth' in many frames of reference, whilst the intrinsic value
of 'existence-in-itself' will still hold true. For example, the exact systemic statement ‘I see
the clock showing 12:00” would fail to be truth a minute later, the fuzzy extrinsic truth “I
see the time” may hold for many hours, while the intrinsic value “I see” should hold true
for all my life. Thus we naturally perhaps can justify higher truth values logically both for
intrinsic values v extrinsic and for extrinsic v systemic, if we include domain-specific
temporal and (state) spatial context.
In this logic a systemic distinction (a division of the world into system/environment or
figure/ground) has a value of one bit, no more, no less - either 'in' NL(1,z,0) or 'out'
NL(0,z,1), where z relates to all the undifferentiated content of the two halves. We can go
on to make more distinctions, more cuts through the whole. In the limit we obtain a
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binary set, corresponding to the number of distinctions made, infinite if we wish. An
extrinsic value however, a one dimensional measurement, has a variable number of bits
of precision - a vague value NL(x,z,y,) where x+y is the range and z includes the
measurement uncertainty. In a Fuzzy Logic reduction z disappears and x+y normalises to
1. Again we can make more measurements within our whole, we obtain then a set of
reals. From this perspective we see that systemic values are simply low resolution
extrinsic ones, crude value distinctions that discard the precision dimension. It may
perhaps be quite reasonable to equate, say, 8 systemic values with one extrinsic value of
8 bit resolution (within a linear viewpoint).
Now we take a further step, we group distinctions. We make associations between
variables, we create an algebraic matrix, a mesh or network of interactions - an intrinsic
system. Given that every systemic is a 1 bit extrinsic, this is a matrix of extrinsics in the
limit. Again we see a new perspective, in that extrinsics are just crude intrinsics, low
resolution views that discard most of the connectivity effects (the two topological
dimensions), i.e. how values interrelate to support or oppose each other (the ‘higherorder’ causal terms usually ignored in science). To evaluate this stage logically we
perhaps may usefully employ a fuzzy matrix logic [Yamauchi] but using neutrosophic
triples. However due to the nonlinear and nonadditive nature of such value interactions
we cannot adopt a simple global mathematics, applying standard matrix operators to the
array. Each intersection pair now may require an individual connective or ‘transition
function’, a local ‘law’ - reminiscent of a spreadsheet mode (because of the circular
causality inherent in complex systems this would then ‘hunt’ for a solution - that attractor
representing the output triple or intrinsic value). It is easy to envisage experimental
changes to this array in the search for fitter dynamical solutions. This contextual
perspective has much in common with the ‘constrained generating procedure’ form of
emergence pioneered by [Holland], which extends our treatment into more general areas
by implying that we must we formulate a logic that can generate further triples, i.e. be
creative.
Thus we add another stage, the matrix in systems terms (if sufficiently complex) gives
rise to emergent properties, a higher level of system, so we have a fourth value
dimension, the hyperset of systems, which I earlier called an 'holarchic' value level - a
nested heterarchy of intrinsics made up of systems or 'holons'. To take an example, in a
rainforest the 'systems' of the geologist, botanist, zoologist, artist and mystic will all see
(and value) different environmental 'systems'. These may be disjoint (if the experts are
too single-minded) or may overlap, some may be more complex than others, they may
differ in 'zoom' ratio (scope in space or time). This is the realm of combinatorics, where
everything can be permutated from the set of wholes, factorial combinations of intrinsic
modules at many levels. Evaluating this whole obviously causes immense practical
difficulties, but we can of course treat relevant subsets as necessary (if we can identify
them). Thus 'sustainability' in environmental terms would be such an holarchic valuation.
In these cases we need to move from a 2D (plane) logical matrix to a 3D one which
includes the various levels, a cubic matrix logic of neutrosophic triples seems required
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9. Dynamical Beliefs
Looking more at the dynamics, we can relate this to tensegrity, the system of balance
proposed for collections of interacting elements by [Buckminster Fuller] in Synergetics
(700.00). Here a tension between a continuous 'pull' to truth (an 'attractor' in complex
systems terms) and a discontinuous 'push' to falsity (a chaotic move or perturbation in
those terms) relates to a balance between convergence and divergence - our edge-ofchaos, or semi-stable state. The indeterminacy relates then to the uncertainty as to
whether a change will create or destroy value (or have no effect) - the 'butterfly effect'
familiar in chaos theory [Gleick] - this also can include stochastic effects and
measurement uncertainties. Trajectories can move in two directions therefore, which
Smarandache relates to 'underhuman' and 'superhuman' behaviours - what in my terms I'd
call 'dysergy' (negative-sum or sub-animal) and 'synergy' (positive-sum or full human),
both of course relating to Hartman's idea of transposition and composition. This relates
also to the idea of cancellation and reinforcement of waves in quantum and
electromagnetic theory, and we can thus also regard values as being potentially ‘in-phase’
or ‘out-of-phase’ with each other. In more general value terms we can say that the three
neutrosophic axes correspond to values that are 'good' (positive-effects and thus 'true'
beliefs), 'bad' (negative-effects and thus 'false' beliefs) and 'groundless' (unpredictable and
thus 'careless' beliefs) - each with respect to a particular situation.
The relation of beliefs to values is a subtle one. We each have a worldview in which we
believe certain actions to be advantageous to us whilst others are not, and we tend to reify
those theories that have in the past proved advantageous in meeting our needs as ‘true’,
whilst those that have failed as ‘false’. But we all have different experiences and
contexts, so there is always a tension between these two poles, what I see as ‘true’ you
may see as ‘false’. This relates to our often limited vision, and to correctly evaluate the
trajectories of an action based upon our beliefs we must take into account how our
worldview meshes with those of the other entities with whom we interact. Bringing
together our common beliefs in ‘truth’ generates what we call science, a consensus as to
which theories have been tested as being generally effective. Yet even here we make
errors, we do not take into account the full range of interactions involved, we reduce the
intrinsic whole to extrinsic slices - just as we do individually. It is for this reason that we
need to formalise a science of values, generating a logic of interactions that can identify
where our narrower beliefs (scientific or more general) fail to be true in terms of the
whole.
In such cases the values relate to the hypersystem. i.e. subsets of the whole system may
have the opposite form, e.g. for a system of 100 people (simplifying each here to just one
systemic value), what I believe is good for me NL(1,0,0) may be bad for you and for 8
others NL(0,0,1) and neutral for the remaining 90 NL(0,1,0). So, for the matrixed
hypersystem of interacting values, the overall result would evaluate as NL(0.01, 0.9,
0.09), assuming standard arithmetic connectives (summing over a simple diagonal matrix
of triples) and normalising. We see that in overall utilitarian terms the result is 8%
negative, thus taking everything into account my belief is proved intrinsically false even
if it was extrinsically true. We can also see the relative effects of this action, in that 90%
of our social group are unaffected, thus we are not inclined to escalate the issue out of all
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proportion - a major problem in logics based upon only two axes. Note however that this
simple example is unidirectional, it takes account only of the effects of my belief on the
group, it doesn’t include the effect of the beliefs of the other 99 members of the group on
me or on each other. Given better knowledge of what all our values are and how they all
interact, we can in principle derive a resultant fitness trajectory for the whole. This
applies equally if the whole is just me and the parts are 100 different personal values. For
more complex nonlinear connectives the same principle holds, although the mathematical
difficulties will of course increase considerably.
10. Towards a Value Formalism
It is not our intention here to outline a fully working model, simply to establish the
feasibility of so doing. In this section we largely follow [Krivov] (to whom the reader is
referred for more technical details) in his attempt to generate a logic based general
systems theory for multi-agent modelling. We adapt those ideas here to our neutrosophic
value focus. We take as our starting point the definition, analogous both with the classical
definition of a Model in predicate calculus and von Bertalanffy’s definition of a System,
of <Values, Connections>, in other words we have a set of values (function or process)
plus a set of interconnections or relations (structure). Our ‘agents’ originate internal states
or goals which must be taken into account, indeed this is our definition of needs - our
drives to meet a set of internal values. To include such a teleology we add to our Finite
Protocol Language modal operators and time, i.e. Operator(ValueComplex, Time, State)
where Operator can be such as needs, prefers, believes, acts etc. and State is the status of
the value complex (true/false for systemic, variable for extrinsic, set of included
extrinsics for intrinsic, set of intrinsics for holarchic). A Model of the system contains a
function stating how the structure and needs will evolve over time, i.e. M(t+1) = F(M(t)),
this we refer to as a ‘logic machine’ (a predicate automata) and it incorporates the
connectives or quantifiers that relate values to each other dynamically. The Relations thus
have the form Relation(Value1, Value2, Affect) where Affect is a connective that relates
the affect on Value1 of Value2, and the overall function is our matrix.
To clarify the real world systems that we are modelling, we have the following
progression for any ‘agent’:
Value → Need (for change in that value) → Preference (ranking of alternatives) →
Belief (fulfilment theory) → Action (environmental output) → Reaction (feedback) →
Update (belief and need changes).
All agents (and values) may of course act simultaneously, so our model is a
multiobjective constraint satisfaction problem. The ranking of preferences can cause its
own problems in the making of decisions [Ha], especially within interconnected
nonlinear systems where ‘ceteris paribus’ (all else being equal) rarely holds. This brings
in logical implication in that some values imply others to some extent (e.g. the ability to
‘philosophise’ implies meeting our primal needs), so a fuzzy implication operator is
required. The timescales for the evolution of the various components (values, beliefs,
preferences, needs, actions) vary, so it may be possible to model these separately if we
wish (given computational resource constraints). Additionally, important aspects of
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preferences and beliefs, as well as actions, are determined by social norms, which brings
in higher-level obligations and canalysation of state space (i.e. [Campbell]’s downward
causation based constraints on alternatives, e.g. laws), and also by environmental issues
(resource availability, costs). It is apparent that needs, preferences and beliefs can all be
fuzzy variables and that we can have considerable uncertainty as to their standing. This
aspect relates to the standard logical notion of “for all x” (∀x), where uncertainty is zero,
through “there exists” or “some x” (∃x) which has variable uncertainty, to complete
undecidability (which we may call Ix). Thus the neutrosophic axis I defines the
improbability that our T/F axes are correct, in other words the truth value of the
believability of our assertions is B(1-I), which relates to the approach taken in the kcalculus in qualitative decision theory [Ha].
Restricting ourselves just to values, there are in neutrosophic logic many (possibly
infinite) forms of definable connective which leaves the possibility of finding a
definitional set that matches what we wish to achieve with values. This is complicated to
do in formalised logical notation (especially given the open ended set of possible
systems, values and nonlinear interactions as here), but we can attempt to do so in more
general terms (it may be possible, more formally, to use genetic algorithms to search the
space of possible connectives to locate the optimum definitions, given an adequately
defined set of goals). I'm primarily interested here however in looking at intuitively
simple ways of combining multiple vectors, i.e. n-Tuples - extrinsic values of the form
Ei(T,I,F) for i in the set 1..k. If we are to get more from less, i.e. synergy (or conversely
less from more, i.e. dysergy) then we need it seems a multiplicative form of connective.
For a simplified 2-value case a form that appeals is R = S(A AND B) where R is the
resultant value and S is a synergy operator which can vary from zero to plus infinity (or
take more nonlinear forms). This allows for both cancellation (S = 0) and reinforcement
(S = +2), matching Moore's quantum wave theory, but also allows for other S values for
more generality. The AND is our normal logical connective, defined in whatever way we
choose for fuzzy truth values. This can easily be extended to cover the multivalued case,
and if necessary we can have separate synergy operators for each interacting value, e.g.
for 3 values: R = (SAA AND SBB AND SCC ) etc. If we assume normal additivity (e.g. 2
values are greater than 1) then we can generate a fuzzy truth table as follows (A and B
both assumed to be 1 here).
S
2

R
4

√2
1

2.818
2

1
1

/√ 2

/ ∑ Vi
0

1.414
1
0

Comment
Synergy, positive-sum, increase factor 2
(100%)
Partial augmentation, 90° in phase
Aggregation of values, zero-sum, standard
maths
Diminution, partially out of phase
Normalised disvaluation, classical logic
Dysergy, negative-sum, 180° phase
cancellation

132

Two problems immediately spring to mind, firstly how do we generalise this to
neutrosophic triples ? There may need to be interchanges between the T, F & I axes as we
vary S, since this seems to convert between T and F. Secondly, can we generalise further
to allow for the interaction of a number of input triples to result in the generation of a
number of new output triples - as needed for the emergence of new values and levels ?
Here we may possibly make use of [Stern]’s Matrix Logic, which uses two by two truth
table operators comprising the values true, false, both (synergy) and neither (dysergy)
spanning the logical levels of scalar, vector and matrix, and capable of generating
autopoietic emergent systems. By generalising these values to fuzzy values and adding
the indeterminacy axis we naturally seem to end up with a 3 x 3 neutrosophic matrix
logic operator.
It will be noted that our approach to logic isn’t static, we move through time - either
discretely or continuously, and to cover the increasing generality we need at least a 4thorder predicate calculus of triples. Our viewpoint throughout blurs the distinction
between logic and mathematics, and sees logic as simply a 1 bit version of mathematics,
whilst mathematics is an infinite bit version of logic. Whether the two can be successfully
merged dynamically with values, using neutrosophic logic, remains to be seen.
11. Conclusion
In this paper we have looked at bringing together three spheres of intellectual activity,
firstly the idea of values or axiology, secondly the field of complex systems science and
thirdly the area of non-Aristotelian logic. We have examined a number of connections
between these fields and can conclude that a new form of paraconsistent logic
(Neutrosophic Logic) may prove instrumental in welding together the needs of interactive
humans whilst getting to grips with contradictory values and unpredictable complexity.
There is much to be done in formalising in detail how this would work in practice, and in
taking into account the complications added by evolution and contextuality, within a
framework of circular causality and emergence. But the indications are promising that
this could be achieved, given sufficient time and expertise.
With the availability of inexpensive computers and the growth in the use of multi-agent
simulations we are now perhaps in a position where we can instigate an experimental
form of normative logic, looking to use agent evolution to develop and evaluate various
logical formalisms. In such systems the agents are generally taken to be autonomous (not
globally controlled), teleological (having internal goals), contextual (interacting with
other agents and their environment), heterogeneous (different from each other) and
autopoietic (self-perpetuating). Whilst much work is yet needed to put such approaches
on a firm footing, there are considerable commonalties between the stance taken in this
paper and recent work within these areas.
By using a predicate calculus approach common to recent work on formalising complex
systems, and both generalising this to a higher-order form suitable for treating multiple
levels and including neutrosophic triples as primitives, we obtain a methodology of
considerable scope, very suitable for use computationally and potentially applicable far
beyond the area of values which has been our main concern in this paper. We should not
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minimise the difficulties however, we subsume here in our generalisation many specialist
fields which all have their own share of difficulties and controversies. Nethertheless, the
need to better integrate disjoint mathematical technicalities with interconnected real life
applications is clear, and to this end normative concepts can form a bridge that links these
two worlds. One final observation is that given our susceptibility for error, in the
recognition of values, in understanding their interactions, in defining the scope of our
systems and in defining suitable connectives, then the adoption of a form of logic that
permits uncertainties and supports paradox seems highly appropriate.
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Appendix: Relating Logics to Teleological Fitness
In this appendix we look briefly at the various forms of logic that we think need to be
integrated if we are to create a valid logic of values. We relate the main idea of each of
these formalisms to our treatment of values in terms of teleological fitness. One of the
key differences we should emphasise is that we replace impersonal logical
generalisations by personalised contextual ones. Each statement is related to the
viewpoint of a living organism (not always human), which must reason out (not always
consciously) ways of meeting their needs within ongoing environmental situations. In
human terms this external context is largely social, and so we understand the effects of
our actions on our own needs and the fitness of our wider societies to be dependent upon
the validity of our socially derived beliefs (we make no distinction formally between
ethical or other type of value fitness). By bringing in the idea of personal agency we
highlight the tension between global rules and local ones. In a specific context it is often
the case that global rules are inapplicable (as they were designed for standardised
situations which do not always hold) and local ones are in conflict (different values are
mutually incompatible when taken together) so we may need to restrict the scope of our
logical rules by imposing appropriate boundary conditions.
Natural Deduction: The definition of a logic without a rigid set of axioms. Our system
has no axioms for generality (allowing us to use fuzzy truth values), all connectives are
defined as local inference rules applied to arbitrary premises (scientific hypotheses). This
open (sympoietic) contextual system contrasts with the closed (autopoietic) global
systems of most formal treatments, and discards completeness for applicability.
Classical Logic: Truth value is derived from valid syntactic forms of argument. The
premises are considered to be fixed truth values, and only Aristotelian truth values (1, 0)
are permitted. We generalise this initially to allow fuzzy truth values for intersection
(AND), union (OR) and the other connectives, and later add semantic considerations
relating to wider values.
Alethic Modal Logic: Qualifies truth by adding possibility, actuality and necessity. The
first we regard as encouraging creative alternatives, new paths through state space; the
second denotes our current position in state space. The third implies that a value cannot
exist or an act take place unless a condition is met (a critical path analogy).
Deontic Logic: Adds obligation, permission and forbidden operators. We regard the first
as an historical social norm intended to avoid fitness reduction (which may be
empirically invalid), the second as an allowable alternative (within the social structure)
and the last as a denial of a freedom to pursue an alternative (due to implied socially
unacceptable disvaluations). Each relation is contextual within a cultural worldview.
Epistemic Logic: Adds knowledge and beliefs. We adopt a coherentist approach to
beliefs, based on the circular logic of complex systems, in which all beliefs support each
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other in a consistent worldview (but one grounded by empirical trial and error, so this is
neither absolute nor relative). We can have three types of belief, ‘true’ - that the
proposition will have positive fitness effects if acted upon, ‘false’ in that it will have
negative effects if acted upon and ‘indeterminate’ where we don’t know what result will
pertain.
Temporal Logic: Adds future and past operators, which relates to values changing over
time (e.g. with metabolism, experience and education) and validity being dependent upon
the timescales involved. In our treatment time is regarded as a sequence of discrete steps.
Dynamic Doxastic Logic: Adds propositions and actions that implement changes in
beliefs. We thus allow for both changes in base values and changes in the effectiveness of
our beliefs in satisfying needs.
Proairetic Logic: Adds preferences, which we relate to rankings of values, and the
rankings of alternatives in the achieving of them, plus the changes in ranking over time
with actions. This logic includes utility measures, which we generalise to matrixed global
fitnesses, incorporating nonlinear interactions of preferences.
Quantum Logic: Adds indeterminacy and probability, discarding the law of excluded
middle. Measurement here relates to making a decision between alternatives, the act of
choice transferring information (knowledge) from possibility to actuality - a trajectory
through state space opening up a new set of resultant possibilities.
Nonmonotonic Logic: Allows new rules to restrict the validity of the existing system,
permitting evolution of truth contexts. This allows us to reduce or increase the scope of
our values and beliefs, depending upon new circumstances, and adds falsification of
existing rules.
Fuzzy Logic: Adds partial fulfilment of truths, an infinite valued form of logic. We allow
partial fulfilment of our values (e.g. what we called 3in5) and partial beliefs about them,
i.e. partial set membership or completeness.
Mereology: Focuses on the relationship between parts and wholes (usually on a
reductionist assumption that the whole equals the sum of the parts). Relates in our
treatment to the difference between intrinsic systems and their component extrinsic and
systemic values.
Non-Adjunctive Logic: Adds non-additivity, i.e. A AND B ≠ A & B. Here this allows
contradictions of joined value systems and the possibility of dysergy and synergy (i.e.
emergence - the whole not being equal to the sum of the parts).
Higher-Order Logic: Add propositions that act upon sets of predicates rather than
atomic facts. Here it relates to intrinsic systems being defined as sets of extrinsic values,
and to higher levels of value logic incorporating sets of intrinsics. Thus the 4 orders of
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logic necessary as a minimum are systemic, extrinsic, intrinsic and holarchic (although
these are not regarded as disjoint but are overlapping frameworks).
Neutrosophic Logic: Adds independent true and false axes plus an indeterminacy one.
We can have values and beliefs that have both true and false aspects (e.g. good and bad
interactions with other sets of values), plus uncertainties as to their effects.
It can be seen that each of these logics expresses only a subset of life’s possibilities, so it
is not surprising that when applied to real human situations that problems occur and
important value data is excluded. It is one purpose of our logic of values to highlight such
problems, and to formulate a set of connectives for each context that minimises such
reductions.
Note that since any analogue value can be expressed as a string of binary digits, it is in
principle possible to generate a logic of values using standard Boolean logic. However
the added complications of doing this, together with the already difficult nature of the
task, suggest instead approaches that adopt more natural human ways of expressing
comparative variability and reasoning. Additionally the advantages of having an axis of
indeterminacy, with neutrosophic logic, allows us to keep in mind the partial nature
(contextual incompleteness) of all logics, and the vast difference between infinite
possibility space and finite actuality space.
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Abstract
Any system based on axioms is incomplete because the axioms cannot be
proven from the system, just believed. But one system can be less-incomplete than
other. Neutrosophy is less-incomplete than many other systems because it contains
them. But this does not mean that it is finished, and it can always be improved. The
comments presented here are an attempt to make Neutrosophy even lessincomplete. I argue that less-incomplete ideas are more useful, since we cannot
perceive truth or falsity or indeterminacy independently of a context, and are
therefore relative. Absolute being and relative being are defined. Also the “silly
theorem problem” is posed, and its partial solution described. The issues arising
from the incompleteness of our contexts are presented. We also note the relativity
and dependance of logic to a context. We propose “metacontextuality” as a
paradigm for containing as many contexts as we can, in order to be less-incomplete
and discuss some possible consequences.

1. Introduction
Upset because none of the logics I knew were able to handle contradictions and
paradoxes, I created my own, which was able to do so (Gershenson 1998; 1999). Later I would
find out that my Multidimensional Logic (MDL) fitted in the category of paraconsistent logics
(Priest and Tanaka, 1996). Basically, I rejected the axiom of no contradiction, and instead of
having truth values of propositions, I defined truth vectors, where each element was
independent of the other. In this way, we can have a vector representing something that is true
and false at the same time, or nor true nor false at the same time. MDL gave interesting
results, and the new perspective influenced me to propose ideas in different branches of
Philosophy, Complexity, and Computer Science (e.g. Gershenson, 1999; 2002).
In the autumn of 2001, I became aware of Neutrosophy (Smarandache, 1995). The fact
that it reached similar results than the ones I had makes me think that there is a lower
probability that we are completely mistaken. Neutrosophy covers a much wider area than my
ideas, but nevertheless I believe it could be enriched by them, since there are non-overlapping
parts. In this work I will expose how some of these ideas might help in making Neutrosophy
less-incomplete.
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The contents of this paper were mainly sparse comments made to Florentin
Smarandache, and while giving them the shape of an article, the continuity of ideas was not an
entire success. My apologies to the sensible reader.

2. To be and not to be...
When people speak about the being, since it is one of the most general things you can
speak about, they often seem to speak about different things. I define two types of being:
absolute and relative. The absolute being (a-being) is independent of the observer, infinite.
The relative being (re-being) is dependant of the observer, therefore finite, and different in
each individual. The re-being can approach as much as we want to towards the a-being, but it
can never comprehend it. Objects a-are. Concepts, representations, and ideas re-are (Objects
do not depend on the representations we have of them).
We can only suppose about what things a-are, we cannot be absolutely sure, we can only
speculate, because they a-are infinite and we are not. We cannot say that something is
absolutely true or false. We can only assert things in a relative way. We could assign truth
values or vectors to them, but these would be relative to our context.
The being would be the conjunction of re-being and a-being. This is, without the
distinction we are drawing between them. But isn’t it confusing to speak about something
which is absolute and relative at the same time? Yes, precisely. But that is what we do every
day.
We can say that every effect a-has cause(s), but it does not mean that we can perceive
them, so some effects do not re-have causes.

3. Reason, beliefs, and experience
Reason cannot prove itself. It would be as if a theorem would like to prove the axioms
it is based upon. Reason, as all systems based in axioms, is incomplete (in the sense of Gödel
(1931) and Turing (1936)). Beliefs are the axioms of reason and thought. Reason cannot prove
the beliefs it is based upon. But how do these beliefs arise, then? Through experience. But
experience needs of previous beliefs and reason to be assimilated, and reason also needs of
experience to be formed, as beliefs need of reason as well. Beliefs, reason, and experience, are
based upon each other. Which came first? All of them. We cannot have one without the others.
Contexts are dynamic, and formed upon beliefs, reason, and experience. It is there where the
re-being lies. Since the re-being is dependant of our context, it is also dependant of our beliefs,
reasonings, and experiences. Contexts are dynamic because they are changed constantly as we
have new experiences, change our beliefs, and our ways of reasoning.
For example, we cannot say if capitalism a-is good or bad (independent of a context).
It re-is good for the people who get a profit from it, re-is neutral for the people who think that
are not affected by it, and bad for people which suffer from it. There re-is a god for people who
believe so, and there re-is not for people who do not believe so, but we cannot say if there a-is
a god. We can speculate as much as we want to about everything which a-is, but we will never
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contain it, therefore we can only have an idea of it. It is not only that “we know without
knowing” (Smarandache, 1995), but less-incompletely: we re-know, but a-know not.
Anything we want to assert has an implicit context, for which what we want to assert is
consistent. But every idea is valid in the context it was created. Ideas cannot a-be right or wrong.
They re-are right or wrong according to a context. And since in order to be created they need
to be consistent with their context, they re-are always right according to their context. Then
which idea is more valuable? We should try to see which context is more valuable. Well, we
cannot say which a-is more valuable, we can only see that if a context contains others, the ideas
created in it will be valid also in the other contexts, and not necessarily vice versa. We do not
know which one a-is better, but the context which contains the others will be less-incomplete.
A problem arises on the horizon...

4. The silly theorem problem
For any silly theorem Ts, we can find at least one set of axioms such that Ts is consistent
with the system defined by the axioms. How do we know a theorem is not silly? Or how do we
know if the axioms are not silly?
We can extend this same problem to contexts: there can re-be any silly idea Is so that
there is at least one context for which it is consistent1. Empiricism comes to the rescue. Well,
not only experience, but evolution more or less helps us get out of the problem. This is,
contexts which support silly ideas, even when they re-are not silly in their own context, will not
be able to contend with the contexts which are able to describe more closely (less-incompletely)
what things a-are. The evolution of contexts consists in making them less-incomplete. In formal
systems a similar evolutionary (tending to pragmatic) criterium could be seen: the axioms
which support silly theorems are not useful, and that is why we then call them silly. If the
axioms and the theorems derived from them are useful in a context, we do not consider them
silly. But this is not a complete solution for the silly theorem problem. There is no complete
solution for the silly theorem problem (Or by saying this that is the solution?).
But silly ideas (for our context) are useful as well, because our ideas become stronger
when they neutralize them, and become less-incomplete if they contain them. There would not
be smart ideas without silly ones.
We can take advantage of the silly theorem problem, in order to define axioms after the
theorems, or contexts after ideas. For example, we might want such sets that A contains B, and
B contains A, but without A and B being equal. We would just need to define the proper
axioms. If this new set theory will be useful or silly is no reason for stopping, because we will
not know if it a-is silly or not, and we will know if it re-is silly only after we create it.

1

Bu t the silliness is also relative to the context of the one who judge s the idea...
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5. Incomplete Language
Not only silliness, but all adjectives can only be <used|applied> in a relative way,
dependant of a context. Language is relative as well. How can we speak about absolute being,
then? We can and we cannot. We speak about it, but in that moment it a-is relative. For us,
it is and it is not-incomplete. But that we cannot completely speak about it, it is not a reason
to stop speaking about it (as Wittgenstein (1918) would early suggest in his Tractatus Logicus
Philosophicus), because we can incompletely represent its completeness... As Wittgenstein
himself (but not most of his followers...) realized, following the ideas in the Tractatus, we
would not be able to speak about anything... (languages are incomplete). Language is used
inside a context. Depending of this context the language will be different.

6. Incompleteness
If we cannot create complete systems, we should try to make them as less-incomplete
as possible. Since our systems are incomplete because they are finite, there is no way of
measuring the completeness of a system. It is like asking: how infinite is x, when x is a finite
number? We could also have a huge system, but if it is not related to the a-being of something,
it is not so useful as a small system which describes closely a part of what something a-is. So,
we could say that a system re-is less-incomplete as it approaches more the a-being.
But, for example, what is the a-being of the number four? We define numbers, so we
determine what they are. But this definition arises on our generalizations of what things a-are.
There a-is no number four, but we could say that there the number four a-is in things.
The a-being is far from materialism. Materialism re-is, and we cannot say for sure if
things a-are only materialistic or not, because we do not know what matter a-is.
So, getting back to the incompleteness of systems, they can approach the a-being as
much as we want to, but we <do not|will never> know what the a-being a-is. We could
measure the incompleteness of a system in a relative way, but I am not interested in defining
such a method. But we can see that a system will be less-incomplete if it contains others, even
the ones that (re-)“are wrong”. This is because a system which tries not only to explain why
things a-are, but also why other people thought it was something else will have a wider
perspective. Because people a-are not mistaken (nor right). There cannot be errors inside their
context (people do not create systems silly/mistaken for themselves). So, by containing as many
contexts as possible, we are also containing as many systems as possible. The great attempts
in science of unifying theories could be seen with these eyes. But for containing as many
contexts as we can, we are required to leave all hope of non contradiction behind, but I prefer
to do it for the sake of less-incompleteness. The non contradiction in systems is just a
prejudice. The systems are incomplete, so the contradictions are caused by their own limits.
Extending the system allows us to contain the paradoxes, and once we
<understand|comprehend> paradoxes, they stop being contradictory.
Perhaps the first reason for entering happily the realm of paradoxes and contradictions
is because we know that our systems are incomplete. This means that, even when they might
be valid for our present context, as our context enlarges, our systems sooner or later will not
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be able to be consistent with all our context, as it has happened all through history. And also
because we are aware that people who do not share crucial parts of our context, they will not
agree with our systems. We are predicting the failure of our systems outside our context (as
1+1=2 in a decimal context, but 1+1=10 in a binary context) by perceiving its limits. This
means that we are predicting that someone will say: “Your system is wrong” (related to his
incompatible context). But by saying this, he proves that we were right. But people inside our
context will say: “You (re)are right”, which as our context evolves will prove to be “wrong” (or
less-incompletely speaking, “less-incomplete”). This is a paradox. But this paradox makes us
less-incomplete, because we are containing the contexts of the people who say “You are
wrong”. Our theory will re-be true and false at the same time (related to different contexts),
but it will always re-be true and false at the same time, as compared with theories which now
claim to “be” true, without admitting that outside their context they might re-be false.
We should not only seek for the truth or falsity or indeterminacy of an idea, because
these are relative (absolute truth (and falsity) is unreachable (but we can approximate as much
as we want to)) but for its less-incompleteness. This less-incompleteness is also relative, based
on our beliefs (one could argue that a small context could be more close to the a-being than
another one which contains it, but this cannot be discussed, just believed).
A less-incomplete theory should contain theories which are not wrong, but incomplete
in our context (i.e. myths, religions, dogmas, etc...). To be against something is useful, but it is
more useful to contain both (<A> and <Anti-A>'s). For example, a less-incomplete political
theory should contain socialism and capitalism, despotism and anarchism, dictatorship and
democracy, fascism and republic, communism and terrorism... At least, understanding why
each one exists and because of what, and for what each one is more suitable; take the things
WE need from them, reject the rest, add a bit of sugar, mix it for five minutes (or until the
foam is assimilated), and you have another utopia! If you know the rules of the game, you can
change them...
6.1. Neutrosophy and Incompleteness
Neutrosophy, as other systems, embraces the spirit just described: attempting to contain
as most contexts as possible, even when they are contradictory, for attempting to be as lessincomplete as possible. But of course Neutrosophy itself predicts its own decay. It is not the
non plus ultra. It is not finished2. But <we cannot|there is no need to> go further now because
it fills successfully our contexts.
For example, we could add more values (concepts) to a (Neutrosophic) vector than
True, Indeterminate, and False. We just need to define them... (e.g. {T, I, F, T^I, T^F, I^F,
T^I^F, ~[T|I|F]}) How useful it is this? Someone might ask the same about T, I and F.
Why not only T & F, or only F. It depends on the context we are, on the things we need. Logics
are just a tool. It depends on what we want to do that we need to make a different tool (of
course, there is no “ultimate” tool). Since Neutrosophy is also based in axioms, it is also
incomplete.

2

Is there such a thing as a “finished idea”???
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<A> is finite, but <Neut-A> is infinite. Therefore, the ideas will evolve infinitely.
There are infinite <Anti-A>'s, each one related to a different context (Reference System in
Smarandache (1995)). The values/ranges of truth, indeterminacy and falsity (T. I. F.), and are
dynamic, relative to a context, and there are infinite contexts, so about any event, there are
infinite number of Neutrosophic values/ranges, and any context a-is also infinite (it cannot be
completely described, as well as the event) Which one is the more representative? The answer
to this question is also related to a context! All the “answers” are related to a context, closed,
finite... the interesting thing is that all questions seem to be open and infinite... so they can be
answered in an infinitude of different (incomplete) ways.
If <A> is combined with <Anti-A>'s, let's suppose it evolves into <Neut-A>. But this
is infinite, so it would not be completely <Neut-A>, but as noted by Smarandache (1995),
<Neo-A>. Each step/cycle the idea is less-incomplete, but there will always be an infinitude
of <Anti-A>'s, and an unreachable <Neut-A>... From a smaller context, <Neo-A> would
look just as the old <A>?

7.Contextuality
Things re-are in dependence of their context. Since there is an infinitude of contexts,
things can re-be in an infinitude of ways. It is only inside a specific context, which we can speak
about the truth or falsity or indeterminacy of a proposition.
7.1. Context-dependant logic
Every proposition P can only have a truth value (or vectors) in dependence of a context
C. This truth value/vector is relative to the context C. Propositions have only sense (in the sense
of Frege (1892)) inside a context(s). Propositions have no sense without a context.
The truth values/vectors of a given proposition can change with context. So, for example
“This proposition is false” has a value of 0.5 in Lukaciewicz logic, [1,1] in multidimensional
logic, (1,1,1) in Neutrosophic Logic, and “?!” in Aristotelean logic. Or, the proposition “The
king of France wears a wig” would be, in terms of multidimensional logic, nor true nor false
([0,0]) in the XXth century context, but true ([1,0]) in the context of the 1st of January of 1700.
We are just indicating the limits of logics. Logics are just tools. They are useful only
inside a context. The context determines the logic. If a proposition goes beyond the context,
the logic developed in the context will not be able to contain it (but not necessarily vice versa).
7.2. Derivations of contextuality
Since all <Anti-A>'s of <A> are related to a reference point, we can find all reference
points so that all the elements of <Neut-A> are contradictory with <A> (and later with
themselves...). This is, any element of <Neut-A> can be potentially <Anti-A>, you just need
to have a reference point.
There will always a-be injustice, because this one is relative. Since different people have
different contexts (or we can use the word Seelenzustand (soul state), to refer to the personal
context, to distinguish from a general context)... So, since people have different
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Seelenzustandes, we cannot speak of absolute justice, so things will be just for the people with
power... The less-catastrophic panorama (and most naive...) would be that the people in the
power would have the less-incomplete Seelenzustandes, trying to contain and understand as
many Seelenzustandes as they can, so, if they are just, in spite their relativity, they will be just
as well for all the people whose Seelenzustandes they contain.
If ideas are different in each Seelenzustand... well, they might have many similarities,
but on the other hand there is the problem of language representing ideas.... one can quote the
words of another in another context to communicate different ideas... but the “problem” of
language is a different story... (“In Philosophy there are no problems, just opinions (like this
one)”)
All adjectives are relative. Thus, we can find “opposite” (related to a reference point)
adjectives for the same object from different perspectives. (What is wrong from one
perspective is right from another, what is beauty-ugliness, good-bad, complex-simple,
complicated-simple, complicated-non-complicated, etc...). Are there adjectives which do not
behave this way?

8. Metacontextuality
Following the ideas exposed above, we can argue that, in order to be less-incomplete,
we need to strive for a metacontextuality, containing as many contexts as possible. We believe
this is the only way we have to approach to the a-being more than we already have, but of
course there might be other ways, and the proposed way will not be definite.
This does not mean that we will agree with “silly” ideas. This means that instead of just
declaring them silly and forgetting about them, we will try to understand what led people to
have such ideas, in order to try to see which perspective of the a-being they had. Then our
perspective will be greater than if we would just ignore the ideas we do not agree with.
We are tied to a context, a relative one. This is because there re-are no basic elements
from where we can build the rest of our world. There are only more complexity and
indeterminism in the entrails of the subatomic particles and quarks. There a-is no essence in
the universe, because everything is related. Everything a-is for and because of everything.
Everything is based on everything. It is naive to try to justify the world once we are already on
it. Everything is a condition of everything. Otherwise, it would not be AS IT IS.
Therefore everything can re-be seen in terms of everything (just as a Turing Machine
(Turing, 1936) can represent all computations (and computations can represent Turing
Machines)). There a-is no base. Everything can re-be a base.
Metacontextuality, as the one Neutrosophy and other currents strive for, by
consequence predicts tolerance. This is, if we try to contain as much contexts as possible, we will
be able to be less intolerant to contexts and Seelenzustandes that are neglected from absolutist
non contradictory points of view. And this tolerance should be able to prevent many conflicts.
But may metacontextuality lead to indifference? This is, since everything can re-be
depending on a specific context, does it matter which context we choose? I believe that this
might be avoided if we put reason on its place, leaving place for experience and beliefs. Anyway
this issue should not be disregarded.
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9. Conclusions
I believe that the question “Do you believe in an absolute reality/truth?” is on the same
level as “Do you believe in God?”. This is, the question is completely metaphysical... And
relative truths are incomplete. Should we keep searching for truth of things? I believe now it
would be more useful to search for the less-incompleteness of things. This can be achieved by
enlarging our contexts, containing as many contexts as we can.
Our limits are the ones we set to ourselves. We need only to take the blindfolding of our
prejudices in order to attempt a metacontextuality. And Neutrosophy bravely does this. If the
ideas exposed here, and the ones of Neutrosophy, are not assimilated by our society, this will
be because the society does not need them. This is, it “functions” based precisely on the partial
blindness of the individuals. Then, should we try to help everyone to open their eyes? We
already are doing so, they will open their eyes only if they want to.
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The Neutrosophy is a new branch of philosophy, introduced by Florentin Smarandache in
1980, which studies the origin, nature and scope of neutralities, as well as their interactions with
different ideational spectra. Neutrosophy considers a proposition, theory, event, concept, or entity,
<A> in relation to its opposite, <Anti-A>, and that which is not <A>, <Non-A>, and that which is
neither <A> nor <Anti—A>, denoted by <Neut—A>. Neutrosophy serves as the basis for the
Neutrosophic Logic (NL) or Smarandache’s logic, which is a general framework for the unification of
all existing logics. The main idea of NL is to characterize each logical statement in a 3D
Neutrosophic Space, where each dimension of the space represents respectively the truth (T), the
falsehood (F), and the indeterminacy (I) of the statement under consideration, where T, I, and F are
standard or non-standard real subsets of ]-0, 1+[. Moreover, in NL each statement is allowed to be
over or under true, over or under false, and over or under indeterminate by using hyper real
numbers developed in the non-standard analysis theory. The neutrosophical value N(A) = (T(A),
A

A

A

I(A), F(A)) in a frame of discernment (world of discourse) 1 of a statement <A> is then defined as a
subset (a volume, not necessary connective; i.e. a set of disjoint volumes) of the neutrosophic space.
Any statement <A>, represented by a triplet N(A), is called a neutrosophic event or N-event. […]
A

)

This Smarandache’s representation is close to the human reasoning. It characterizes and catches the
imprecision of knowledge or linguistic inexactitude received by various observers, uncertainty due to
incomplete knowledge of acquisition errors or stochasticity, and vagueness due to lack of clear
contours or limits. This approach allows theoretically to consider any kinds of logical statements.
For example, the fuzzy set logic or the classical modal logic (which works with statements verifying
T(A), I(A)/
/0, F(A)= 1-T(A), where T is a real number belonging to [0, 1]) are included in NL. The
neutrosophic logic can easily handle also paradoxes. We emphasize the fact that in general the
neutrosohic value N(A) of a proposition <A> can also depend on dynamical parameters which can
)

evolve with time, space, etc.

[…] the foundations for a new theory of paradoxical and plausible reasoning [i.e. DezertSmarandache Theory, ref. n.] has been developed, that takes into account in the combination process
itself the possibility for uncertain and paradoxical information. The basis for the development of this
theory is to work with the hyper-power set of the frame of discernment relative to the problem under
consideration rather than its classical power set since, in general, the frame of discernment cannot be
fully described in terms of an exhaustive and exclusive list of disjoint elementary hypotheses. In such
general case, no refinement is possible to apply directly the Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) of
evidence. In our new theory [i.e. DSmT, ref. n.], the rule of combination is justified from the
maximum entropy principle and there is no mathematical impossibility to combine sources of
evidence even if they appear at first glance in contradiction (in the Shafer’s sense) since the paradox
between sources is fully taken into account in our formalism. We have also shown that in general,
the combination of evidence yields unavoidable paradoxes.
This theory has shown, through many illustrated examples, that conclusion drawn from it provides
results which agree perfectly with the human reasoning and is useful to take a decision on complex
problems where DST usually fails. […] this work has been devoted to the development of a
theoretical bridge between the neutrosophic logic and this new theory, in order to solve the delicate
problem of the combination of neutrosophic evidences. The neutrosophic logic serves here as the
most general framework (prerequisite) for dealing with uncertain and paradoxical sources of
information through this new theory.
Dr. Jean Dezert
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